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1. Batavia and its environs 
 
A major phenomenon in the development of Early Modern history was the emergence of port 
cities in the wake of expanding global trade. Despite their often relatively small size and 
proportionately moderate population numbers, towns were the motors of economic change in 
the seventeenth century. They played an important role as emporia for the buying and selling 
of commercial and agricultural products. Yet it is often forgotten that people who lived in 
towns depended on their hinterland. Cities1 did not produce the food and raw materials they 
needed themselves. These had to be purchased from the rural producers. In exchange for 
these means of subsistence, cities offered the manufactured products, services, or trade goods, 
which rural dwellers could not make or acquire themselves. Although on the face of it a simple 
exchange mechanism was at work, the relationship between cities and their hinterlands was a 
force to be reckoned with in socio-economic change. 
 This study is an attempt to reconstruct some of the factors which propelled the socio-
economic development in the environs of Batavia, the area which was called the Ommelanden 
(the surrounding area) throughout the era of the Dutch East India Company (or VOC). Owing 
to its geographical position, as its name implies, the Ommelanden area was indeed the 
hinterland of Batavia. Situated in the area between the mountains and the port city by the sea, 
this region was a never failing source of food crops, building materials, and human resources.  
  Most historiography about Batavia tends to depict the Ommelanden as the location of the 
sugar industry and of the private country estates of Europeans. The majority of population in 
this region, the thousands of Indonesians who came here from elsewhere in the Archipelago, 
are usually only mentioned in passing. The people who lived in the environs of the city are 
                                                 
1 The term ‗city‘ needs some preliminary clarification. According to Peter Burke, who was commenting on the 
standards of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a major urban centre was one with a population of around 
100,000 people. In 1500 there were probably only four cities of this size in Europe: Paris, Venice, Naples, and 
Istambul. See Peter Burke, Antwerp, a metropolis in comparative perspective (Gent: Martial and Snoeck, 1993), p. 8. 
However, in the case of Southeast Asia, the population of Batavia inside and outside city walls in 1730 was 
104,093 people. See Hans Gooszen, Population Census in VOC-Batavia 1673-1792 (Leiden: Intercontinenta no. 25, 
2003), p. 29 and 40. 
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often dismissed with a few words saying that they resided in separate settlements, were 
devoted to their own customs, and lived under the authority of their own headmen. The 
history of the Ommelanden is generally discussed simply as part of the history of Batavia 
proper.2 The Ommelanden as an object of study in themselves have only recently begun to 
attract scholarly attention. Therefore understandably one historian of Batavia has remarked 
that ‗our knowledge of the Ommelanden is deficient and fraught with clichés‘.3  
 The specific focus of this study will concentrate on the opening up and the early 
development of the Ommelanden. My endeavour is to explain the main factors which 
generated the growing number of socio-economic activities in this region. I shall try to provide 
an explanation of why the region around Batavia only really began to develop in the last 
quarter of the seventeenth century. In that period, the socio-economic expansion of Batavia to 
the Ommelanden changed this region considerably in terms of landscape and demography. A 
new kind of society and mode of production were created within the colonial context.  
 Superficially, Ommelanden society greatly resembled rural communities living in the 
environs of Banten, Semarang, and Surabaya and other port towns in Java. Nevertheless, close 
scrutiny of this region leads to the conclusion that this was a society in which slave labour 
played a major role in rural economic activities and in which peasants had to come to terms 
with new types of agricultural production. In this respect it might rightfully be claimed that the 
society of Batavia and the Ommelanden was one of the first colonial societies created by the 
Dutch on Asian soil.  
 Another aim of this study is to demonstrate how the Ommelanden population was created. 
This attempt will inevitably stray from or even collide with the romantic tales which still exist 
about the origins of the orang Betawi (the native population of Batavia and later Jakarta), but it 
in no way detracts from the interesting origins of these people. The history of the Betawi 
people is inextricably tied to the history of Batavia during the colonial period. They constitute 
the last ‗discrete‘ ethnicity formed among the various indigenous ethnicities in Indonesia. In 
most of works about the history of Jakarta society, the emergence of the orang Betawi only 
                                                 
2 The Ommelanden as an object of study is discussed in a stimulating way in Remco Raben, ―Round about 
Batavia: Ethnicity and authority in the Ommelanden, 1650-1800‖, in Kees Grijns and Peter J.M. Nas (eds.), 
Jakarta-Batavia: socio cultural essays (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000), and in H.E. Niemeijer, ―Slavery, Ethnicity and the 
Economic Independence of Women in Seventeenth-Century Batavia‖, in Barbara Watson Andaya (ed.), Other 
Pasts. Women, Gender, and History in Early Modern Southeast Asia (Hawai‘i: University of Hawai‘i at Mânoa, 2000). 
3 Raben, ―Round about Batavia‖, p. 93. 
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merits a passing mention. All that is said is that the Betawi people were basically a mixture of 
the many ethnicities which lived in Batavia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.4  
 Until the 1980s, no orang Betawi raised any objection to this theory of how their group was 
formed. The reaction first appeared during 1990s.5  The main objection raised against the 
dominant theory was that it postulates that one of the elements which formed Betawi people 
consisted of slaves. One prominent Betawi author, who has recently written several books 
about the history of his people, argues that orang Betawi were already living in the Jakarta region 
long before Batavia was founded in 1619.6 Unfortunately, his argumentation is based mainly 
on secondary sources and is not supported by primary sources. 
 Society in Batavia and the Ommelanden was always multi-ethnic. Out of this polyglot 
population appeared a distinctive community identifying itself as orang Betawi. They were 
Muslim and speakers of Malay who adopted and incorporated words from the Chinese and 
Balinese languages.7 In this study, I argue that Betawi people are an amalgamation of free and 
manumitted Indonesians and non-Indonesians who settled in the Ommelanden in the second 
half of the seventeenth century. As a people they were shaped by colonial rule in a colonial 
economy. In fact, it is possible to say that these people who became the progenitors of 
present-day orang Betawi were colonists themselves. 
 
2. The spatial and temporal scope  
 
 The study of the hinterland of an early-modern city is best analysed within the confines of a 
limited geographical area, that is to say: the area in which the socio-economic expansion of the 
city was most highly concentrated. As region under the direct control of Batavia, the 
Ommelanden was a rural area in which the urban impact of Batavia was clearly visible. 
                                                 
4 There are several works which examine the origin of orang Betawi such as Pauline D. Milone, Queen City of the 
East: The Metamorphosis of a Colonial Capital (Unpublished PhD dissertation: University of California, Berkeley, 
1966); Lance Castle, ―The Ethnic Profile of Djakarta‖, in Indonesia, Vol. 3, April 1967, pp. 153-204; Jean Gelman 
Taylor, The Social World of Batavia. European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia (Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1983); and Remco Raben, Batavia and Colombo, The Ethnic and Spatial Order of Two Colonial Cities, 1600-1800 
(Unpublished PhD dissertation: Leiden University, 1996).  
5 Yasmine Z. Shahab, The Creation of Ethnic Tradition: the Betawi of Jakarta (Unpublished PhD dissertation: Scool of 
Oriental and African Studies, London, 1994), p. 82. 
6 See Ridwan Saidi, Profil Orang Betawi: asal muasal, kebudayaan, dan adat istiadatnya (Jakarta: Gunara Kata, 1997), and 
Ridwan Saidi, Babad Tanah Betawi (Jakarta: Gria Media Prima, 2002).  
7 Jean Gelman Taylor, ―Batavia‖, in Ooi Kiat Gin, Southeast Asia, A Historical Encyclopedia, From Angkor Wat To 
East Timor (Santa Barbara, California: ABC CLIO, 2004), p. 228, see also Cornelis Dirk Grijns, Jakarta Malay: a 
multidimensional approach to spatial variation, 2 Volumes (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1991). 
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Consequently, a definition and geographical description of the Ommelanden is only possible in 
the context of the development of the jurisdiction of the VOC in the areas surrounding 
Batavia. Throughout the seventeenth century, the boundaries of the territory of the 
Ommelanden were gradually extended, this process which made it more clearly defined, 
covering an area more or less coinciding with the region nowadays styled Jabodetabek or 
Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi.8 
 The eighteenth century has conventionally been regarded as a ‗dead‘ or ‗sleepy‘ period in the 
history of Southeast Asia; an era inherently less lively and hence implicitly less important than 
the periods which preceded or followed it.9 In fact, in contravention to this conventional 
opinion, between 1684 and 1740 the Ommelanden of Batavia underwent a dynamic socio-
economic development. Because of several important events occurring in that particular year, I 
have chosen 1684 as the point of departure for this study. In this year, after several decades of 
hostilities with Mataram and Banten, the Batavian government had finally established its 
authority in the areas surrounding Batavia as witnessed by the fact that, just two years earlier, 
the College van Heemraden (the District Council) began to carry out its task of administering the 
Ommelanden.10 That same year the Chinese imperial government also relaxed its prohibition 
on overseas trade and a ground swell of Chinese immigration to Batavia and the Ommelanden 
was the immediate result. During the next more than fifty years, the Ommelanden were 
transformed from being an unsecured and unexploited backwater into one of the most densely 
populated and intensively exploited rural areas in the Indonesian Archipelago. This dynamic 
period of socio-economic development in the Ommelanden ended in 1740 when the Chinese 
rebellion broke out in this region and this is the reason that this study will terminate in that 
year.   
 
3. Previous studies 
 
The socio-economic development of Batavia and the Ommelanden has already been the 
subject of various studies. The one which must be mentioned first is the classic study by F. de 
                                                 
8 For the development of the Ommelanden territory and boundaries see sub-chapter on boundaries formation in 
Chapter Two. 
9 David K. Wyatt, ―The Eighteenth Century in Southeast Asia‖, in Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra (eds.), On 
the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 39.  
10 For the discussion about the tasks and areas under the jurisdiction of the College van Heemraden see sub-chapter 
on land management in chapter four.  
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Haan. In this pioneering work, the former archivist of the Landsarchief at Batavia dealt only 
briefly with the ethnic composition of the people in the Ommelanden. 11  Choosing to 
concentrate mainly on the urban society within the city walls, he painted a picture in which all 
the ethnicities were kept separate from each other, compelled to reside in distinct kampung; 
each ethnicity governed by its own headman and all distinctively clad in their ethnic costume.12 
De Haan‘s work is quite comprehensive and it is apparent that, as an archivist, he did use 
primary sources. Nevertheless, unfortunately his book might have been better organized and 
there are no footnotes. In its inception, the Colonial government envisaged Oud Batavia as a 
‗coffee table publication‘ to commemorate the third centenary of Batavia in 1919, but De 
Haan had other ideas and preferred to se his book as an academic work, which should be 
uncluttered by footnotes. Despite these shortcomings, the book has been very important to 
my research since it contains many keen and incisive insights and observations about the daily 
life of the citizens of Batavia and to a lesser degree also about the daily activities of the 
inhabitants of the Ommelanden. 
 Jean Gelman Taylor‘s work about the social world of Batavia is concerned with the social 
relations that developed between the Dutch elite in Asia throughout the VOC period.13 In her 
choice to focus on the Company establishment in Batavia, she ventures beyond the usual 
emphasis on political, economy, military, and administrative aspects of the colonial regime and 
portrays instead the human relations between Europeans, Creoles, Asians, and Mestizos. She 
also stresses the important role played by women in helping the careers of their husbands who 
aspired to become high-ranking Company officials. The drawback to Taylor‘s work is that it 
presents only a limited picture of Batavian society since it is primarily concerned with the 
social elite and their lifestyle in the eighteenth century. Existing alongside the Batavian elites, 
many other groups, poor Eurasians, Chinese, Moors, and various Indonesian groups, were also 
part and parcel of the social world of Batavia. They lived their lives and made their livelihoods 
in the city and its environs, but they are not discussed extensively in Taylor‘s book with the 
exception of some who had direct relations with the Batavian elite. 
                                                 
11 F. De Haan, Oud Batavia, 2 Volumes (Batavia: G. Kolff, 1922). 
12 In his work, De Haan explained that the people in the Ommelanden lived in separate kampung on the basis of 
their ethnic origin. Each kampung had a headman appointed from its own people, see Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 469.   
13 Jean Gelman Taylor, The Social World of Batavia. European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia (Madison, The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1983). 
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 The developments of the Chinese community of Batavia, the decline of its ecology, the 
religious life, and the biographical histories of Mestizo women have all captured Leonard 
Blussé‘s interest.14 He postulates that until 1740 Batavia was both a Dutch and a Chinese 
colonial city and convincingly argues that although with its markets and warehouses Batavia 
undeniably occupied a central position in the Dutch intra-Asian trading network, it 
simultaneously also operated as a nucleus in the Chinese trade network in Southeast Asia. 
Because of the indispensable contribution of Chinese merchants and entrepreneurs, Batavia 
became prosperous and developed into one of the biggest emporia in Asia. The Chinese were 
also pioneers in the opening up of the environs of Batavia. Chinese craftsmanship and labour 
in the sugar industry were the engines which drove the economic development of the 
Ommelanden. Blussé also gives an explanation of how the uncontrolled economic expansion 
combined with the weakness of the colonial administration proved the basic, underlying 
reason for the ecological disaster which engulfed Batavia in the 1730s.  
 The urban history of Batavia, particularly how it related to the ethnic administration and 
spatial order, is discussed in Remco Raben‘s unpublished PhD thesis.15 The basic thesis of 
Raben‘s dissertation is that the colonial city was a meeting place of a great variety of different 
ethnicities. Raben formulates the spatial aspects of colonial cities in terms of physical 
arrangements: the layout of the street and buildings; their architecture; the distribution of 
housing; the density of habitation; and the location and use of public space. He puts forward 
the argument that the policy of ethnic residential segregation imposed by the colonial 
government was always more of concept on paper rather than a representation of reality. The 
actually mixed residential pattern, in combination with a rapid cultural and matrimonial 
amalgamation among its immigrants, undermined any official classifications. Using quantitative 
evidence from the annual reports drawn up by the district supervisors in the Ommelanden, he 
gives the impression of residential freedom. 
 Hendrik E. Niemeijer‘s work on the colonial society of Batavia in the seventeenth century is 
a well-documented monograph based on archival research but does lead us partly beyond the 
confines of the city to consider its relations with the rural surrounding.16 Niemeijer argues that 
Batavia was a Dutch-created colonial city built on Asian soil, made up of an Asian multi-ethnic 
                                                 
14 Leonard Blussé, Strange Company. Chinese settlers, mestizo women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Floris 
Publication, 1986). 
15 Raben, Batavia and Colombo. 
16 Hendrik E. Niemeijer, Batavia. Een koloniale samenleving in de 17de  eeuw (Amsterdam: Balans, 2005). 
 7 
society. Certainly, Batavia was built by the Company as its Asian headquarters, but this city was 
not a Dutch city in demographic terms, since more than half of its population consisted of 
slaves who originated from South Asia and elsewhere in Indonesian Archipelago. Niemeijer‘s 
study does venture beyond the city walls. He describes the formation of society in the 
Ommelanden, focusing on the establishment of the kampung and the daily life in the rural 
surroundings of Batavia. His work has been a great stimulus for my research since he deals 
with the Ommelanden in depth and devotes separate chapters to a discussion of the cultural 
character and social interaction of the people who lived in this region.  
 
4. Source material 
 
In order to explain the socio-economic development of the Ommelanden in the early 
eighteenth century, I have investigated the primary archival sources very carefully. Almost all 
of the records used in this study are kept in the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (the National 
Archives of the Republic of Indonesia / ANRI) in Jakarta. These primary sources can be 
divided into four categories: the records left by the High Government (the Hoge Regering); the 
paperwork produced by the urban or civil administration of Batavia (the College van Schepenen); 
the sources left by the local rural administration (the College van Heemraden); and the papers of 
the notaries of Batavia (the Notariële Archives). Each of these types of source material gives us 
different viewpoints on the various subjects being analyzed and they supplement each other. 
Consequently, together they can provide a better understanding of the nature of the socio-
economic development in the Ommelanden.  
 The records left by the Hoge Regering give the perspective of the Colonial Government. The 
High Government was established in 1609 and consisted of the Governor-General and the 
Council of the Indies. From 1617, the Council of the Indies consisted of nine members. Their 
task was to support the Governor-General in a host of matters pertaining to the general 
management of trade, war, government, and in the administration of justice in all civil and 
criminal matters.17 The authority exercised by the High Government was virtually that of an 
independent state. This institution had the highest authority over all of the Company officials 
                                                 
17 H.E. Niemeijer, ―The Central Administration of the VOC Government and the Local Institutions of Batavia 
(1619-1811) – an Introduction‖, in G. L. Balk, F. van Dijk, and D.J. Kortlang (eds.), The archives of the Dutch East 
India Company (VOC) and the Local Institutions in Batavia (Jakarta) (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 62. 
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and Dutch settlements in Asia. Under the terms of the octrooi (charter), the Dutch East India 
Company received from the States-General in 1602, it was empowered to preserve order, to 
administer criminal and civil justice, and to issue regulations.18  
 There was no separation between the Company administration in Asia and the 
administration in the Dutch headquarters. Both administrations fell under the authority and 
supervision of the High Government. All of the important regulations to do with the 
administration of Batavia and the Ommelanden and other Dutch settlements were issued by 
the Hoge Regering. Most of these regulations have been compiled, ordered, and published by 
J.A. van der Chijs in the Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek.19 These compilations of regulations are 
very important to this study since they preserve the Company perspectives on the colonial 
administration, judicial matters, and the way colonial society was organized. The archival 
deposits of the Hoge Regering are enormous in size, but fortunately some sources publications 
have compiled from these documents including the Daghregister van Batavia20 (Daily Journals of 
Batavia), the Generale Missiven 21  (General Letters to the Gentlemen XVII – the Board of 
Directors of the VOC), and the Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum.22 The first is the journal 
of daily activities in Batavia to do with trade, politics, and military developments, while the 
second contains all the important letters from the Governor-General and Council to the 
Directors in the Dutch Republic, and the third is a compilation of contracts between the VOC 
and Asian local rulers.  
 The Hoge Regering documents consulted for this study are those which contain information 
about the policies of the administration for Batavia and Ommelanden. Although most 
resolutions have been published in the Plakaatboek, many other documents relevant to my 
study are not covered by this source publication. The documents most relevant and important 
to my study are the Minuut Generale Resoluties (MGR). These resolutions are not the final 
decisions, because they still had to be submitted to the High Government for approval. 
                                                 
18 John Ball, Indonesian Legal History 1602-1848 (Sydney: Oughtershaw Press, 1982), p. 9. 
19 J.A. van der Chijs (ed.), Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811, 17 Volumes (Batavia and Den Haag, 1885-
1901). 
20 J.A. van der Chijs et. al. (eds.), Dahregister gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel 
Nederlants-India, 31 Volumes (Batavia and ‘s-Gravenhage, 1888-1931).  
21 W.P. Coolhaas and J. van Goor (eds.), Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der 
Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie. Rijks geschiedkundige publicatiën, grote serie nos. 104, 112, 125, 134, 150, 159, 
164, 193, and 205. 9 Volumes (‗sGravenhage, 1960-1988). 
22 J.E. Heeres en F.W. Stapel (eds.), Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum. Verzameling van politieke contracten en 
verdere verdragen door de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde. 57, 87, 91, 
93, 96 (‘s-Gravenhage 1907-1955). 
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Consequently they still contain all kinds of information which might have been omitted in the 
final resolution. The approved resolutions formed the basis for the Net-Generale Resoluties 
(NGR), the formally approved decisions.23 Since the latter documents are a summary of the 
first, it is important to consult MGR to discover all the considerations behind the decisions of 
the High Government. 
 The sources left by the College van Schepenen (the College of Aldermen) provide a view of the 
Colonial administration at the urban level. The Company established the College van 
Aldermen on 24 June 1620 to administer urban and civil affairs of Batavia. In its early years, 
the members of this College consisted of two Company officials and three free burghers of 
Batavia. The Company appointed the Chinese Captain, the headman of the Chinese 
community in town, as an extra-ordinary member. Throughout the VOC period, the number 
of members of the College changed several times depending on their tasks, but invariably 
consisted of the Company officials, free citizens, a Chinese captain and later also indigenous 
captains as extra-ordinary members. The president or the chairman of this College was always 
a Company official with the rank of Councilor of the Indies or Extra-ordinary Councilor of 
the Indies,24 a clue that the College of Aldermen was not an independent institution. 
 The jurisdiction of the College of Aldermen covered both inside and outside the town. 
When the College van Heemranden (the District Council) became fully operational in 1682, the 
authority of this College, especially that pertaining to the supervision of public works, 
agricultural activities, and land ownership in the Ommelanden, superseded the first. One of the 
important tasks delegated to the College of Aldermen was the registration of the conveyancing 
of real estate and the transfer of slaves. Each transfer was subject to a 10 per cent conveyance 
tax.25 Perhaps in attempts to avoid this tax, people in Batavia and the Ommelanden often 
preferred to transfer their property by notarial deed. Nevertheless, the sources left by the 
College van Aldermen have been important to my research since this College was also the 
court of justice for the free citizens of Batavia and the Ommelanden. When it functioned as 
the court of justice for the citizens this college was called the Schepenbank (Court of Aldermen).  
 The sources left by the College van Heemraden (the District Council) throw light on the colonial 
administration at the local level. These materials are one of the primary sources which deal 
                                                 
23 See information about the relation between Minuut Generale Resoluties and Net-Generale Resoluties in G. L. Balk, F. 
van Dijk, and D.J. Kortlang (eds.), The archives of the Dutch East India Company, p. 220. 
24 Niemeijer, ―The Central Administration of the VOC‖, p. 67. 
25 Ibid., p. 69. 
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specifically with the Ommelanden. The Heemraden council had been established in 1664, but it 
did not exercise full powers until 1682. The principal duty of this council was to set up and 
organize the infrastructure essential to the Company interests in the Ommelanden. Its tasks 
included the development and maintenance of roads, bridges, water drainage, canals, and 
dams. Later its duties expanded to cover the management of the Company land and taking the 
census to monitor population growth. It also issued licences for such industrial undertakings as 
sugar-mills, brickworks, and arak distilleries.26  
 Given the scope of these tasks, most of the Heemraden documents contain information about 
land ownership and reclamation, water management, infrastructural development, and the 
management of rural factories. Although they give the colonial perspective, the Heemraden 
resolutions offer plenty of information about how the common people negotiated with the 
colonial administration. The names of ordinary inhabitants of the Ommelanden appear very 
frequently in the documents on such occasions as when they had conflicts about landed 
property with other people, asked permission to build dams, bridges, sluices and other 
infrastructure, applied for land grants, and asked permission to cut trees on the Company 
lands. Unfortunately the Heemraden archival collection is not very extensive since only the 
resolutions of the original documents have been preserved. Nevertheless, it remains the most 
important source for the history of the Ommelanden.  
 The sources left by the notaries of Batavia offer a micro-level point of view, since notaries 
recorded transactions related the daily activities of the Ommelanden societies. The notarial 
archives contain a wealth of material about the inhabitants of Batavia and the Ommelanden, 
without which any definitive study on the socio-economic history of this city and its environs 
could not be written. 27  The notaries were agents of the legal institutions brought to the 
Netherlands East Indies by the Dutch East India Company. As headquarters of this 
organization and a bustling commercial city, Batavia necessarily offered its citizens a judicial 
system and the notarial offices were part of this. Following the example of Dutch cities, the 
Company established the notarial institutions wherever possible in the Dutch colonies in Asia, 
Africa, and America.  
                                                 
26 The system of land management and infrastructure implemented by the Company had only functioned properly 
after the College van Heemraden became fully operational in 1682. See H.E. Niemeijer, ―The Closure of the 
Bendungan, The Colonial Port City of Batavia/Jakarta and its Primary Hinterland in the Seventeenth Century‖ 
(unpublished paper, 2003), p. 2. 
27 Blussé, Strange Company, p. 77. 
 11 
 The notary‘s position in Batavia should be considered complementary to the work of the 
Raad van Justitie (Council of Justice) and the Schepenbank (Court of Aldermen). The legal system 
which was in force in Batavia separated people into those who worked for the Company and 
those who did not.28 The Raad van Justitie was the court for the Company employees, their 
families, and slaves. This court was presided over by a member of the Raad van Indië (Council 
of the Indies) and staffed by high-ranking Company men with legal training. The Schepenbank 
was the court for the civilian population of Batavia and the Ommelanden.29 The members of 
this court consisted of the high-ranking Company officials and prominent Europeans and 
Chinese, who were not necessarily trained lawyers. The notarial offices provided services to the 
people who were subject to these two courts. 
 From the early seventeenth until the early nineteenth century, more than 110 notaries 
practiced, offering their services to the inhabitants of Batavia and the Ommelanden. They were 
obliged work for everybody: rich and poor, European and non-European, even slaves. The 
work of a notary consisted of the drawing up of wills, commercial contracts, marriage 
certificates, letters of obligation (obligatie) and other legal documents. By High Government 
Resolution of 12 November 1620, the office of public notary was separated from that of the 
city clerk of the court. 
 
5. Organization of this study 
 
Since the aim of this study is to explain the various factors which stimulated the socio-
economic development in the Ommelanden, my strategy has been to scrutinize these factors 
from the bottom up. In doing so, I shall describe the socio-economic expansion of Batavia to 
the Ommelanden like an artist who draws the background to his picture first, before filling in 
the details. Therefore, I have divided the main part of this study into five chapters and each of 
the previous chapters is the setting of its successor. 
 In Chapter Two I deal with the landscape of the Ommelanden. It begins with a description 
of the geographical characteristics of this region which was covered with tropical forests and 
criss-crossed by rivers. This was the sort of landscape which was very suitable to be developed 
                                                 
28 Eric Alan Jones, Wives, Slaves, and Concubines: A History of the Female Underclass in Dutch Asia (Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2003), p. 105. 
29 Pamela Anne McVay, ―I am the devils own”: Crime, Class, and Identity in the Seventeenth Century Dutch East Indies 
(Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana Campaign, 1995), p. 64. 
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into an agrarian hinterland which could support a maritime trading port like Batavia, namely: it 
could feed not only the inhabitants of the city but also the sailors on the ships in the roadstead. 
The process of boundary formation in the Ommelanden reveals that the Dutch and Javanese 
concepts of territory and boundary differed markedly. Through a process of wars, alliances, 
and contracts between the Company and local rulers, the Ommelanden boundaries finally 
clearly emerged in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Even when the boundary 
formation was still in progress, various efforts were made by private Chinese and European 
entrepreneurs to dig canals. Since the colonial government did not want Batavia to have to 
depend on the supply of foodstuffs from elsewhere, water management and canal building 
were promoted infrastructural support for agricultural development. However, as the years 
went by, uncontrolled agricultural development ushered in deforestation. The deforested 
hinterland and disorganized water management ultimately emerged as the main factors which 
led to the ecological deterioration of the Ommelanden in the 1730s. 
 Chapter Three addresses the development of the local administration. As part of its 
population policy, the colonial government settled various Indonesian ethnic groups which 
served as auxiliary troops in the Company military campaigns in the Ommelanden. Their 
settlements provided the basis for the establishment of kampung on the basis of communities 
of the same ethnic origin. This might be considered in the light of a colonial strategy to 
facilitate the administration of the Indonesian people. No local administration to speak of 
existed in the forest environment of Jayakarta prior to the establishment of the Company 
authority. A new local administration had to be created and this was a combination of 
Indonesian traditional customs and institutions and the administrative conventions current in 
the Dutch Republic. In this chapter I shall show that the Betawi people in the Ommelanden 
were a creation of colonial society since they moved in from elsewhere, lived under the 
colonial administration, and developed their economy within the colonial context. 
 Chapter Four analyses the patterns of land ownership in the Ommelanden. During the early 
years of Batavia, the colonial government did not have any special policy on land ownership. 
Jurisdiction pertaining to land ownership in the Ommelanden only became more organized 
when the Heemraden begun to operate fully in 1682. Although the government granted and sold 
much of its land, it nonetheless remained the biggest land owner. Huge chunks of land or the 
landed estates (particuliere landerijen) belonged mostly to Europeans and to a few Chinese and 
Mardijkers. Most Indonesians only could afford to have a small plot of land. The estates in the 
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Ommelanden were utilized for many purposes including paddy cultivation, sugar-cane fields, 
vegetable gardens, and animal husbandry. In this chapter the value of land and land conflicts 
will be examined.  
 Slavery and labour is the subject of Chapter Five. There were two sources of manpower in 
use in the Ommelanden: slaves and hired labour. Throughout the seventeenth century, Batavia 
became part of an extensive slave trade network which encompassed all of the Company 
territories from the Cape of Good Hope in the west to the Moluccas in the east. In this 
chapter I shall demonstrate that the most active slave sellers and buyers in the Ommelanden 
were Indonesian people. Nevertheless, the supply of slaves could not keep up with the 
demand for manpower. Thousands of Chinese sojourners and Javanese migrants were 
attracted there by the growing agricultural activities in the Ommelanden and became the 
source of cheap labour. 
 The development of the sugar industry as the most important agricultural enterprise in the 
Ommelanden will be reviewed in Chapter Six. I shall begin this chapter by explaining the 
position of Batavian sugar in the Intra-Asian Trade. The efforts of the Company to find and 
create an international market for the Batavian sugar led to the sugar boom period of the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Chinese entrepreneurs stand out as the prominent 
movers and shakers who determined the development of the sugar industry but small 
entrepreneurs with limited capital were not excluded from the sugar industry. The sugar 
business was not restricted just to sugar production; it also encompassed the selling and 
renting of sugar-mills and their equipment. The sugar production process in the sugar-mills 
required huge quantities of firewood, a demand which eventually caused massive deforestation 

















This chapter introduces the Ommelanden of Batavia with a sketch of their most salient 
geographical features, reasoning that the natural conditions can highlight many aspects of the 
socio-economic developments in this region at the end of the seventeenth century. The 
geographical position, the type of the soil, the climate, the rainfall, and the bedding of the 
rivers all played a role in determining the local ecological conditions and had an impact on the 
density of population, the agrarian development, even the degree of commercialization in the 
environs of Batavia. As a matter of fact, the geographical characteristics of the Ommelanden 
form the background and the basis of the socio-economic activities which will be analysed in 
the following chapters.  
 
1. The geographical features 
 
The port of Calapa is a magnificent port. It is the most important and best of all. This is 
where the trade is greatest and whither they all sail from Sumatra, and Palembang, Laue, 
Tamjompura, Malacca, Maccassar, Java and Madura and many other places…The 
merchandise from the whole kingdom comes here to this port…Many junks anchor in 
this port.30 
 
 This is how the Portuguese merchant Tomé Pires described the port of Calapa at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century in his Suma Oriental. Calapa or Sunda Kelapa was the earlier 
name of Jayakarta or Jakarta which the Dutch transformed into their Asian headquarters in 
1619 and renamed Batavia. Pires praises the strategic position of Kelapa, located close to the 
Sunda Strait, as a trading port and, around a hundred years later when searching for a base of 
the VOC, Governor-General Jan Pietersz Coen also recognized the commercial possibilities it 
                                                 
30  Tomé Pires, The Suma Oriental of Tome Pirés and The Book of Francisco Rodrigues, Vol. 1, translated from the 
Portuguese and edited by Armando Cortesao (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1944), pp. 172-173. 
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offered. After it had become the Asian nerve centre of the Dutch East India Company, 
Batavia also assumed the function of the most important port in the western part of Indonesia; 
it even grew into a hub of the intra-Asian trading maritime network. The nodal position of 
Batavia in the maritime world of Asia would be retained until the later part of eighteenth 
century when it was surpassed by first Calcutta and later Singapore. 
 In the early sixteenth century, Kelapa still served as the main port for the West Javanese 
Hindu kingdom of Pajajaran (1344-1570s), whose capital was located in the vicinity of the 
present city of Bogor. In 1527, the sultan of Cirebon sent troops to conquer Kelapa. To crown 
their success they renamed it Jayakarta, meaning ‗Great Victory‘. By the end of the sixteenth 
century, the town had become a satellite of the Banten sultanate.31 Kelapa had a well-sheltered 
roadstead and was conveniently sited as a port of call for ships sailing the sea lanes of the 
Archipelago. In his description, Pires mentions that Kelapa was the emporium where the 
commodities from the entire territory of Pajajaran were collected prior to their distribution to 
other places. Because Pires also mentioned the presence of Chinese junks in the port, it can be 
assumed that Kelapa had been integrated into the Chinese maritime trading network at least 
since the early sixteenth century.  
 The strategic location of Kelapa, its sheltered bay, and its accessibility for the Chinese junks 
were all important considerations in the Dutch decision to establish their Asian rendezvous in 
this place.32 Compared to the remote spice-producing islands of Ambon and Banda, the island 
of Java was much more centrally placed in Asian trade, outweighing the fact that it did not 
produce the highly sought-after nutmeg and cloves. Instead Java produced other commodities, 
including pepper, rice, and timber. However, it seems that from the economic point of view 
the direct environs of Batavia barely played a role in the Company decision to select this 
location. For its role as an emporium and the Company headquarters, Batavia could also have 
been founded at any other location with a well-protected roadstead. This explains why the 
High Government did not pay much attention to its environs in the early decades of the 
Batavian settlement. The upshot was that initially the city had to depend on the Javanese 
                                                 
31 The Portuguese arrived in Sunda Kelapa in 1522. They concluded an agreement with the king of Pajajaran to 
conduct their future trade through it. According to Portuguese sources, Pajajaran considered the alliance 
beneficial, as it provided the kingdom with an ally against the threat from Muslim encroachment from the east. 
But when they Portuguese made a follow-up trip in 1527, they found that the port of Sunda Kelapa had come 
under the control of Muslim Javanese led by a Sumatran from Pasai known as Falatehan. See, Julian Millie, 
Splashed by The Saint, Ritual reading and Islamic sanctity in West Java (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), p. 4. 
32 Blussé, Strange Company, p. 80. 
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North Coast, Siam and elsewhere for its supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. During this 
period Batavia acquired the bulk of its population and slaves from India and secured its wealth 
from maritime trade. 
 Batavia was located in a coastal region which consisted of low-lying, marshy, sandy-clay soil 
overgrown with lush tropical forests. Geologically, the coastal plains consist of young alluvial 
sediment, the deposit of the various rivers which flow down to the north from the Priangan 
Highlands.33 The gradual process of land formation still continues today. The chocolate brown 
colour of the rivers indicates the large amounts of silt which are carried down to the sea and 
deposited there. Floods or banjir are frequent after heavy rains, when the swollen rivers break 
through their levees and submerge large parts of the plain. Although this area been subjected 
to gradual infrastructural developments since the middle of the seventeenth century, its general 
morphology has remained practically unchanged. 
 
 
Map 1: The lowlands between the bay of Jakarta and the mountains south of Bogor 
Source: A. Heuken, Historical Sites of Jakarta (Jakarta: Cipta Loka Caraka, 2007), p. 150. 
                                                 
33 Samuel van Valkenburg, ―Agricultural Regions of Asia. Part IX—Java‖, in Economic Geography, Vol. 12, No. 1, 
January 1936, p. 1. 
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 Several kilometres inland, the soil becomes more solid but still spongy during the wet season. 
On account of these characteristics, in soil taxonomy the alluvial soil is categorized as 
fluvisol.34 Fluvisol soils also occur on the east coast of Sumatra and on the south and west 
coasts of Kalimantan. Variations in colour, texture, and organic content in fluvisols are linked 
to the river regime. Well-drained soils may carry forests or bamboo; poorly-drained soils are 
commonly grass-covered, and highly acid soils carry swamp vegetation. 35  Fluvisols can be 
intensively farmed and can support a high population density. In such undertakings the crop 
patterns, rotation, and agricultural management on fluvisol soils are closely related to 
hydrological conditions.     
 Before this low-lying land around Batavia, known as the Ommelanden, could be brought 
under cultivation, it had to be raised and any cultivation of this region required a considerable 
amount of drainage and irrigation. Before the land had been raised, it was difficult to travel 
inland. Fortunately a series of parallel rivers criss-crossed Batavia and its environs and 
therefore the principal means of transport was by water. Before the coming of the modern 
road and railway networks, the rivers still remained the main arteries of communication, 
especially for transportation. River transport was particularly important, not only to the urban 
sector, but also to the rural economy, as many roads proved to be impassable during the wet 
season.  
 Consequently, Ommelanden rivers had a dual use as highways and for irrigation purposes. 
They were important as water suppliers for the rice-fields, sugar industry, and the market 
gardens. The lands along the rivers formed a perfect location for the cultivation of crops 
which required a constant supply of water and offered excellent pasturage for cattle-breeding. 
Rural economic activities in the Ommelanden were centred on the river banks and therefore 
the lands bordering the Ciliwung, Ancol, Sunter, and Marunda to the east, and the Krukut, 
Grogol, Anke, and Citarum to the west were in high demand. 
 The spine of Java is formed by a line of volcanoes running the length of the island. Nutrient- 
rich lava and ash from these volcanoes account for the fertile soils on the foothills of the 
northern plain, especially in West and Central Java.36 To the south of the Ommelanden, three 
                                                 
34 R. Dudal, ―Soils of Southeast Asia‖, in Avijit Gupta (ed.), The Physical Geography of Southeast Asia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 103. 
35 Ibid., p. 96. 
36  Friedhelm Göthenbolth et.al. (eds.), Ecology of Insular Southeast Asia. The Indonesian Archipelago (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier, 2006), p. 10. 
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high volcanic peaks, Salak, Gede, and Pangrango, form a natural barrier to human travel and 
transportation. The intermittent eruptions of these volcanoes were the chief sources of 
essential soil nutrients in the Ommelanden. The presence of an abundance of water for 
agricultural activities on the foot hills of the mountains and in the coastal plains and the highly 
fertile soil of the Ommelanden ensured the production of adequate food crops and could also 
support the cultivation of such cash crops as sugar-cane, pepper, and coffee. 
 The whole of the Indonesian Archipelago is situated in the tropical zone, which implies a 
prevailing climate with an average monthly temperature which never falls below 18°C. The 
tropical climate is also characterized by profuse seasonal rainfall, meaning that a wet season is 
alternated by a dry season.37 The climate in this zone, which covers nearly half of the globe, is 
fairly uniform and the differences between daily maximum and minimum temperatures are 
small. According to recent data, the temperature of Jakarta has a monthly average of 26°C and 
remains constant at this value throughout the year. 38  The month with the lowest average 
temperature is January with 25.3°C., and that with the highest is May with 26.3°C.  
 It is important to note that around 1700 the prevailing temperatures in all parts of the world 
for which climatic assessments are available were below present levels. This phenomenon was 
the result of reduced evaporation and the accumulation of snow and ice built up over the 
previous cold decades.39 However, these climatic variations throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century played only a modest role in the Ommelanden. There were some reports of 
harvest failures in Java during this period, but most of these were caused by such non-climatic 
factors as war, marauding wild pigs, and fires. Two drought years, 1695 and 1698, were 
mentioned in Java during the period under review, but the historical records do not speak of 
harvest failures.40 
 The Indonesian Archipelago is the quintessential monsoon region of the world. East 
monsoon winds from the Australian continent blowing towards the Asiatic Low prevail from 
May to October, while western monsoon winds from Asia blow towards the Australian Low 
from November to April. The east monsoon is a dry continental wind of which the moisture 
content increases on its way westwards as it picks up water. Conversely, the west monsoon 
carries a great deal of moisture, the result of passing over a wide stretch of warm oceanic water 
                                                 
37 Kim H. Tan, Soils in the Humid Tropics and Monsoon Region of Indonesia (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2008), p. 54. 
38 Ibid. 
39 H.H. Lamb, Climate, History and the Modern World (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 222. 
40 Peter Boomgaard, Southeast Asia: An Environmental History (Santa Barabara: ABC- CLIO, 2007), p. 125. 
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and this high moisture content precipitates as heavy convectional rains as soon as it reaches 
the warm lowlands.41 The regular pattern of monsoon winds creates two seasons. The east 
monsoon produces the dry season and the west monsoon the wet season. During the wet 
season, the rainfall usually increases heavily towards the mountains. In the hinterland of 
Batavia, the heavy rainfall occurs in the southern region towards the Priangan Highlands,42 
causing massive banjir which flood the low-lying plains.  
  
2. Boundary formation 
 
The first factory of the Dutch East India Company in Java was located in Banten.43 The 
sultanate of Banten pursued a free trade policy as a lure to attract foreign traders from Asia 
and Europe to the port. Strenuous competition between many merchants from various 
countries and the refusal of the ruler of Banten to make any concessions turned the Company 
efforts to monopolize the Banten market into a complete failure. Consequently, the 
Gentlemen Seventeen, the Company Directors, preferred to establish their own headquarters 
in Asia where they could govern their own affairs without interference from any local ruler. 
Ideally, what they sought was a fortified port under complete Dutch sovereignty. This would 
be the seat of the Governor-General, who would direct the purchases of the Company and, if 
necessary, take command of military operations against European competitors or un-co-
operative Asian rulers. 
 The Dutch had their eye on Jayakarta, a prosperous port town located around 150 kilometres 
to the east of Banten, which they thought would be the ideal location for a permanent base in 
the Indonesian Archipelago. In a 1610, a trading-post was built in this port town after Jacques 
l‘Hermite had received permission to go ahead with this project from the Pangeran of Jayakarta. 
In the summer 1618, Governor-General Jan Pieterz Coen decided to move most of the 
Company possessions from nearby Banten to the new factory.44 A year later, after complicated 
                                                 
41 Valkenburg, ―Agricultural Region of Asia. Part IX—Java‖, p. 30. 
42 Samuel van Valkenburg, ―Java: The Economy Geography of Tropical Island‖, in Geographical Review, Vol. 15, 
No. 4, October 1925, p. 572. 
43 After the first Dutch fleet arrived in Banten in 1596, the Dutch continued to visit the town in pursuit of 
pepper. Increasing competition pushed the Portuguese to blockade Kota Banten, but the Dutch managed to 
break it by defeating a Portuguese fleet in Banten Bay in 1601, after which they established a factory there in 
1603. See Ota Atsushi, Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten, 
1750-1830 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 16-17.  
44 Blussé, Strange Company, p. 21. 
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conflicts between the Dutch, the pangeran of Jayakarta, the sultan of Banten, and the English, 
the Company troops razed the town and Coen rebuilt it entirely as the Company headquarters. 
The new colonial government promoted Protestant Christianity as the religion of the ruling 
class. It introduced the Christian calendar and work week and established Dutch municipal 
institutions.45 Batavia was actually the first city built by the Dutch on Asian soil. 
 The Dutch were treading on precarious ground when they established Batavia. Several years 
before the establishment of Batavia the kingdoms of Mataram and Banten --the first located in 
the southern part of Central Java and the second in the northern corner of West Java-- were 
embroiled in armed rivalry to gain supremacy of the Priangan and other hilly regions in West 
Java. These two kingdoms and sometimes Cirebon too --a principality to the north of the 
eastern Priangan-- were constantly caught up in disputes about control of people and territory. 
Continuous regional conflicts between the two realms meant that conditions in Jayakarta were 
unsafe and unstable. When the Dutch arrived, the shapes of the boundaries in West Java had 
not yet been stabilized and in fact were still never clearly defined until the beginning of 
eighteenth century. 
 In the context of the Early Modern period, it is important to realize that the Dutch and 
Javanese held different views about such concepts as territory and boundary. The Dutch 
applied Western concepts which emphasized the necessity to establish the clear-cut limits of 
boundaries which can be represented by lines drawn on maps. Where boundaries did not exist, 
or old ones no longer applied, it was important to draw a new one.46 In the Western world 
view, the sovereignty of a polity is still always related by its political capacity to exercise 
authority in a clearly circumscribed, delineated territory. Without a territory and its boundaries, 
the sovereignty of a state or city could degenerate into a chaotic situation, since it would be 
difficult to know where the sovereignty of a state or city ended and that of another began.  
 In the eyes of the Javanese, territorial claims existed only as a subsidiary to claims to over-
lordship of other subordinated rulers or communities. The concept of a clear boundary line 
was alien to the Javanese realms and therefore the legal and cartographic instruments used to 
enforce boundary definition were also absent. Although the essence of sovereignty was of 
great importance, the territorial aspect of sovereignty was negotiable. As in other pre-modern 
                                                 
45 Jean Gelman Taylor, ―Batavia‖, in Ooi Keat Gin (ed.), Southeast Asia, A Historical Encyclopaedia, from Angkor Wat 
to East Timor (Santa Barbara, California: ABC Clio, 2004), p. 227. 
46 Robert L. Solomon, ―Boundaries Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia‖, in World Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1, 
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Southeast Asian communities, the Javanese considered personal and communal loyalties more 
important than territorial control. This view was a consequence of the geographical and 
demographic conditions in Southeast Asia, where land was available in abundance but the 
number of inhabitants, hence potential subjects, was limited. 
 After a brief period of intense rivalry and conflict with the British and Portuguese in the 
early decades of the seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company gradually began to 
establish itself as the supreme maritime and commercial power in Southeast Asia.47 A few years 
after it was granted its charter in 1602, the Company emerged as a sort of colonial state in the 
making. Its first colony in the Indonesian Archipelago was Amboina, captured from the 
Portuguese in 1605, which was followed by the subjugation of other islands in the North 
Moluccas in 1607, Banda in 1621, and most importantly Batavia in 1619. As the dominant 
maritime hegemonic power in Asia, the Company was in a position to establish colonies, but 
the acquisition of territory was not its primary interest. The Dutch realized that their resources 
were limited, especially in terms of capital and manpower. They were aware that the 
maintenance of control over a large territory was more difficult than its actual conquest. 
 Therefore, in many cases the Company preferred to establish a trading-post in the region in 
which it wanted to engage in commercial activities rather than establish a colony. Territorial 
control was regarded as subsidiary to commercial interests. As long as the local realms 
guaranteed the safety of the Company employees, accepted Dutch naval superiority, and did 
not meddle excessively in the commercial dealings of the Company, the High Government in 
Batavia refrained from direct intervention in the affairs of the indigenous rulers.48 
 Only when the aim of acquiring economic profits required military enforcement and 
territorial control would the Dutch become involved in local political affairs. This is what was 
happening in Jakarta/Batavia but also in some other places like the North Moluccas (1607) 
and Banda (1621). The foundation of Batavia on the ruins of Jakarta was the outcome of the 
Dutch determination to have a rendezvous which was strategically situated at the hub of their 
Asian trading networks and could link the commercial networks of the Indian Ocean with 
those of insular Southeast Asia and the China seas. 
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 During the early decades of Batavia, when the main focus of the Company was concentrated 
on maritime trade, Batavia tended to resemble Melaka under Portuguese rule, an emporium 
without back-up from its hinterland, rather than Spanish Manila, a self-sufficient port city 
supported by its environs. As the years passed, the interest of the High Government in the 
Ommelanden grew steadily for both security and economic reasons. In the wake of two 
attacks from Mataram in 1628 and 1629 and several assaults from Banten during the first fifty 
years of the existence of Batavia, the Dutch realized it was important to establish their 
authority in the environs of Batavia if they were to maintain the security of the headquarters 
and end its isolation from its hinterland. 
 In economic terms, the Dutch also found it useful to develop the environs of Batavia as an 
agricultural area which could support the city with raw materials, foodstuffs, cash crops, and 
industrial products. Shortly after the establishment of the headquarters, the colonial 
government discovered how dependent this entrepôt really was on various agricultural 
products sold by Chinese and indigenous traders. During this early period, almost all of its 
necessities were supplied from overseas. Because of the sparse population and limited 
economic activities in the areas surrounding the city, the existence of Batavia depended fully 
on its maritime trade. Even if there were local products available, they could not quite compete 
in price and quantity with the products which were supplied by neighbouring Asian merchants. 
This situation forced the High Government to conclude that the total dependence of the city 
on these small trading networks was preventing the exploitation of the hinterland.49 
 In the early years of Batavia, the Dutch incorrectly assumed that the territory of their new 
headquarters coincided with the territory of the former ‗kingdom of Jakarta‘. Under this 
misapprehension the colonial power assumed that the territory of Batavia extended from the 
Citarum River in the east to the Cisadane River in the west and from the Java Sea in the north 
to the Indian Ocean in the south.50 This assumption was a far cry from reality because the 
kingdom of Jakarta was no more than a principality under the protectorate of Banten and the 
highlands to the south of Batavia properly belonged to West Priangan. On account of the 
various outbreaks of hostilities and wars with the local realms mentioned earlier, the colonial 
rulers soon realized that the actual territory of Batavia was much smaller than they had 
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believed. They also recognized that settlement and economic expansion to the hinterland 
would be impossible unless the authority of the city could be enforced in this region by 
political and military power. 
 It would not be wholly untrue to say that, in the first half of the seventeenth century the 
Company acted mainly in the capacity of trader, whereas in the later period territorial 
acquisition put its officials, in the first instance, in the position of having to make political 
decisions.51 Although the VOC had already become master of the seas in the Indonesian 
Archipelago, especially after the conquest of Jakarta (1619) and Melaka (1641), its transition 
from merchant to a sovereign polity only began in the 1650s.52 The Javanese realms did not 
acknowledge Batavia as a ‗sovereign state‘ until the Batavian government proved it could retain 
its position and enforce local military supremacy. Consequently, once the colonial government 
tried to exercise its authority in the areas outside the walled city, it was next to impossible to 
avoid involvement in internal regional conflicts and all kinds of other troubles with the 
neighbouring rulers. 
 The long and short of this story is that the formation of the Ommelanden boundaries was 
the product of dynamic interaction between the Dutch and the neighbouring realms. The 
shape of the Ommelanden boundaries gradually began to emerge clearly as a result of various 
wars, diplomatic negotiations, and contracts between the Company and the indigenous 
Javanese rulers. The rise of Batavia as a political power in West Java was a parallel process to 
the rise of the kingdom of Mataram under Sultan Agung53 as the most powerful kingdom in 
the interior of Java. During Sultan Agung‘s reign (1613-1646), Mataram expanded its authority 
over almost the entire island. After a series of military campaigns in East Java which 
culminated in the fall of Surabaya in 1625,54 Mataram turned its attention to extending its 
power into West Java as far as Cirebon. Two military assaults on Batavia in 1628 and 1629 
failed to capture the Dutch headquarters. After these setbacks, Sultan Agung had to accept the 
continued existence of the Company in Java and he launched no more serious military 
expeditions against Batavia. 
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 The Company had long recognized the importance of the kingdom of Mataram both to its 
own existence in the island and its commercial endeavours. In 1652, a diplomatic mission 
under Rykloff van Goens was sent to Mataram. Javanese court poets and chroniclers portray 
the Dutch diplomatic mission to the court as a gesture of humble submission; nevertheless, 
this mission succeeded in resolving the western boundaries of Batavia through the conclusion 
of a verbal agreement with the susuhunan which stated that Dutch authority extended to the 
Citarum/Kerawang River.55 The eastern boundary of Batavia was extended to the Pamanukan 
River, and in 1677 south as far as the Indian Ocean after the Company assisted Mataram in 
suppressing the revolt of the Madurese Prince Trunajaya. When the court of Mataram was 
captured by the rebels, Amangkurat I escaped to Company controlled territory in 1677 but 
died during his flight. His successor, Amangkurat II (r. 1677-1703) granted the Company 
various trade monopolies and ceded the western part of Mataram territory to it in exchange for 
Company military support for his efforts to regain the throne.56 Within the new territory, the 
West and Central Priangan regions officially came under the jurisdiction of Batavia.  
 Nevertheless, the 1679 Bantenese military campaign to recapture the Sumedang region by 
passing through ‗Batavia territory‘ proved that the effective authority of the Company was 
more a concept on paper rather than an actual reality. In 1681, beset by worries that their 
principality would be captured by Banten, the rulers of Cirebon ceded their sovereignty to the 
Company. However, owing to its limitations of capital and manpower, the newly acquired 
territory was not governed directly by the colonial power. According to Couper‘s ‗Seven 
Regulations‘ of 1684, the Priangan Regents were instructed to administer their people under 
the authority of the Company and the susuhunan of Mataram, on the basis of their own 
‗traditional laws, customs, and privileges‘.57 Finally the eastern territory of Batavia was firmly 
established under the authority of the Company in 1705, when Mataram officially conceded 
the Company sovereignty over Cirebon and the Priangan regions.  
 To the west of the Company headquarters, the way the Ommelanden boundaries took shape 
was rather different. Banten, a maritime kingdom with territorial authority, was the chief 
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power to the west of Batavia. By the end of the sixteenth century, this pepper-exporting 
kingdom had grown into one of the most flourishing entrepôts in Southeast Asia.58 Before the 
port town of Jakarta became a Dutch possession, it had been regarded as a vassal by Banten. 
Therefore, Banten regarded the Dutch position in Batavia a usurpation of its territory.59 The 
claim of Banten to Batavia and the Ommelanden rested on the necessity to have environs 
which could be used as an agricultural hinterland and as a ‗buffer zone‘ between its realm and 
Mataram. The establishment of a fortified European trading-post located close to Banten and 
beyond the control of any indigenous authority was regarded by this kingdom as a potential 
threat to its maritime trade activities. To add insult to injury, the roadstead of Banten was 
periodically being blockaded Company ships, upsetting the economic activities of this port 
which rebounded on the prosperity of the pepper plantations.60 
 In the early decades of Batavia, Bantenese marauders often created disturbances in the areas 
surrounding Batavia and could only be gradually repulsed. Although an initial peace agreement 
between Batavia and Banten was signed in 1639, this piece of paper could not protect the 
Chinese market gardeners who worked outside the city walls, from Bantenese raiders.61 The 
first treaty setting out the boundaries between Batavia and Banten was signed in 1659 and 
fixed the Cisadane/Tangerang River as the limit between the two polities.  
 As mentioned before, in Java a written agreement was little more than a promise on paper. 
This was made explicit in 1678 when Bantenese troops marched to Cirebon through the 
hinterland of Batavia and an open conflict broke out with the Company. This conflict ended 
with the defeat of Banten and the subjugation of Cirebon to Company hegemony. The 
relationship between Batavia and Banten reached a crucial point when the Bantenese crown 
prince, Pangeran Hadji, rebelled against his father, Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa (1651-1683). In 
1682 the crown prince accepted the Dutch suzerainty over Banten in exchange for military 
support.62 Although Banten ceded its full independence to the States-General of the Dutch 
Republic, the political influence of the Company was not exerted at the village level until the 
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mid-eighteenth century, a situation rather similar to that in Cirebon and Priangan during the 
same period.63 
 Since 1705 the Company had officially exercised full authority over a large part of West Java, 
with the exception of the sultanate of Banten. Because Dutch territorial jurisdiction had grown 
gradually under widely differing political and economic conditions, the character of the 
administration differed from region to region. The centre of Dutch authority was the walled 
city of Batavia, which was governed directly by the High Government. In the environs of 
Batavia or the Ommelanden, authority rested in the hands of the College van Heemraden. The 
Ommelanden covered the territory bordered in the east by the Citarum River and in the west 
by the Cisadane River. In the north the limit was the Java Sea and the boundary in the south 
were the Jakatrasche Bovenlanden or the highlands of Jakarta. Two other regions under Dutch 
authority in West Java were the Preanger Bovenlanden (the Priangan Highlands) and Cirebon. The 
first was located directly to the east of the Ommelanden whereas Cirebon was situated 
between Priangan and Mataram in Central Java. In these two regions, the Dutch governed 
indirectly. That is to say that the local rulers ran the daily administration and exercised certain 
duties on behalf of the colonial government, as among them verplichte leverantiën or set deliveries 
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Map 3: Batavia and the Ommelanden 
Source: Hendrik E. Niemeijer, Batavia. Een koloniale samenleving in de 17de eeuw (Amsterdam: Balans, 2005), pp. 8-9. 
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3. Water control and irrigation 
 
Generally speaking, Java is an island with a surplus of water, evidence of which is the 
widespread tropical rain forest in this island prior to 1800. Most of Java receives at least 2000 
mm of rainfall per year and there is a positive water balance for the majority of months.64 In 
the Ommelanden it was obvious even in the seventeenth century that water control and 
irrigation would be essential to the development of economic activities. The hydraulic 
infrastructure which was gradually built up over the years considerably shaped the regional 
landscape. Canals and irrigation systems as forms of water control form a visible record of 
human efforts to tame nature and promote agricultural activities. In turn, water management 
shapes the nature of economic development, social relations, and transportation. 
 Careful supply and control of water is the key factor in the cultivation of wet rice, the most 
important crop in Java. Water control and irrigation for rice-fields (sawah) have been a part of 
agriculture in Java since the pre-modern period. The oldest manifestation of agricultural water 
management in Indonesian Archipelago appears to have taken the form of the modification of 
natural swamps.65 The flooding of a certain area for agricultural purposes requires an immense 
input of labour and tools, since such ‗wet agriculture‘ requires land clearance, levelling the 
ground, the creation of a terrace, and a system of dams and water conduits for the distribution 
of water. Therefore, intensive irrigation for sawah was only feasible in fertile regions traversed 
by rivers and supported by an adequate labour force organized by a local ruler. Traditional 
rulers were interested in the creation of densely settled wet-rice areas because the people there 
were tied to the soil and were therefore easier to tax and to conscript for corveé and in times 
of war.66 Massive wet-rice cultivation and impressive irrigation works in pre-modern Java were 
to be found in the central areas of the island, to the south of Mount Merapi, and in the east, in 
the Brantas River valley. 
 For a burgeoning agricultural region like the seventeenth-century Ommelanden, irrigation 
was of course of crucial importance. The cultivation of both rice and sugar were dependent on 
it. Because the Ommelanden rivers nearly all have short courses and limited catchment areas, 
the abrupt uneven and variable rainfall makes it crucial that the agricultural population to 
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harness the flows of water to the best of their ability. There often are two problems with water 
in ‗wet agriculture‘: not enough and too much. Each condition imposes a constraint on crop 
growth.67  During the dry season, a lack of water is to be expected. It is therefore important to 
store water in times of relatively abundant rainfall so that it can be used for irrigation in both 
wet and dry season. During the wet season, the Ommelanden experience a high rate of 
precipitation which results in a water surplus and floods; hence in that season water drainage is 
as important as irrigation.  
 Hydraulic engineering was one of typical forms of expertise the Dutch brought to their 
colonies. After all, the Dutch had a long tradition of planning and actively shaping their own 
water environment. The geographical characteristics of the Netherlands, a delta region crossed 
by big rivers, and the experience of frequent floods had made the Dutch experts in 
manipulating water flows. Therefore it is not surprising that digging canals and creating 
irrigation systems were two of the Dutch priorities in Batavia and later also in the 
Ommelanden. The geographical similarity between the Dutch River estuary landscape and the 
Ommelanden, low-lying lands with many rivers, was the chief reason which prompted the 
Dutch to develop a waterworks system similar to those in the Netherlands around Batavia. 
 The major purpose of the colonial irrigation scheme was to encourage agricultural settlement 
and political stability, increase production, raise state revenue, and improve communications 
and transportation. Protection against drought and the prevention of famine were secondary 
considerations which subsequently loomed much larger.68 When the Dutch established Batavia 
on the ruins of Jayakarta, they had to deal with water control from the very beginning. As a 
port town, the site of Jayakarta had been determined, like many other port cities in sixteenth 
century Southeast Asia, by its favourable location for the maritime trade, and not by its 
proximity to wet-rice growing areas. However, because the Company did not want Batavia to 
have to depend on the supply of rice imports from elsewhere, water management and canal 
building were promoted for agricultural development and local transportation. 
 The earliest infrastructural works in the Ommelanden were pioneered by private initiatives. 
In 1648, a Chinese sugar entrepreneur, Phoa Bing Ham, dug a canal, known as the Molenvliet, 
to connect his estate in Tanah Abang, located to the south of Batavia, with the city. His 
ground-breaking work was followed by others who dug canals outside the west wall of Batavia, 
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the Ammanusgracht and Bacherachtgracht, and from the city eastwards to the Sunter River and 
Ancol, the Sontarse vaart and Ancolse vaart. The digging of this last canal was sponsored by a 
member of the Raad van Indië, François Caron, who been granted seven big estates, amounting 
to 855 hectares, by the Company. 69  The digging of the canals not only improved the 
transportation, it also helped to drain the low-lying land and eased the run-off of water during 
the rainy season. 
 These infrastructural works and the economic activities for which they created the 
opportunity heightened the necessity to set up an administration organ which dealt specifically 
with areas surrounding the city. Therefore on 19 September 1664, the Batavian government 
established a College van Heemraden (the Board of Land Trustees or the District Council). Before 
the establishment of the Heemraden the duty of supervising the Ommelanden was the 
responsibility of the landdrost (sheriff), but the Batavian government was aware that this 
Company officer was overloaded with work. In its early years, the Heemraden had to operate 
with no clear description of it tasks, but in the course of time it became apparent that the  
main responsibility of the board was to administer the affairs of the inhabitants, manage the 
land ownership, and supervise and maintain the public works. Perhaps owing to the insecurity 
prevailing in the outlying areas of Batavia, the District Council remained inactive for several 
years. The reason behind its reactivation in 1679 was the necessity of a body to take charge of 
the construction of the Zuiderringsloot (the south ring canal) since the College van Schepenen (the 
College of Aldermen) refused to have anything to do with the building of this canal.70 The 
Zuiderringsloot was to provide irrigation and drainage for land and the estates located to the 
southwest of the city.71 
 The water control and irrigation problems in the Ommelanden stemmed mainly from the 
efforts of the wet-rice cultivators to obtain a constant supply of water for their rice-fields. The 
expansion of the acreage of rice-fields created its own problems. The absence of traditional 
Javanese organizations which would normally have dealt with irrigation and drainage in the 
Ommelanden forced the involvement of the colonial administration in regulating the water 
management. Rice is a three- to five-months crop and requires water throughout its growth 
cycle. To maximize rice production through multiple cropping, water must be stored during 
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the wet season and released during the dry season. It goes without saying that such waterworks 
as dams, sluices, and ditches are very important to sawah. The increasing acreage of sawah, and 
also of the cane-fields at the beginning of eighteenth century created enormous upheavals in 
terms of irrigation and drainage. The large acreage of sawah raised the demand for a water 
supply which only could be assured by the building of dams during the dry season.  
 In 1718, a Malay Intje Carim sent a letter to the Heemraden. He complained about a Balinese 
named Salim who had built a dam which meant that his land did not obtain enough water. 
Salim refused to open the dam because he wanted to be sure that his rice-field, located in 
Cempaka Putih in the east of the Ommelanden, would have an adequate supply of water. In 
response, the Heemraden sent two of their members, Ary Crul and Barent Blocke, accompanied 
by a landmeeter (land surveyor) to examine the dam before a decision was taken.72 A week later, 
the Heemraden‘s emissaries produce a report which said that the dam did indeed cut off the 
irrigation supply to Carim‘s land; so they had it opened and obliged Salim to acquiesce in this 
decision. 73  Another request was submitted about the same time by the Chinese Captain 
Tomboqua. He complained about the damming up of several ditches on Company land 
located along the Tangerang River by a Javanese, Aria Soeta Dilaga, which resulted in a 
shortage of water for the sugar-mill on his land. The Heemraden sent Barent Blocke as the 
Gecommitteerde voor de Zaken der Inlanderen (Commissioner in Charge of Native Affairs) to 
investigate this case.74 The commissioner returned with a report stating that the land on which 
the ditches were located had been granted to Aria Soeta Dilaga in 1717. He had subsequently 
built the dams to guarantee the supply of water to his rice-fields, vegetable gardens, and fish 
ponds. To solve this problem, the Chinese Captain was recommended to dig his own ditch 
since his sugar-mill was located close to the Tangerang River.75 
 The construction of many dams, constructed with timber or natural stone without any co-
ordination by the local authorities created continuous conflicts between the various land 
owners. The Heemraden tried to solve these problems by obliging the landowners to ask 
permission to build a dam and to provide proof they held a licence by showing a copy of the 
relevant Heemraden resolution. In 1721, some sixty illegal dams were removed by the Heemraden, 
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but many others were repaired by the owners only one day later.76 A careful investigation of 
the Grogol and Krukut Riviers by the Heemraden in 1739 found that there were fifty illegal 
dams interrupting the flow of these rivers. 77  Large-scale rice cultivation required a large 
amount of water in constant supply. Without careful organization and intensive supervision of 
the irrigation and drainage systems by a local authority, it was an uphill battle to stop the 
construction of illegal dams.   
 Most of Batavia and its surrounding areas was situated on low-lying land only a few metres 
above sea level. The city itself was originally located right on the seashore, but the surrounding 
delta continued expanding towards the sea, built up by the silt carried down by the Ciliwung 
River. Because of these geographical characteristics, Batavia was and Jakarta still is subject to 
seasonal flooding by the Ciliwung, Grogol, Krukut, and Anke which cross the plain. During 
the dry season, the volume of water was low and consequently the rivers and canals were 
reduced to dirty, muddy trickles of water clogged with smelly sediment. In the wet season the 
volume of water increased drastically, carrying down all kinds of natural and human waste 
from the hinterland. 
 Problems with the slow but inevitable expansion of the shoreline and the forming of 
sandbanks in the estuary of the Ciliwung were part of the scene right from the earliest years of 
Batavia. Dutch maps from the years 1619 and 1628 show how much the coastline in front of 
the city expanded in just a decade. An effort was made to solve these problems by 
constructing a palisade wall, but it was wasted effort and in the end a canal had to be dug 
through the newly reclaimed land.78 Complaints about the stench from the canals during the 
dry season were noted down from 1633 at least and were repeated regularly, even becoming 
more virulent.79 Banjir flooded Batavia and its immediate environs in 1665 and it was reported 
that every now and then streets of the town were also inundated by the spring tide. 80 In 1692, 
the government announced that it was feared that, within several years, the Ciliwung would no 
longer be navigable for boats and sampan (traditional small craft) because it had become too 
shallow. It is apparent that the sedimentation at the mouth of the rivers and the alternate 
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surplus and the lack of water posed environmental problems in Batavia and its surroundings 
from the very foundation of the city.  
 Owing to the human intervention in the nature in the hinterland of Batavia, in the course of 
time the flooding in town and the Ommelanden worsened considerably. Although economic 
expansion brought prosperity to the city and its inhabitants, it definitely had a negative impact 
on the balance of nature. Tree felling to fuel the sugar-mills decreased the amount of land 
covered by forests in the upstream area of the Ciliwung and caused the sudden rise of water 
levels in this river during the rainy season. Another factor which aggravated the environmental 
conditions was the reckless development of waterworks for the irrigation of sawah which 
spiralled out of the control of the local authority. Moreover, the increasing number of 
inhabitants and rural industrial activities in the Ommelanden led to even more human garbage. 
The rivers and canal were used by the inhabitants as sewers for their waste. The sugar-mills 
were the biggest producers of organic waste which was dumped from the mills into the rivers 
and canals of the Ommelanden. 
 Some solutions were sought to prevent further flooding. These efforts still could not fully 
save Batavia from the annual banjir during the rainy season. The primary function of the 
Ommelanden canals was to divert the water currents of the rivers, but even though big canals 
were built to the east and west side of the city, these waterworks were useless in preventing the 
inundations caused by heavy rains. The capacity of rivers and canals declined as they were 
silted up with mud and garbage which had been carried down and become stuck at the outlets, 
along the riverbanks, in front of the dams, against bridge foundations, and in the sluices. 
Several attempts were made to stop the silting up process by dredging with mills, nets, and 
human labour. Even if this work was carried out regularly, the problem of flooding continued.  
 Massive deforestation aggravated the ecological conditions. Unused logs were dumped into 
the waterways and impeded the flow of the river. The Ciliwung River was used as the main 
conduit for transporting both logs and bamboo. On 26 April 1700, Cornelis Chastelein 
reported to the Heemraden that there was a big log of a Rengas tree stuck in the Ciliwung at 
Condet which had stopped the flow of the river.81 Four days later, the Heemraden sent Hendrik 
Boland, the landdrost, to remove the log but since the log was very big, the sheriff had to cut it 
into several chunks before it could be taken out of the river.82 Two years later, once again 
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Cornelis Chastelein reported a log which was obstructing the Ciliwung in front of a sugar-mill 
named Parang Pakis. The upshot was that Chastelein‘s land in Seringsing could not obtain 
sufficient water.83 In response, two weeks later the Heemraden issued a regulation requiring 
every land owner to remove personally all obstructing logs from the rivers or canals which 
flowed through their lands.84 
 To try to prevent the flooding of the Ciliwung, in 1725 the government built a dam for the 
purpose of redirecting its waters towards the Westerse vaart. Nevertheless, during the wet season 
the volume of water in the river raised so drastically the river tried to retake its previous 
course. The current in the water caused so much damage to the dam that it had to be opened 
up again to prevent it from caving in. 
 
4. The deforestation problem 
 
Nowadays the area surrounding Jakarta has been entirely denuded of its forests because of 
economic development and ever-increasing population pressure. It is hard to imagine that, 
prior to the eighteenth century, this urban region was covered by a dense tropical forest. The 
only permanent non-forest vegetation in Java before the human intervention of the early-
modern period was to be found on coastal cliffs and beaches, seasonally flooded river plains, 
and the slopes of active volcanoes. Prior to the fifteenth century, the interaction between 
human habitat and the forest environment in Southeast Asia was primarily one of 
interdependence. Trees were felled for food, fuel, and aromatic woods, and in the dry season 
they were set on fire to provide ash for the slash-and-burn shifting cultivation.85 Because of the 
low population density, there was enough time for the forests to regenerate. 
 Tropical forests in the seventeenth-century Ommelanden stretched from the coastal regions 
all the way up into the Priangan mountain areas. 86  Tropical forest is a tall, dense, evergreen 
forest which forms the natural vegetation cover of the wet tropics. In the tropical lowlands, 
these forests grow on almost any soil type on which the annual rainfall is well distributed. 87 
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There are two kinds of forest in the Indonesian Archipelago: teak forests which are dominated 
by teak and jungle wood forests, the collective name for all non-teak forests.88 The jungle 
wood forest and water formed the dominant natural elements in the Ommelanden. In the early 
days of Batavia, some Company employees made reconnaissance trips via the rivers in the 
vicinity of the town in search for timber. 89  It was they who discovered that the area 
surrounding Batavia was covered by heavy jungle. 
 A crucial factor in the relationship between Batavia and its environs was the fact that this city 
had to be supplied with a number of basic goods to satisfy the materials needs of its 
population and the incoming and outgoing shipping. These included basic foodstuffs (rice, 
vegetables, meat, fish, and fruit), materials for the construction of buildings, and fuel for 
industrial production (the sugar industry, arak distilleries, brick and lime kilns). Timber from 
the nearby forest could serve as both fuel and building material and this dual purpose was the 
principal reason why the forest disappeared so quickly.90 
 Traditional Indonesian houses were built mostly of wood and bamboo, whereas Dutch and 
Chinese houses were constructed of stone, brick, and wood. Constructions such as bridges, 
dikes, and warehouses also required large quantities of wood. The artisans in the pre-modern 
industry, brick-makers, blacksmiths, and goldsmiths, used timber and charcoal as fuel. Timber 
was also used in huge quantities as fuel in the sugar industry and arak distillery. 
 Timber, especially teak, was essential to the Company fleet. Teak (Tectona grandis) was prized 
above all other woods in the Archipelago for its durability, strength, virtual immunity to 
attacks by insects and fungi, relatively light weight, and resistance to corrosion on contact with 
metal.91 Throughout the seventeenth century, the building of new ships and the repair of those 
already afloat by the Company increased the demand for timber. On average, the Company‘s 
East Indiamen were much larger than the indigenous ships and boats in the Archipelago and 
consequently the number of large trees which needed to be felled per ship increased.92 Batavia, 
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the Dutch headquarters which maintained a large dockyard on the island Onrust, therefore, 
required a large quantity of timber.  
 Early-modern Southeast Asia was much more thickly forested than China or Europe and 
almost certainly also more thickly forested than India. By 1400, perhaps as much as 85 to 95 
per cent of Southeast Asia was still under forest cover.93 Until the end of the eighteenth 
century, with the exception of Java most of the Southeast Asian forests still survived, especially 
in the area surrounding Batavia and some areas in Central Java. In the latter region, 40 per cent 
of the teak forests were lost between 1776 and 1840 in the rapid deforestation required to 
meet economic demands and urban requirements.94 But the fact remains that, in the environs 
of Batavia, deforestation occurred even earlier than in any other place in Java. Unfortunately 
we do not have quantitative data about the pace of deforestation in this region, but it is 
apparent that the economic and demographic expansion of Batavia into its hinterland at the 
end of seventeenth century was the main factor for the rapid deforestation. 
 One of the first supplies of timber for construction works in Batavia was provided by Jan 
Con, a Chinese entrepreneur from Banten, just a few years after the founding of the city. 
Under his supervision, small groups of Chinese wood-cutters felled the trees on the islands 
and in the forests in the vicinity of the new Dutch colony.95 This was a dangerous occupation 
since the wood-cutters had to be constantly on the look-out for attacks by marauders from 
Banten. Until the 1650s, every year the Company cut down swathes of the standing forest 
around Batavia to satisfy the demand for timber and to clear the fields as a precaution against 
sudden attacks from either Mataram or Banten.96  
 If the demand for timber had mainly come from the public works sector during the early 
decades of Batavia, from the last quarter of the seventeenth century until the 1730s most of 
timber was devoured by rural industry, especially sugar-mills. The Batavian sugar-mills 
operated in the rural areas because they had to be located near the cane-fields and the forests 
which provided them with fuel. Firewood was used as fuel for boiling the cane juice until it 
condensed into crystals. This process took several hours and had to be fuelled by large 
quantities of firewood. Therefore, among rural industries in the Ommelanden, sugar-mills 
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stand out as the biggest consumers of firewood. The ideal location for a sugar-mill was by the 
side of a river, surrounded by forest. When the forests in the area surrounding a mill had all 
been felled, the owner would remove his mill to a new location close to a virgin forest. 
 During the sugar boom period, the Batavian government was inundated with requests from 
sugar entrepreneurs who intended to relocate their mills. Because of the deforestation in the 
immediate environs of Batavia the new mill location was usually sited farther away from town 
than the previous one. In 1704, for instance, the Chinese sugar-miller Oey Soeko requested 
permission from the government to remove his sugar-mill from the land owned by Domingo 
Marcus in Cakung on the bank of the Ciliwung River to a plot belonging to the Company in 
Oedjong Menting. 97  In 1718, the College van Heemraden, approved a request from Chinese 
Luitenant Li Jonqua to relocate his sugar-mill from the land owned bij Ursela Indijk on the 
bank of the Ciliwung in Condet to his own land on the bank of the Tangerang River.98 
Another request came from Gouw Tsinko who wanted to move the three sugar-mills which he 
had just bought, located on the land owned by Burgher Albert Reguleth on the bank of the 
Ciliwung, to his own land on the bank of the Tangerang River and the Mokervaart.99 
 These examples show that, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, certain regions along 
the Grote Rivier were already denuded of their forests because of the depredations of the sugar 
industry. Deforestation in the environs of Batavia had taken place at an even earlier date. In 
1701, a reconnaissance team was sent to upstream along the Ommelanden rivers to investigate 
the causes of the polluted water which was flowing through the city. This expedition returned 
with a report that they had found the upper reaches of the Ciliwung had been completely 
denuded to fuel the sugar-mills on the land of Cornelis Chastelein.100 
 When the situation in the Ommelanden became safer in the 1680s, the Javanese specialized 
in the job of timber suppliers. Bands of Javanese from the North Coast and Central Java 
flocked to the Ommelanden to offer their services as wood-cutters. Most of them were 
seasonal migrants who would cut down trees in the Ommelanden forests under contract to 
Batavian entrepreneurs to deliver designated quantities of firewood. In 1697, for example, 
Soeta Wangsa, the Captain of East Javanese, reported to the College van Heemraden that 1200 
logs had been deposited near the Company redoubt of Mr Cornelis, which was located on the 
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bank of Ciliwung River to the south of the city. These logs had been felled by groups of 
Javanese at various places in the Ommelanden belonging to the Company. 
 
Table 1: The locations of 1200 logs according to Captain Soeta Wangsa‘s report101  
 
Name of Place Group Leader Number of Logs 
Cadong Alang Tanoe Singa 200 
 Naja Diwangsa 50 
 Naja Diwangsa 50 
Cadong Waringin Marta Souta 170 
 Nata Bradja 60 
 Marta Prana 335 
Cadong Pandack Tschitra 130 
Parakan Cambangh Raga Wangsa 180 
Tschietayam Houyan 50 
 Sub Total 1225 
 Rotten and Lost 25 
 Total 1200 
 
 This source does not say who placed the order to have these logs cut. It might have come 
from the government or perhaps the Javanese themselves took the initiative in felling. In the 
example below it is clear who gave the order to cut the trees. In November 1700, the secretary 
of the Heemraden reported that Karta Silinga, a Javanese lieutenant, and his people had cut 115 
square roeden of firewood on the Company land in Boedjong Gede.102 The job was carried out 
after orders to do so have been issued by the Heemraden. In January 1701 this body decided to 
sell this firewood at auction to Ommelanden sugar-millers.103 
 Deforestation in the Ommelanden was also the consequence of agricultural activities, 
particularly the creation of rice-fields. The cultivation of rice was enthusiastically encouraged 
by the Company as part of its efforts to reduce the dependence of Batavia on the import of 
rice from the north coasts of Central and East Java. Rice was the most important staple in the 
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diet of the city and its environs and consequently the paramount position of rice-fields in the 
food crop picture of the Ommelanden is incontestable. Rice occupied more land than any 
other crop. Most of the rice for Batavia was cultivated in sawah, but some dry rice was also 
grown by the slash-and-burn method. This latter method of rice cultivation did enormous 
harm to the Ommelanden forests. In order to protect the forests, slash-and-burn cultivation in 
the Ommelanden was forbidden in 1750.104 By that time the rice production of this region 
seems have been sufficient to fulfil the demand of the city.  
 Nobody would deny that economic expansion and population growth were the driving 
forces behind the deforestation process in the Ommelanden. There was a strong relationship 
between security conditions, economic expansion, population growth, and deforestation. Each 
of these factors formed a precondition for the one which followed. As security in the 
Ommelanden improved in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, Batavian economic 
expansion mushroomed. The booming economic activities in the Ommelanden acted as a 
magnet for thousands of migrants from China and Central and North Coast Java. There were 
13,593 people living outside the city walls in 1679. A decade later in 1689, this number had 
swelled to 45,550 and another decade later in 1699 to 49,688.105 
 The rapid deforestation in the Ommelanden was a source of worry to the Batavian 
government. A written placard in 1696 declared that no trees were to be cut on Company land 
without proper authorization.106 On the same placard, the government also forbade the setting-
up of new sugar-mills, arak distilleries, lime and brick kilns, and saw-mills without government 
permission. Anyone caught cutting down trees red-handed would be fined as much as 200 
rijksdaalders. This placard is a clue that the environment in the Ommelanden had begun to 
deteriorate by the end of the seventeenth century. 
 Despite such measures, illegal logging continued. Without close on-the-spot supervision, 
such decrees were not worth the paper they were written on. It was difficult to carry out 
inspections in all the forests on the Company land since they spread out over the length and 
breadth of the Ommelanden. As it was Company policy to station only a limited number of 
employees in this region, it was well-nigh impossible to prevent bands of Javanese from 
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cutting the forests and selling timber illegally. Another fly in the ointment was that the garrison 
at military outposts in the Ommelanden often failed in their duty of supervising the logs being 
floated down river past their posts. There are also clues to a mutually beneficial relationship 
between illegal wood-traders and corrupt local militia officers. 
 In 1698, three Javanese, Diepa Marta, Derpa Mangala, and Marta Praya, collaborating with 
fellow Javanese workers, cut 1136 sections of logs from the Company land in Cikarang by the 
side of Tsikias River. They floated these logs down to the seashore via the river. When the logs 
passed the Zoutelande Post, located on the bank of the Ancol River, they were confiscated.107 
It seems they had not bribed the Company Javanese militia to turn a blind eye to the logs. The 
confiscated logs were put up for sale by the Heemraden at the going market rate. The board did 
not have the power to sanction corporal punishment, but it did have the authority to collect 
fines. The revenue from the sale was used by the College van Heemraden for its own benefit. 
 The government was assisted in its efforts to preserve the forests in the Ommelanden by a 
high-ranking Company official, Cornelis Chastelein, who was the owner of several private 
estates. In his will Chastelein manumitted all his slaves and made them collective owners of his 
estate.  In the same will, he decreed that forest on his estate in Depok, located in the south of 
the Ommelanden, should be preserved. His will expressly stated that the forest at Depok 
should not be cut down or despoiled, and the local inhabitants were only allowed to cut down 
timber and firewood for their own use, not for sale.108 Through the provisions of his will, he 
succeeded in preserving the forest in Depok, a rare remnant of the Ommelanden lowland rain 
forest, until the beginning of the twentieth century. 
 
5. Ecological deterioration 
 
Pre-modern Batavia had a different morphology to other cities in Indonesia. Anthony Reid has 
pointed out that pre-modern Indonesian towns consisted of several villages bonded together, 
in which plants and trees grew aplenty. These ‗towns‘ were semi-rural and did not display a 
typical urban ecology. Houses were surrounded by yards, with fruit trees, vegetables, and 
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bamboo fences.109 In and around such port towns as Banten, Cirebon, and Semarang pre-
industrial and agricultural activities were carried out, but such undertakings were not as 
extensively planned as in Batavia. It seems that traditional Indonesian towns did not have any 
ecological problems worth mentioning. 
 Batavia continued to grow and prosper during its first one hundred years. Although there 
were several setbacks caused by hostilities with local realms and rice embargoes from the north 
coast of Java, the city flourished and won fame as the ‗Queen of the East‘. In 1724 the Dutch 
minister of religion and writer, François Valentijn, wrote that ―of the cities of the East there is 
none which can be compared with Batavia for beauty, cleanliness of buildings, and the beauty 
of its shady canals, the ornamentation of its straight street and roads as well as the largeness of 
its far-flung trade‖.110 
 However, only ten years after his magnum opus extolled them, the beauty and glory of Batavia 
had deteriorated and such praise was soon replaced by reproaches about how unhealthy it was. 
A malaria epidemic took the city by surprise in 1733, spreading death among the inhabitants.111 
If Batavia had been quite a healthy city until the 1720s, in the 1730s its mortality rate surpassed 
that of the European cities. Every year more than 2000 Europeans died; many of them new 
immigrants who had just arrived in Batavia. In 1734 a general day of prayer and fasting was 
declared to beseech God to lift this plague from the city. The disease did not abate and carried 
away Governor-General Dirk van Cloon (1732-1735).112 The insalubrity of Batavia was on a 
par with or even worse than such a notorious plague hole as Calcutta in India.113 No wonder 
its nickname ‗Queen of the East‘ was transformed into that of the ‗Graveyard of the East‖.  
 The malaria epidemic of 1733 was not the only reason that Batavia was such a hotbed of 
disease. Certainly it did act as a trigger, but the insalubrity of Batavia had it roots in the 
ecological deterioration which had been taking place in the Ommelanden ever since the second 
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half of the seventeenth century. This huge deterioration in health in Batavia did not happen 
overnight; it was the direct result of the reckless exploitation of the hinterland, which was 
ruthlessly pursued without any consideration for the balance of nature. It is unfortunate that 
the economic activities of the town were subjected mainly to the business interests of the 
VOC and no second thought was spared for the long-term growth of the city itself. 
 Several explanations have been given for the ecological deterioration and insanitary 
conditions in Batavia. Leonard Blussé argues that the deterioration of the Batavian 
environment which began in the 1730s was not caused by the Dutch layout of the city or any 
natural disaster; it was primarily the rampaging growth in the activities of the sugar industry in 
the Ommelanden. The rapid expansion of the acreage of cane-fields and the number of sugar-
mills in the Ommelanden had ushered in large-scale deforestation and altered the features of 
the natural irrigation systems in this region until ultimately the tipping point of its ecological 
balance was reached. The shortage of water and water pollution only became apparent in the 
late 1720s. Blussé regards the water pollution and the breakdown in water management as the 
main reasons for the outbreaks of epidemics and the very high mortality rates in Batavia in the 
eighteenth century. He also argues that the environmental decline was the result of the absence 
of a properly functioning institutional framework.114  
 Another explanation is offered by P.H. van der Brug, who argues that malaria was the main 
factor behind the insanitariness of Batavia. The mosquitoes which are the vectors of malaria 
belong to the species Anopheles Sundaicus, a saltwater species which breeds in brackish waters 
near the seashore and it was quite clear that the high mortality was restricted to the coastal 
areas. The mosquitoes could easily find their way into the walled city since they bred in the 
fishponds surrounding it. These fishponds were first laid out by Javanese fishermen in 1729 
but, because saltwater fishponds take several years to construct, the fishermen do not seem to 
have begun to use them until 1733. In the same year, Batavia was scourged by a virulent 
malaria epidemic and thousands of native people and European immigrants died.115  
 In his article about Batavian agricultural expansion and the environmental management of 
the Ommelanden, H.E. Niemeijer argues that the insanitariness of Batavia and its immediate 
environs could largely be blamed on the increasing number of dams in the Ommelanden. 
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Many of these dams were considered illegal because they were built without any permission 
from the Heemraden. Their purpose was to divert the main stream of the Ciliwung for 
agricultural purposes. The rub was that, since they had been constructed without any co-
ordination and their number were legion, their construction weakened the current of the 
Ciliwung, even bringing it to a halt when it entered the city.116 The upshot was that the canals 
inside in the intramuros dried up and seawater began to seep into the town, eventually providing 
an ideal breeding ground for Anopheles Sundaicus. 
 The explanations above shed light on the relationship between the economic expansion of 
Batavia into its hinterland and ecological deterioration. As the Company headquarters, 
eighteenth-century Batavia was basically a Dutch city with a physical appearance and 
administration more similar to the cities in the Netherlands than to other towns in Indonesia. 
It had to contend with a host of environmental problems such as pollution, deforestation, and 
a shortage of fresh water as did many cities in Western Europe. As in Batavia, the ecological 
deterioration of many Western European cities was also attributable to un-co-ordinated pre-
modern industrial activities.  
 Nevertheless, Batavia was different from its European counterparts in the sense that its 
citizens did not enjoy any political power or privilege. The city administration was firmly under 
the control of the High Government and the VOC denied Batavia the opportunity to take care 
of its own affairs. This hegemonic attitude of the colonial government made it difficult for 
Batavia to grow into a real city. As far as the Company was concerned, Batavia was first and 
foremost its headquarters and, as a consequence, some important issues which might have 
helped the city to overcome its problems were never paid proper attention.   
 One of the main causes of the poor quality of health in Batavia was the lack of freshwater 
and concomitant water pollution. There were many sources of water pollution in Batavia: 
direct discharges by local industry; sewage; and landfills. But one major source of pollution 
came from sources that were difficult to determine, and therefore difficult to control. During 
the dry season, the current in the canals would stop and stagnate. The city government did 
take action to prevent the water pollution and to try to guarantee the water supply, but failed 
to recognize the real problems. 
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 The main source of fresh water for Batavia was the Ciliwung. As with most rivers in 
Southeast Asia, the Ciliwung is relatively short, with a total length of less than 120 km. 
Throughout the VOC period, almost all of the urban inhabitants obtained their drinking water 
from this river. Anything that was dumped into the Ciliwung upstream would obviously 
pollute the waterways in town in the early period of Batavia, industrial activities and agriculture 
were concentrated along the Ciliwung. Almost all of the waste produced by these undertakings 
ended up in this river. It is easy to imagine what a negative impact this had on the quality of 
fresh water which was delivered to the city   
 Another waste product also tossed into the Ciliwung was human faeces which also 
contaminated the river. The inhabitants of Batavia and the Ommelanden used river and canals 
as open sewers and therefore the stench emanating from the waterways during the dry season 
was horrendous. Many citizens fell victim to such gastro-intestinal diseases as dysentery and 
cholera.117 This problem lasted until the twentieth century, when people began to boil their 
drinking water before consuming it. Nevertheless, the practice of using waterways as an open 
sewer still continues today, especially in the poorer parts of the urban areas of Jakarta. 
 The urban government tried to protect Batavia from industrial pollution by concentrating 
the dirtiest industries in a special quarter outside the city. In the Ommelanden, this quarter was 
located along the Molenvliet. The water of this canal flowed directly into Batavia so it could 
conveniently facilitate the transportation of industrial products. There were some industries 
situated along the Molenvliet such as flour-mills, saw-mills, brickworks, and lime kilns. 118 
Despite all best intentions, this centralization of industry could not protect Batavia against 
water pollution, because, besides its obvious possibilities as a transportation artery, the 
Molenvliet also supplied the industrial works with water and carried away their waste.   
 Figures from 1696 show that there were sixteen sugar-mills located along the Ciliwung. This 
number was surpassed by the sugar-mills which were lined up along the Sunter (36 mills) and 
the Pesanggrahan River (26 mills).119 Even though their numbers seem modest compared to 
these latter figures, we should not underestimate the negative effects of these sixteen mills on 
the water of Ciliwung. In the first half of the eighteenth century, when the forested areas along 
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the river decreased considerably, many of these mills were relocated to other places. The 
Heemraden‘s inventory of 1767 reveals that, among the eighty-two sugar-mills in the 
Ommelanden, only six were situated on the banks of this river. According to this inventory, 
twenty-two mills were sited along the Cisadane River, twelve on the banks of the Bekasi River 
and the rest were spread over the banks of rivers and canals in the surrounding areas of 
Batavia. 120  These two inventories lead to the conclusion that in the eighteenth century, 
although their fuel requirements had caused the removal of all the forests along their banks, 
perhaps the sugar-mills were not the main cause of the lack of water and water pollution in 
Batavia. 
 Other rural industries besides the sugar-mills were located on the banks of the Ciliwung: arak 
distilleries; brick- and tile-works, and lime kilns. All of these industries must surely also have 
contributed to the water pollution. Conceivably, their activities had even had more detrimental 
effects because, in contrast to the sugar-mills which operated only during the sugar harvesting 
season, these industries were fully operational throughout the year.  
 Since the waterways inside the walled city were connected to the network of canals in the 
Ommelanden, it is also possible that the source of water pollution came from the industries 
located along the Molenvliet, the Krukut River, and the Grogol River in the areas surrounding 
Batavia.121 Besides polluting the water, these pre-modern industries also polluted the air with 
their smoke. The process of baking bricks and tiles and burning lime in the kilns gave off a 
thin smoke and, when the wind blew towards the city, this smoke caused air pollution. 
 Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ciliwung continued to function as the main source 
of water for many rice- and cane-fields located in the south of the Ommelanden. The 
construction of new canals connected the Ciliwung with other rivers and provided irrigation to 
those estates which were not located close the riverside. These canal connections also diverted 
large quantities of water from the river, thereby reducing its level. Conditions worsened when 
private landowners built dams to secure an adequate supply of water for their own estates. 
 In 1732, Governor-General Diderik Durven ordered the construction of the Mokervaart to 
solve the water supply in the Ommelanden.122 This canal was planned to connect the Krukut 
and the Grogol Rivers and provide irrigation for the estates located between Fort Vijfhoek and 
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Fort Rijswijk. The Mokervaart did eventually indeed increase the volume of water supply to 
Batavia but it failed to create better water circulation. This canal actually even brought in 
additional deposits of mud, the result of soil erosion, and thereby speeded the silting up 
process.  
 Blussé argues that the construction of the Mokervaart was the tipping point for the spread of 
malaria epidemic in 1733. This was because the stagnant water offered the mosquitoes an ideal 
breeding ground. Almost all of the canal workers died in harness and the canal was not 
completed until years later.123 If we combine his argument with those of Van der Brug and 
Niemeijer, the inescapable conclusion is that the malaria epidemic in Batavia was a result of a 
series of interconnected factors. These arguments complement each other and provide a better 
explanation for the insanitariness of the city. To this explanation, we can add such factors as 
the lack of knowledge about the ecological characteristics of Batavia and the lax control of 
economic activities in the Ommelanden. Undoubtedly these also contributed to the ecological 


























The time has now arrived to explore the origins of the people of the Ommelanden and find 
out how the local administration in the environs of Batavia was formed. At the time city was 
established, no definitive form of government existed in its environs and therefore the colonial 
government had to invent a completely new administrative model. In the long run, a 
combination of the Company interests and the ethnic diversity of the inhabitants ultimately 
determined the nature of administration which was created. Following the blueprint of local 
administration in the Dutch Republic, authority in the Ommelanden was represented by the 
Heemraden and the landdrosten. The administration at the kampung level was entrusted to the 
hands of kampung headmen. It would have been an uphill battle to run the daily administration 
without the collaboration of these local officers. 
 
1. The origin of the Ommelanden people 
 
Governor-General Jan Pieterzoon Coen occupied Jayakarta on 20 May 1619 and thereupon 
proceeded to transform it into the Company general rendezvous in Asia. With the weight of 
being the founder of Batavia resting on his shoulders, his first thought was that the town 
needed a large workforce to back up the salaried Company personnel if it were to be 
transformed into a properly functioning centre for the Intra-Asian trading network. The 
expelled native inhabitants of Jayakarta fled west to Banten with their ruler or east to the 
interior of Java and were therefore of no use as a potential workforce. At this early stage, the 
Dutch had a great deal of difficulty in identifying the difference between the Bantenese, the 
Sundanese, and the Javanese, but felt quite secure after this exodus. There was a general feeling 
that the new town and its immediate environs were no longer peopled by its erstwhile native 
inhabitants who could be construed as a possible threat. It was walking on eggshells. Two 
large-scale attacks launched on the town by Mataram in 1628 and 1629 and the chronic 
recurrence of hostilities with Banten were the chief reasons the Company felt it had to deal 
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carefully with the Javanese, keeping them at arm‘s length. As a consequence, for a few decades 
after the foundation of the city the Company had to depend on people who moved in from 
often far distant places to populate Batavia. In 1705, Cornelis Chastelein reported that not a 
single descendant of the original population of Jakarta was still living in the Ommelanden. 
They had all been taken along by the Bantenese during the siege of the town in 1619.124  
 Although the city of Batavia was a Dutch colonial settlement, Europeans always formed a 
minority. The Heeren XVII rejected Coen‘s plan to turn Batavia into a colony run by free 
European citizens. The implementation of that plan would have meant that these vrijburgers 
could trade on their own account and might therefore develop into putative rivals in the 
Company monopolies in trade. Another reason the Company was thrown back onto its 
dependence on Asian human resources was the huge distance separating the new colony from 
the Netherlands. This distance could only be bridged by a long dangerous voyage lasting at 
least six months. The majority of the population of Batavia, therefore, consisted of Asians 
from inside and outside the Indonesian Archipelago. 
 Among the first settlers in Batavia were the Chinese. They had created a settlement of their 
own in Jayakarta even before the arrival of the Dutch. Besides the Chinese, there also were 
many Indians who originated from the Malabar and Coromandel Coasts. Some of these 
Indians were free traders or soldiers, but most of them had been purchased and transported 
to Batavia as slaves on Company ships. Other settlers, the so called Papangers, had come to 
Batavia from the Philippines as prisoners-of-war. In the early period of Batavia, a number of 
immigrants also came from Japan, until the Tokugawa shogunate forbade migration in 1635 
and effectively closed off the island empire.125 Chinese sojourners continued to arrive in 
Batavia, even though the Chinese emperor also placed restrictions on and finally prohibited 
overseas migration in various ways. Beside these groups of people from outside the 
Archipelago, various indigenous ethnic groups from within Nusantara had also begun to 
populate the Ommelanden since the 1650s. 
 Initially, the city of Batavia and its surrounding territory produced hardly any food for local 
consumption. In order to redress this omission, the first priority of the Company was to 
develop the immediate hinterland, a move which entailed that it had to set about populating 
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the Ommelanden with farmers. Since Coen‘s plan to build Batavia as a European colony had 
been rejected by the Heeren XVII, obviously people had to be brought in from elsewhere in 
Asia to settle around the town. As the local rulers in Java were hostile, the Company preferred 
to populate the Ommelanden with people from far away who would be less menacing. Hence, 
mirroring the situation inside the city walls, in the very early years the majority of the 
population of the Ommelanden consisted of various ethnicities from outside Java. 
 As a logic consequence of the precarious security situation, the extent of the early settlement 
of the Ommelanden was very closely related to the degree to which the safety of settlers could 
be guaranteed. As long as Batavian government could not provide adequate protection for the  
area surrounding the city, life for settlers in this region was always going to be living on a knife 
edge. Therefore, during the first few decades after it had been established, the immediate 
environs of Batavia were cleared of forests, removing any potential cover for unexpected 
attacks from either Banten or Mataram. In 1636, for instance, some years after it had been 
successfully defended against the attacks by Mataram, the land to the east of the city was 
cleared of undergrowth and burned off for the length of about half a Dutch mile. Ten years 
later, when the government had been reassured by the signing of a peace treaty with Banten, 
the Ommelanden were considered safe and could be settled at will by those inhabitants who 
chose to do so. However, westwards the peace with Banten was short-lived. In 1656, hostilities 
between Banten and the Company broke out anew and, as a precautionary measure, the 
Batavian government felt itself forced to expell all male Javanese inhabitants residing in the 
city. This policy remained in force even after the cessation of hostilities. Javanese were 
required to reside in four specified kampung in the Ommelanden, where they were supervised 
by their own headmen.126  
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Illustration 1: The killing of Chinese prisoners in the backyard of the Batavia City Hall 
Source: A. Heuken, Historical Sites of Jakarta (Jakarta: Cipta Loka Caraka, 2007), p. 91. 
 
 This policy of expelling a group of people who was regarded as a potential threat to the 
existence of the city was repeated in 1740 when the Chinese rebellion broke out in the 
Ommelanden in early October. As it was feared that the Chinese living inside the city might 
conspire with the rebels, thousands of them were slaughtered by their Asian and European 
fellow townsmen in a week-long pogrom. After that year, the Chinese were no longer allowed 
to live inside the city walls, but were obliged to take up residence in the Chinesche kamp, a China 
town outside the city walls. 
 The Company reaped various advantages from its decision to populate the Ommelanden 
with Asian people of different ethnic backgrounds. Militarily the move offered the benefit that 
the inhabitants of the settlements around the city could be called up as soldiers in the event of 
sudden attacks by either Banten or Mataram. They could also be recruited as auxiliary troops 
for the armed expeditions mounted by the Company. This was a great saving since these 
troops only had to be put on the army pay-rolls during any military campaigns. Economically, 
the presence of inhabitants in the kampung around the city boosted the efforts of the Company 
to make Batavia into a self-sufficient city, because they could be set to work to supply Batavia 
with agricultural products. Most of them were indeed employed in agricultural occupations, 
earning a living as workers in the nascent sugar industry, as market gardeners, or as paddy-
planters. Tax-wise, the increase in the Ommelanden population at the end of the seventeenth 
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century was closely related to the contemporary sugar boom in the world market. Every sugar-
mill operating in the Ommelanden had to pay taxes. The cultivation of paddy was later also a 
ready source of taxes-in-kind. Every paddy plantation owner was required to deliver 10 per 
cent of the paddy harvest to the Company warehouses. 
 People in the Ommelanden were divided into various categories on the basis of their ethnic 
background. The first consisted of the local Company soldiers, both active and retired. Among 
the first groups of Indonesian soldiers who arrived in the Ommelanden in 1656 were the 
Ambonese. Their commander at that time was Captain Tahalele from the island of Luhu in the 
Moluccas. Before their arrival in Batavia, they had been part of the military expeditionary force 
under Commander Arnout de Vlamingh van Outshoorn, which finally ended the war which 
had been raging in Ambon on and off since the 1630s.127 Among these soldiers was the 
famous Captain Jonker of Manipa, who replaced Tahalele as the commander of the Ambonese 
in 1658. Although the Ambonese Captain and his followers often participated in military 
expeditions abroad, the Company provided them with a large chunk of land located some 
distance to the east of the city, in the coastal region named Marunda. Jonker and his band were 
required to settle there as a group and form their own kampung.  
 Nevertheless, the first group of Indonesian people who came to Batavia from elsewhere in 
the Indonesian Archipelago were not soldiers. They were the Bandanese who was brought 
there soon after Jan Pieterzoon Coen‘s conquest of their homeland in 1621. The Company 
provided them with a place to live in a quarter located close by the eastern side of the city 
walls. This quarter was also occupied by the Japanese, Papangers (people from the 
Philippines), and other free Asian inhabitants.128 The settlement of Ambonese soldiers in 1656 
was immediately followed by those of bands of warriors from Makassar, the Bugis kingdoms, 
and Bali. They also were required to settle in groups in the Ommelanden and were granted 
areas of land on which to establish a kampung.  
 Apart from these indigenous soldiers, another significant section of the Ommelanden 
population was composed of slaves and manumitted slaves who had been imported from 
various places and therefore had different ethnic origins. In the early years of Batavia, most of 
the slaves working there had originated from the Indian Subcontinent. The Coromandel Coast 
and Bengal were the two main regions from which these slaves, most of whom had been 
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converted to Christianity by their Dutch masters, were imported. Mardijker129 was the term 
used by the Company to label these freed Christian slaves. Information about the early history 
of Mardijker settlements around the town of Batavia is fairly scant, but it seems that they 
already opted for the Dutch side during the time at which Banten was laying siege to the 
fortress of Jayakarta in 1619. In 1628, it was noted that there were two companies of infantry 
formed by Mardijkers deployed against the troops of Mataram.130 The Mardijkers from South 
Asia used the Portuguese Creole language as their lingua franca and under VOC law they were 
permitted to dress as Europeans because of their status as Christians. As dark-skinned Indians 
predominated in the population, the Dutch also began to refer to the manumitted slaves as vrije 
swarten or free blacks.131 In the 1691 census, the Mardijker population in the Ommelanden was 
estimated at 6,181,132  in 1722 their number had increased to 7,156,133  but by 1739 it had 
dropped to 5,247.134  
 In the second half of the seventeenth century, islands in the Indonesian Archipelago also 
began to supply Batavia with a growing number of slaves. It was financially more advantageous 
to the Company to purchase slaves from within the Archipelago as it only took a couple of 
weeks to transport them, compared to the passage of South Asian slaves which often took 
several months. Besides these logistical considerations, in Indonesia itself traditionally there 
had always been thriving slave markets. In the Archipelago, the VOC did not purchase or 
transport slaves on its own ships but was supplied by Indonesian, Chinese or Dutch free 
merchants who delivered the slaves in Batavia on their own ships. One of the biggest 
exporters of slaves in the Archipelago was the island of Bali where the local rajas were eager to 
dispose of their surplus population. After the conquest of Makassar in 1661, this port city also 
became a major supplier of slaves for Batavia. Company law forbade the taking of the slaves 
from among the Javanese because the High Government did not want to offend the 
neighbouring rulers and for fear that they might conspire against the Europeans.135 In contrast 
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to the Mardijkers, the slaves who came from the Indonesian Archipelago and were the property 
of non-Christian slave owners tended to convert to Islam when they were freed. It is difficult 
to estimate their number because as soon as they were manumitted, they would mix with the 
kampung population in the Ommelanden with whom there was no religious barrier. 
 Free immigrants who chose to settle in Batavia for economic and political reasons formed a 
significant part of the population. Chinese immigrants were attracted by the economic 
opportunities offered by the Ommelanden. Batavia was a major trading centre for Chinese 
merchants. The Company allowed indeed even encouraged, Chinese merchants to conduct 
their commercial activities freely in Batavia, because the merchandise which they brought from 
China was required by the local population or, in the case of silk or tea, was a useful 
component in the Company trade with Europe. The Chinese played a crucial role in the 
development of Batavia from its very foundation, so much so that Batavia was in many 
respects as much a Chinese colonial town as a Western one.  From the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century, most of the Chinese migrants were workers who sought employment in 
the rapidly developing sugar industry in the Ommelanden. The Heemraden censuses show that 
the Chinese formed one of the biggest ethnicities in this area. In 1689 their number amounted 
to 2,342,136 in 1719 this had increased to 7,550,137 and in 1739 there were some 10,574138 
registered Chinese were living in the Ommelanden. The Chinese sojourners earned their living 
as traders, carpenters and other craftsmen, sugar entrepreneurs, workers in the sugar industry, 
coolies employed in construction, and as dock workers. 
 Other free migrants who flowed in large members were the Javanese, the majority of whom 
came from the Mataram provinces and Cirebon in the east or from Banten in the west. They 
were also settled in the Company-controlled areas around Batavia or on vacant land at the foot 
of the mountains in the south of the Ommelanden. Some worked as peasants who cleared the 
virgin territory and transformed it into paddy-fields; others were seasonal workers who hired 
themselves out in groups as labourers in the sugar industry, cattle herders, or wood-cutters 
felling trees and selling timber to Batavia. In the Dutch sources, the Javanese labourers are 
referred to as bujang (Malay, literary meaning ‗bachelor‘). In their attempts to control the waves 
of Javanese migrants and seasonal workers, the colonial administration tried to gain some 
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overview by concentrating them in specific areas. This proved to be a hopeless task since the 
Javanese roamed all over the countryside and settled where they pleased; whether on waste 
ground or on the land which belonged to private owners, or even on the Company land. 
 The smallest ethnic groups in the Ommelanden were the Europeans139 and the Mestizos, 
Christian people of mixed European and Asian descent. Europeans, particularly women, in 
Batavia and certainly also in the Ommelanden were mostly of Asian birth or descent on the 
maternal side and, over time, this mixed parentage was the ethnic background of many 
Company employees of all ranks.140 Although Europeans and Mestizos never accounted for 
more than 3 per cent of the total population, they enjoyed high social status and played 
important roles in the economy. All the positions in the Heemraden were occupied by 
Dutchmen, so it was normal that the interests of this group in the Ommelanden took priority.   
 
2. Settlement patterns and kampung development 
 
 When the Dutch visited Jayakarta for the first time in 1596, they found a small urban 
settlement clustered at the mouth of the Ciliwung River. There were around 3,000 dwelling in 
the town, all of them constructed of wood and bamboo. The residence of the Pangeran 
Jayakarta, the ruler of the port town and vassal of the sultan of Banten, the mosque, and the 
market were located on the western bank of the river.141 The indigenous settlements were 
concentrated on the eastern bank of the Ciliwung, opposite to the palace of the Pangeran. A 
tiny Chinese town was located close to the eastern side of the mouth of the Ciliwung River.  
 In 1610, the first Company trading post in Jayakarta, named Nassau, was built in the 
immediate vicinity of the Chinese settlement. Three years after its establishment, it was entirely 
rebuilt in stone. In 1617 a second building was added. To protect these buildings the Company 
constructed walls three feet thick. Protected in this walled trading post, the Dutch survived the 
attacks of the coalition army of Jayakarta, Banten, and the English before they were able to 
establish Batavia in 1619. 
                                                 
139 In the course of time, the majority of so-called Dutchmen in Batavia and the Ommelanden were really 
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 The arrival of the Dutch changed the layout of the city fundamentally. A concept of town 
planning, foreign to Indonesian culture, was introduced and the former town once dominated 
by wooden and bamboo structures were transformed into a fortified city built of stone and 
bricks, with tiled roofs. All of the indigenous settlements clustered along the banks of Ciliwung 
were demolished, since the Batavian government deemed it wise to depopulate the areas 
around the city walls to prevent sudden attacks from local enemies. In the founding period of 
Batavia hardly any indigenous settlements were left standing in its immediate surroundings. 
The inhabitants of Batavia lived safely inside the walls. As a consequence, during the earliest 
years of its existence the emerging city remained cut off from its hinterland. It was basically an 
enclave more accessible by sea than by land. 
 The isolation of Batavia did not last long. The high density of population inside the city wall, 
the Company efforts to provide proper protection, and the agricultural potential of the 
Ommelanden were the three main factors which pushed people to move into the areas 
surrounding the city. Although this move outside the city walls had already commenced in the 
1630s, extensive settlement only began by the end of seventeenth. By 1689, the total number 
of settlers in the environs of Batavia amounted to 45,550,142 already more than double the 
20,051 people living in the inner city.143 
 Batavia Castle was built at the water‘s edge, a position from where it could control the 
harbour. It was the headquarters of the VOC. Ships anchored in the bay and unloaded 
travellers and goods onto the local craft used as lighters and operated by Malays, Javanese, and 
Chinese. Batavia only achieved its characteristic shape as a castle town after it had survived 
two sieges by the armies of Mataram in 1628-1629. The process of fortification and the 
building of the city walls had been completed by the end of the 1630s. Early in that decade, the 
Ciliwung which dissected the town was straightened and canalized. The area covered by the 
walls of the inner city of Batavia was not large, only 1 by 1.5 km.144 The walled city stretched 
out in rectangular blocks of houses, intersected by canals on both sides of the Cliliwung. 
European residences were concentrated in the east, while most of Asian and indigenous 
dwellings were located in the west. The population in the inner city was already very dense 
even before the end of the seventeenth century. According to the census of 1673, the total 
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number of the population including suburbs amounted to 27,051, in 1680 30,740, and by 1684 
the number had increased to 32,243.145 
 Institutionally, Batavia was a Dutch city in Asia because many of its civil institutions closely 
resembled those in contemporary Dutch cities. 146  These bodies included the College van 
Schepenen (Board of Aldermen), the College van Weesmeesteren (Board of Governors of the 
Orphanage), the Raad van Justitie (Court of Justice), and the College van Heemraden (the District 
Council). Despite all these governing bodies, this high concentration of population created 
problems in town. To give but one example, the densely packed housing was a huge hazard in 
the event of fire. In 1622, many Chinese cottages built of wood and bamboo in the eastern 
part of the city burned down. Another great fire broke out in 1657, which destroyed some fifty 
houses in the western quarter. Ten years later, the government decreed that no more bamboo 
dwellings would be permitted throughout the entire city.147 
 This obvious consequence of this regulation was that poor people who could not afford to 
build or rent houses constructed of stone or brick had no choice but to move extramuros. Many 
Chinese, Mardijkers, and Moors (Indian Muslims) moved out and formed dominant 
populations in their new quarters in the eastern, southwestern, and western suburbs. Initially 
there was no special quarter for the Chinese. Only after the Chinese massacre of 1740 did the 
government decide to build a Chinesche kamp or China town in an area located southwest of the 
city walls. The Moors had their own special quarter known as Pekojan.148 This quarter was 
located outside of the west wall of Batavia between Bacherachtgracht and Amanusgracht. The 
name Pekojan is derived from the word koja, a term for Muslim immigrants from the Malabar 
Coast and Coromandel.149 Most of the Mardijkers resided on the swampy land opened up 
across the river by the southeast gate of the city, where they built a church which was known 
for centuries as the Portuguese church (now Gereja Sion) since the services were held in that 
language.150  
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Illustration 2: Outer Portuguese Church 
Source: Max de Bruijn and Bast Kist, Johannes Rach 1720-1783, Artist in Indonesia and Asia (Jakarta: National Library 
of Indonesia, 2001), p. 58. 
 
 The Company always gave the highest priority to the security of Batavia. Threats could come 
either from inside or outside. All indigenous and non-European inhabitants who lived 
intramuros were obliged to reside in specific wijken or quarters under the supervision of 
wijkmeesteren or quartermasters. When Bantenese warriors invaded the countryside around 
Batavia in 1656, the Company issued a ban on all Javanese in the inner city. After that, 
Javanese settlements were located near the fort of Jacatra on the bank of the Krukut River, 
outside the Dietspoort, and outside the Utrecht Gate.151 
 In order to exercise effective supervision of the Javanese, the colonial government divided 
their settlements into two groups. Those who settled east of the Ciliwung were called ooster-
Javanen and those residing west of the river were called wester-Javanen. These people were placed 
under the command of their own officials and the leader of each section was awarded the 
military title of Javanese Captain. In the performance of their duties, the Javanese Captains 
were assisted by lower-ranking Javanese officers. 
 To keep Batavia secure, the Company also decided to concentrate other indigenous 
settlements outside the city walls. By forcibly locating their residences in the Ommelanden, the 
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colonial administration could rid the city of potentially harmful elements. The other purpose 
was to protect Batavia from direct attacks by the armies of local Javanese rulers. By arranging 
indigenous settlements at various corners of the city defences, the obvious strategy was that, if 
war broke out, these settlements could be used as a frontline defence before the enemy 
warriors could reach the city walls. 
 The Ambonese soldiers who arrived in 1656 were given land close to the outer Company 
forts. In 1663, a group of Bugis under Arung Patudju was granted a piece of land by the side 
of River Krukut.152 The Makassarese was settled on the northern side of the Amanusgracht in 
1673.153 In 1687 another group of Bugis was placed ―under supervision of Fort Anke‖ on the 
northern side of the Bacherachtsgracht.154 
 These Indonesian settlements in the environs of Batavia were called kampung. All of them 
were administered by their own headmen. The establishment of kampung composed of 
communities of the same ethnic origin was part and parcel of the Company strategy to 
facilitate the administration of indigenous people. Nowadays, some districts in Jakarta still bear 
names like Kampung Ambon, Kampung Makassar, Kampung Bali, and Kampung Bandan. 
The policy of settling such ethnic groups as Makassarese, Bugis, and Madurese in separate 
kampung around the city was not restricted to Batavia, but was also pursued in other towns 
along the north coast of Java.155 There was no obvious pattern in the arrangement of kampung 
in the Ommelanden, everything depended on the availability of vacant land.  
 The basis of the administrative and land-allotment system was the donation of a plot of land 
to an indigenous headman, thereby presenting him with a means to earn a living for himself 
and his fellow-countrymen. These kampung were usually clustered around the six small forts 
(redoubt) which formed an outer line of the defence of the city at a distance of one to two 
kilometres. The initiative of establishing kampung was not confined to the side of the 
Company; the indigenous leaders were also eager to undertake such an enterprise. The 
Balinese Captain Lampiedja and his people submitted a request to occupy the Company land 
on the western bank of the Grogol River in 1687.156 Around about the same time, a group of 
Bugis people under the command of Jourobassa (juru bahasa/translator) also submitted a 
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petition to be allowed to occupy a plot of the Company land at Cengkareng, 157  and the 
Balinese Captain Tiben proposed to create a kampung on the bank of the Sunter River.158 
 Since the government had no good survey of its own land in the Ommelanden at its 
disposal, the allocation was somewhat irregular and tended to progress in fits and starts. A list 
of night watches in various Indonesian quarters in the Ommelanden gives some impression of 
the location of the kampung. The list forms part of the Heemraden Resolution of 24 June 1730 
which decreed that each indigenous leader in the various kampung had to organize a night 
patrol in his own quarter.159 
 
Table 2: Location of several kampungs in the Ommelanden 
 
People Leader Location 
Javanese Captain Soeta Wangsa Mangga Doea 
Ambonese Captain Zacharias Bintang Mangga Doea 
Balinese Captain Achmat Katewel Pisang Batoe 
Javanese Captain Bagoes Mantoe Pageraman 
Ambonese Lieutenant Warnar Abrahams  North of the Amanusgracht 
Makassarese Vaandrig Daeng Mabella North of the Amanusgracht 
Bugis Captain Barak North of the 
Bacherachtgracht and close 
to Fort Sevenhoek 
Balinese Captain Gusti Cutut North of the 
Bacherachtgracht and close 
to Fort Sevenhoek 
Balinese Vaandrig Soedjaja South of the Bacheracgracht 
and beyond Fort Vijfhoek  
Balinese Captain Rangin North of the 
Bacherachtgracht and below 
the Fort Vijfhoek 
Bugis Captain To Issa Patoeakan 
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Balinese Lieutenant Achmat Babandam Alongside of the Molenvliet 
Javanese Lieutenant Bagus Carta Buiten de Boom/Outside 
the Boom on the Molenvliet 
 
 Not all of the kampung in the Ommelanden are listed in this table. Prominent omissions are 
the Butonese kampung which was located to the south of the Ancolsevaart,160 the Bandanese 
Kampung on the northern side of the same canal,161 and the Balinese Kampung under Captain 
Mochamat Sale in Pakodjan.162 The names of kampung locations in the Heemraden resolutions 
were not always written consistently, because there were multiple kampung named, for instance, 
Mangga Doea, Pisang Batoe, Pageraman, Patoeakan, and Pacodjan. There also were regions 
which were probably broader in size than kampung such as those on the northern side of the 
Amanusgracht, the northern and southern sides of the Bacherachtgracht, the banks of the 
Molenvliet, and the northern and southern sides of Ancolsevaart. More than one kampung 
could be located in these areas. For instance, we do know that an Ambonese and a 
Makassarese kampung were both located north of the Amanusgracht and that Bugis and 
Balinese kampung were situated north of the Bacherachtgracht.  
 Another factor which heavily determined the settlement patterns in the Ommelanden was 
the growing interest in agricultural activities. The sugar boom which started at the end of the 
seventeenth century attracted hundreds of Chinese as well as large numbers of Javanese 
migrants from the north coast and the interior of Java, encouraging to journey to and settle 
down in the Ommelanden. The number of sugar-mills operating in the Ommelanden in the 
years 1710, 1713 and, 1734 always amounted to more than 100. At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, during the harvest season a sugar-mill required between nineteen and 
twenty-six labourers. Using that number as a basis, we can estimate how many labourers were 
employed by the Omemlanden sugar-mills. For example, there were 130 sugar-mills operating 
in 1710. Those sugar-mills required no fewer than 2,470-3,380 labourers. That number can be 
doubled because a sugar-mill operated 24 hours a day during the harvest season and required 
at least two shifts of labourers.  
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 Batavian sugar labourers settled in cabins (petak) in the sugar-mill camps or on the land 
around the sugar-mill. These sugar industry workers had to be very mobile since every couple 
of years sugar-mills were relocated, moving farther away from the city in search of more 
heavily forested surroundings. In 1711 there were fifty sugar-mills located along the banks of 
the Ciliwung River and twenty-three on those of the Pesanggrahan River.163 Half a century 
later in 1767, the number of sugar-mills at these locations had been reduced to five and nine.164 
The declining number of sugar-mills along both rivers after a few decades of rapid growth was 
undoubtedly caused by deforestation. The sugar workers were also seasonal migrants. Most of 
them came to work at the sugar-mills only during the harvest season. During the off-season, 
these labourers might either take another job in the Ommelanden, working as paddy cultivator, 
market gardener, cattle herder or they returned to their home villages if they were Javanese or 
Sundanese. 
 
3. Local administration 
 
 There was no definite form of government in the original surroundings of Jayakarta prior to 
the establishment of the authority of the Company. The challenge was to invent a totally new 
administrative model to control the newly created multi-ethnic society. The Company interests 
and the ethnic variety of the population were the two factors which eventually determined the 
sort of administration created. In an economic sense, the Company needed only a restricted 
number of agricultural products such as sugar, rice, vegetables, timber, and cattle. All of these 
products, with the exception of sugar, were for home consumption only. They were required 
purely to provision Batavia with its necessities. The Company interest in this area was 
therefore closely related to the recruitment of labour for local agriculture and for the supply of 
soldiers from the ranks of the non-European militias. The employment of civilians as auxiliary 
troops in military campaigns was a legacy of the organization of contemporary Dutch cities. 
During the war of secession with Spain, the Eighty Years‘ War 1568-1648, the citizens of 
Dutch towns were organized into civil militias.165 This practice was brought to Asia by the 
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Dutch and implemented in the colonial settlement of Batavia both inside and outside the walls. 
The militia in town was called the schutterij [musketeers] 
 When it created a local administration in the Ommelanden, the guiding beacon governing 
the actions of the Company was pragmatism. The form of this administration was not decided 
on in the mother country and imported but was made up on the spot to suit the local 
conditions. The upshot was that, in many cases, local customs and usages were fused with the 
institutions and administrative conventions current in the Dutch Republic. To a certain extent, 
the Asian inhabitants, grouped in kampung under command of their own headmen, remained 
subordinate to their own laws. This method of indirect rule was the usual state of affairs found 
throughout all of Southeast Asia, particularly in the cosmopolitan port cities, where foreign 
nations were grouped under a leader of their own and allowed some degree of autonomous 
authority. However, the indigenous kampung were not completely exempt from colonial 
government intervention. The government control of the indigenous kampung was 
implemented by the College van Heemraden, the Gecommitteerde voor de zaken der Inlanderen, the 
landdrost, and the wijkmeesters. These institutions and their officials represented the Company 
authority at the local level. As a result, the local administration which emerged was an amalgam 
of Southeast Asian and Dutch customs. 
 It must be emphasized that, although the VOC did become a territorial power in Java, 
Ceylon and the Moluccas, it always remained an alien body on the fringes of Asian society, 
even in those regions which it administered directly. 166  The local administration in the 
Ommelanden was basically a colonial one, since the highest authority remained in the hands of 
the High Government of Batavia and all important decisions to do with the population in 
general were determined by the colonial interests. On the other hand, in daily life this 
administration was run at a lower level by indigenous officers who referred to their own adat 
(customs) and traditions for guidance.167 As long as there were no important matters which 
required direct government intervention, the administration at the kampung level was quite 
similar to that in other kampung or villages in Indonesia. Nevertheless, although the traditional 
elements could be found in these kampung, life in them was actually considerably modified by 
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the large presence of slaves and migrant labourers.168 The Ommelanden kampung were societies 
whose homogenous character soon faded away, submerged by the increasing number of 
manumitted slaves and subsequent ethnic mingling.  
 The development of the local administration of the Ommelanden was determined by two 
factors: the effort considered worthwhile to have access to inhabitants who could be drafted 
into the expeditionary armies and the policy of leaving the daily administration in the hands of 
the ethnic leaders themselves. The first factor had an obvious impact on the hierarchical 
arrangement of the indigenous officers. In this situation, obviously a military hierarchy became 
the prevalent model, since most of the earliest inhabitants in the kampung settled in the 
Ommelanden after having completed a tour of duty in a military campaign. Therefore, the 
hierarchy of indigenous leaders closely followed that of the colonial military service. The 
highest title in the indigenous local administration was that of captain. He was assisted by 
lieutenants, vaandrigs (ensigns), and sergeants. The kampung headmen were often also the 
commanders of the indigenous auxiliary troops called up during the Company military 
campaigns. 
 The consequence of the second factor was that the colonial government had no direct access 
to ordinary people in the kampung. They had to deal with the indigenous headmen before their 
decision could have an impact on the kampung inhabitants. The principal intention of the 
Company in allowing the indigenous administration to operate at ground level was to cut costs 
and avoid unnecessary problems. The absence of direct control was never a big problem as 
long as the Ommelanden inhabitants followed and obeyed Company orders. To be the 
spokesman for the administration and general supervisor over the Asian nations, the High 
Government appointed the Commissaris over de zaken van de inlander (Commissioner in Charge of 
Native Affairs). This office was founded in 1686 when the members of the High Government 
Joan van Hoorn and Isaac de Saint Martin were assigned to organize the settlement of the 
Inlandse (native Indonesian) population groups in the Ommelanden.169 
 The Chinese community in Batavia was the first group to have its own headman or Captain. 
Captain Souw Beng Kong (Ben Con) was appointed chief of the Chinese community in 
Batavia on 11 October 1620 by Governor-General Jan Pietersz Coen. ‗Captain‘ in this case 
was simply a title and not a military rank, because the Chinese Captain had no military 
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function. His task was to maintain law and order and settle any civil affairs which might arise 
in his community. Another important task Ben Con had to shoulder was to collect a poll tax 
among his countrymen. This tax, called the hoofdgeld der Chinesen, was introduced on 9 October 
1619. Every Chinese between sixteen and sixty had an obligation to pay a monthly tax 
amounting to 1.5 rijksdaalders,170  which exempted them from all corvée labour and militia 
duties. During the first three days of each month, the Chinese Captain raised the flag in front 
of his house as the sign to the Chinese that they had to pay their tax. As a result, in later years 
the street in front of his residence was called Jalan Tiang Bendera (Flagpole Street). Every 
Chinese who paid the poll tax would receive a vrijbriefje (exemption permit) as proof. The 
institution of Chinese Captain and the Chinese poll tax were still in force at the end of the 
VOC era.  
 The colonial government complemented the Chinese administration in Batavia with 
institutions such as the Chinese hospital and the College van Boedelmeesters or the Curatorial 
Board. These institutions were responsible for the social welfare of the Chinese population. 
The number of Chinese grew exponentially throughout the seventeenth century until they 
became the largest ethnic group in the city. The swelling number of Chinese citizens made it 
necessary to appoint lower-ranking Chinese officers. From 1678, the Chinese Captains were 
assisted by several lieutenants, secretaries, Chineesche wijkmeesters (Chinese supervisors of town 
quarters) and other auxiliaries.171 Together they bore the responsibility for the collection of 
taxes, the taking of the annual census, and the maintenance of law and order.     
 Following the example of this model, in the course of time other groups of people were also 
organized under their own headman or captain. Hence, in the early decades of Batavia, there 
were Japanese, Mardijker, Malay, and Papangan Captains. Unlike the Chinese Captain, these 
other captains also had a military function. During the Company military campaigns they acted 
as commanders of the militias recruited from their own community. In times of peace, they 
also maintained law and order and settled civil affairs but, since the non-Chinese citizens did 
not have to pay a poll tax, this was one task these other captains did not have to worry about. 
 The earliest development of the Javanese Captain can be traced back to a decree issued on 
19 January 1635, by which the Company declared that Javanese should choose their own 
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headman to supervise the thirty Javanese households who lived inside the city walls.172 More 
regulation was imposed on the administration of Indonesian people when, by decree of 6 
December 1678, the government divided the ‗indigenous‘ population of Batavia into various 
groups, each consisting of 100 persons, under the supervision of their own officers be they 
lieutenants, vaandrigs, or sergeants.173 Because they had arrived as warrior bands, it was not very 
difficult for some groups of people from Eastern Indonesia, among them Ambonese, 
Makassarese, and Bugis to adjust themselves to the Ommelanden administration which was 
based on military organization. However, it was quite a different story and required an 
enormous adjustment for the Javanese and Balinese who were also present in the 
Ommelanden in large numbers. The former had come as free migrants; the majority of the 
second as slaves. As civilians, without any military background, these people proved more 
difficult to organize and could only gradually be eased into the local administration.  
 The decision about whether a group would be granted separate status and hence allowed to 
form a kampung was entirely up to the colonial government. There was no standard procedure 
for appointing the Indonesian captains and other lower-ranking officials. They could be 
nominated by the government by fellow officials, by their followers, or even by individual 
request. As a rule, Indonesian officials in the Ommelanden were not permitted to pass on their 
title to their descendants, but occasionally some indigenous captains did manage to keep the 
prestigious position within their family. Some good examples were Captain der Ooster-Javanen 
Soeta Wangsa, the Malay Captain Encik Bagus, and the Balinese family Babandam.174 
  
4. Authority in the Ommelanden 
 
 Consequently, authority in the Ommelanden was exercised in a two-tier system. The first 
and highest was the authority vested in the colonial government; the other, subordinate to the 
first, was that vested in the indigenous officials. The implementation of authority was exercised 
through various institutions established to control natural and human resources. The actual 
performance of their duties by the College van Heemraden, the Gecommitteerde voor de zaken der 
Inlanderen, the landdrost, and the landmeeter was limited in terms of budget and potential, since 
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they had to deal with a territory and a population which grew steadily throughout the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth century. This would have been a virtually impossible task 
without recruiting indigenous headmen as part of the colonial administration and using them 
as formal leaders of their own ethnicity at ground level.  
 The Company policy was to intervene in indigenous affairs no more than was necessary to 
protect its own interests. Hence, its authority and administrative organization depended largely 
on local circumstances.175 In the case of the Ommelanden, by delegation of authority through 
the indigenous officers, the colonial government could rule without being directly involved in 
the daily administration of the kampung. In reality, the indigenous officers enjoyed a great deal 
of freedom in running their own affairs. Externally, they acted as formal leaders and 
intermediaries between the colonial government and the kampung inhabitants; internally they 
also enjoyed high status as the religious and adat leaders in their communities. 
 In the early decades of Batavia, no specific administrative institution was appointed to tackle 
any problems which might happen to arise in the region outside the city. The administration of 
the intermediate hinterland at that time was taken care of by the College van Schepenen (the 
College of Aldermen). This College was officially established on 1 July 1620, although it had 
already issued its first instructions on 24 June 1620.176 Besides carrying out their administrative 
functions, the Aldermen also had to shoulder judicial tasks. In its capacity as a court, this 
College was known as the Schepenbank (the Court of Aldermen). The whole of the population 
of Batavia and the Ommelanden was subject to the jurisdiction of this court. Another 
important duty undertaken by the Schepenen was the registration of the transfer of private 
landed property and slaves. Under Batavian jurisdiction, the transfer of private land was 
forbidden without possession of a deed issued by the Schepenen.177 
 The High Government appointed the bailiff or baljuw, the chief of police, to be in charge of 
the law enforcement to which the citizens living inside and outside the city were subject. When 
his office was set up in 1620, there was no clear description of the extent of the bailiff‘s 
authority but this assumed more concrete lines after the establishment of the Schepenbank the 
same year. The main task of the bailiff was the maintenance of peace, order, and security 
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within the borders of his territory. He also served as public prosecutor in the Court of 
Aldermen. To help him in carrying out his duties, the High Government invested him with the 
authority to arrest persons who broke the law, fine them, or take other legal action against 
them. He was assisted by kaffers, black policemen, who were paid and equipped from the fines 
he collected. By a decree issued in 1622, the bailiff was assisted by four kaffers, but this number 
had increased to eight in 1681 to keep up with the population growth.178 Later eighteenth- 
century court proceedings still refer to the policemen as kaffers but it seems that by then they 
were no longer Indian but Madurese.179 To maintain law and order, it was necessary for the 
bailiff and his kaffers to keep close contact with the heads of the quarter (wijkmeesteren) and with 
the leaders of the various ethnic communities inside and outside the city.   
 The territory of the bailiff was reduced and limited to Batavia only in 1651, when the 
colonial government specially appointed a separate officer, the landdrost or sheriff, to keep law 
and order in the Ommelanden.180 The growing number of complaints about such crimes as 
theft, robbery, and violence in the expanding territory of the Ommelanden had eventually 
forced the government decides to appoint this landdrost to maintain security, peace, and order 
outside the town. He was essentially a second bailiff and his duties were more or less similar. 
Nevertheless, the area covered by his jurisdiction was much broader since the Company 
territory in the areas surrounding Batavia kept steadily increasing. In 1678, after its territory 
had been extended under the terms of the contract with Mataram signed in 1677, the High 
Government appointed a second landdrost for the environs of Batavia. Henceforth there were 
two landdrosten assigned to the Ommelanden; one for the eastern side and the other for the 
western side of the city.181 The Ciliwung River was the boundary line. The landdrosten were also 
assisted by kaffers, eight on the western side and six on the eastern side. 
  The expanding area of the Ommelanden gradually made the tasks of the landdrost more 
onerous. Many territorial disputes between landowners in the Ommelanden can simply be put 
down to the lack of any proper supervision of landownership. The High Government had to 
concede that the landdrost and his assistants were being engulfed by their work. Therefore, in 
1664 it was decided to establish the College van Heemraden (the District Council) whose principal 
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duty would be to supervise landownership and settle disputes between landowners. In 1667 
the Hoge Regering decided to dig a canal which would connect the walled city with the River 
Sunter. The construction costs would be covered by the tax imposed on the land located along 
the canal and the task of levying this tax was assigned to the Heemraden. A year later, the 
colonial government issued a regulation which stated that it was forbidden to dig any canal 
along a public road without the authorization of the Heemraden.182 For the first few years of its 
existence, the College van Heemraden was actually a dormant institution and it only became fully 
active after it was re-established in 1684.183 Five years earlier, in 1679, this College had already 
assumed the duty of the Schepenen of supervising the excavation of the Zuiderringsloot, the 
southern ring canal. After its overhaul, the Heemraden became the institution in charge of the 
supervision of the Ommelanden infrastructure, taking responsibility for roads, bridges, canals 
dams, and buildings. Another of its tasks was the maintenance of security in the countryside 
and hence the landdrosten were attached to it. 
 One important Company official who was attached to the Heemraden was the Gecommitteerde 
voor de zaken der Inlanderen. The increasing number of Javanese migrants who illegally occupied 
vacant land in the second half of the seventeenth century was the principal reason for the 
establishment of this office. In the early years of this post, the main task of this Commissioner 
was to curb the rising number of the illegal settlers. Later he also assumed the job of the 
implementation of the tiende paddy (10 per cent tax on paddy). In 1685 the progress being made 
in the rice cultivation in the Ommelanden had tempted the Heemraden to slap a tax on the rice 
harvested from the Company land. They put the Commissioner in charge of monitoring the 
collection of paddy at the Company granaries.184 
 The decentralized local administration in the Ommelanden was inspired by the Dutch 
experience in their homeland. In conformity with the tradition of urban administration in the 
Dutch Republic, in 1655 Governor-General Joan Maetsuyker decided to divide Batavia and its 
surrounding into districts. It is likely that he was inspired by the division of the Dutch cities 
into kwartieren (quarters or districts). The kwartieren were wards responsible for such duties as 
tax gathering and extinguishing fires. They also provided schutters (members of the citizen 
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militia).185 At the urban district level, the colonial authority was represented by the wijkmeesteren 
(quartermasters or district supervisors). The government realized that, since the number of the 
bailiffs and kaffers was limited, they needed to be supported by lower-ranking officials who 
could maintain law and order at the neighbourhood level. Therefore, two wijkmeesters were 
appointed for each wijk (ward) in the inner city. In the beginning, all wijkmeesters were 
European, Mestizo, or Mardijker, but after 1690 there were Chinese wijkmeesters186 and later 
also Indonesian.  
 The wijkmeesters saw to police matters, supervised construction works, and sanitation. 187 
These minor officials also kept an eye on the moral conduct of the inhabitants of the quarter 
and the situation of the poor. Petitions for the admission to the poorhouse of Batavia were 
almost always written by the wijkmeester.188 After 1673 they also carried out a yearly census of all 
the inhabitants of their respective quarters. Unlike other Company officials, the wijkmeesters 
were not paid for doing their job, but their prestige among their fellow citizens rose because of 
the social responsibilities they assumed in such matters as the management of mutual 
assistance in the event of illness, death, and marriage. In the Ommelanden, the wijkmeesters had 
to seek co-operation with the kampung headmen, since the majority of the inhabitants in this 
region were Indonesians living in kampung. A quarter was often composed of more than one 
kampung, and therefore it was crucial that the Supervisors maintain good relations with the 
kampung leaders if they wanted to carry out their duties successfully. 
 Two years after the re-establishment of the Heemraden, district supervisors were also 
appointed in the Ommelanden. Their duties closely resembled those of their counterparts in 
the inner city. Their main task was to help the landdrost in maintaining peace and order. They 
also supervised public works and oversaw the cleaning of the roads and watercourses in their 
neighbourhood.189 The Ommelanden wijkmeesters were also required to conduct the annual 
census; a task more difficult than in the city, since a quarter in the Ommelanden was made up 
of more than one kampung and often also contained private estates within its borders. The 
Supervisors had to rely on the co-operation of kampung headmen or of the mandors (supervisors 
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of private estates) in collecting data about the population. 190  Through mandors and other 
personnel, the owners of private estates virtually ruled as potentates over the inhabitants living 
and working on their estates. One such landowner was Cornelis Chastelein, who possessed 
large holdings at Depok. In 1686, the system was elaborated by the appointment of four 
members of the Raad van Indië as opperwijkmeesters (senior district supervisors) for the inner city 
and the Ommelanden.   
 Local authority at the ground level was in the hands of kampung headmen. In contrast to 
other institutions in the Ommelanden which were dominated by Europeans, the kampung 
headmen were usually Indonesian group leaders who had shown their loyalty and leadership as 
commanders of auxiliary troops in the military expeditions organized by the Company. Hence, 
it was in the natural run of things that the colonial government should grant them the military 
title of captain. Nevertheless, the military character of the kampung was gradually watered down 
by the influx of new kampung inhabitants, the majority of whom were liberated slaves and free 
migrants from the north coast and interior of Java. In the eighteenth century, the main 
criterion for the appointment of a kampung headman was no longer his military talents but 
more often his obedience to and capacity to carry out tasks for the Company.  
 Both the internal order and the successful administration of the kampung depended on how 
well a kampung leader could wield his authority and drum up the co-operation of the 
inhabitants of his kampung. Indeed, the authority of a charismatic headman could exceed the 
boundaries of his kampung territory and also be acknowledged by people of other nations. This 
was the case with Kapitan Jonker, the headman of the Ambonese kampung in Marunda. He was 
also accepted as their leader by the Makassarese, Butonese, and Malays. When these people 
returned to Batavia after having served under this kapitan in the Company military campaigns, 
they refused to take up residence in the kampung to which they were assigned by the High 
Government, preferring to settle with Captain Jonker in Marunda.191 
 Officially the Indonesian captains represented the government at the ground level, but in 
practice what won their leadership real recognition were their personal charisma and their 
ability to provide protection. It was a common practice for the Indonesian officers to petition 
the Company for land so they could provide their followers with plots on which they could 
pursue agricultural activities. On 10 May 1687, for instance, the Balinese Captain Tiben asked 
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for a plot located between the Sunter and Cakung Rivers in Pondok Bambu in order to 
provide his people with land which could be used for rice cultivation.192 Another example is 
the petition lodged with the Heemraden by the Javanese Lieutenant Tsitra Naya on 21 October 
1701. He asked for a plot located to the southeast of Batavia in an area called Cipinang. This 
Javanese lieutenant had been cultivating this land with his followers since 1682.193 
 
5. Social interaction 
 
The local society formed in the Ommelanden throughout both the seventeenth and the 
eighteenth century was essentially a colonial society. It bore many resemblances to other 
communities in and around the coastal port towns of Java, in the sense that various groups of 
Asian people, among them Chinese, Arabs, Indians, Malays, Makasarese, Bugis, and Balinese, 
lived in their own kampung and under their own leaders. The major point of divergence was 
that the Ommelanden people did not become the vassals of a feudal ruler, but lived under the 
colonial jurisdiction of the Company. At this point it should be stressed that they enjoyed a 
relative degree of freedom, because they could follow their own religion, observe their own 
traditional customs, and move to other kampung in search of a better job. The landdrosten would 
only intervene in kampung life if there were criminal cases involving theft, armed robbery, or 
murder. 
 As elsewhere in Java, the people of the Ommelanden obtained their livelihood from the 
cultivation of rice, vegetables, and fruit, but there was the added dimension that they also 
undertook the growing of new agricultural produce which could be sold on the Asian and 
European markets. Chief among them were sugar-cane, pepper, and coffee. Many were 
employed as paid workers in the rural industries which had sprung up in significant numbers in 
the areas surrounding Batavia. Chief among them were sugar-mills, arak distilleries, lime-kilns, 
and brickworks. Another feature which betrayed the fact that the Ommelanden was populated 
by a colonial society was the inescapable presence of slavery. Slaves were employed in the 
domestic, agricultural, and rural industrial sectors. The existence of a large number of legal 
slaves and ex-slaves was what set Ommelanden society apart from its counterparts in the other 
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port towns of Java. Alongside the free Javanese migrants, manumitted slaves provided the 
kampung with their chief source of new inhabitants. 
 Jean Gelman Taylor states that the colonial society in Batavia during the VOC period was 
made up of groups who were only superficially European and, since Asian, Eurasian, and 
Creole wives constituted the majority of the spouses there, they exerted a strong influence on 
the colonial elite in such matters as manners, lifestyle, and recreation.194 Only at the beginning 
of eighteenth century did the Europeans, who occupied the highest stratum of colonial society, 
begin to live permanently in the Ommelanden.195 The majority of them were high-ranking 
Company servants, retired officials, and rich citizens who built country houses along the 
Ciliwung River and the Molenvliet Canal to the south of Batavia. In the seventeenth century, 
the Europeans had merely used their country estates for recreational purposes. They would 
beguile a couple of hours at their country retreats and return to Batavia before nightfall. But, 
when this region became more secure in the eighteenth century, the members of the European 
elite changed their living habits and began to reside there permanently. 
 The annual census shows that the number of Europeans in the Ommelanden throughout the 
VOC period never exceeded 1 per cent of the total population. Although they were a tiny 
minority, they continued to dominate economic life and occupied all of the important 
administrative positions. In contrast to the Europeans inhabitants in the inner city in which 
Company personnel and soldiers rubbed shoulders and tried to find some space, the majority 
of the Europeans in the Ommelanden consisted of prominent, wealthy citizens. They often 
owned huge country estates, were served by slaves, and lived a completely separate existence 
from the settlements of other groups of inhabitants. Only the slaves manumitted from the 
country houses had had experience of intensive contact with Europeans but, after their 
manumission, these ex-slaves generally left European customs behind them and converted to 
Islam, after which they were absorbed by the kampung communities. 
 Other non-Indonesian inhabitants of the Ommelanden were the Chinese, Moors, Mestizos, 
and Mardijkers. The Mardijkers and Moors had been granted land by the Company on which 
to set up kampung. The former had a kampung in Tugu, the latter in Pakojan. The colonial 
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government did not encourage the Chinese and Mestizos to set about establishing their own 
kampung, and as the best way to obviate any such initiative was not to issue these groups with 
land grants. As a consequence, the Chinese lived dispersed over the kampung in the immediate 
environs of Batavia, among them Pagaraman, Patekuan, Patuakan, and Pakojan. It was only 
after the trauma of the Chinese revolt in 1740 that they were obliged to move to specially set 
up the Chinese kamp southwest of the city. In fact, a great number of Chinese lived a fair 
distance from Batavia as they worked in the sugar-mills which over the years were gradually 
moved farther and farther away from the city in search of more timber to fuel them. The 
census results indicate that the most of the Mestizos lived in the eastern suburb of Batavia.196  
  These non-Indonesian inhabitants earned a livelihood in the Ommelanden as entrepreneurs, 
agriculturalists, and rural labourers, living in the kampung side by side with people of different 
ethnic origins. Since they had usually arrived from overseas without wives, it was a common 
practice for the Chinese and Moors to marry local women. Inter-marriage also occurred 
among the Mardijkers and Mestizos. Therefore, in comparison with the Europeans, these non-
Indonesian inhabitants interacted quite closely with the indigenous people. As time went by, 
their offspring were absorbed by kampung communities and became ‗Indonesian‘.  
 By adhering to a policy of ‗divide and rule‘, the intention of the colonial government was to 
concentrate ethnic groups so that they could be easily administered and kept apart, but in fact 
there was little control over persons who moved from one kampung to another. Therefore, as 
time went by distinct ethnic quarters still existed only in the official mind, but were rare in 
reality: kampung were officially projected for specific ethnic groups, but most of them were 
occupied by various ethnicities. The following list shows the places of residence of 1000 slave- 
buyers in the Ommelanden.197  
 
Table 3: Residence of slave buyers in the Ommelanden from 1000 samples, 1723-1731 
 
 
 Bali  Bugis Chinese Java Makasar Malay Sumbawa Others Total 
Ancol 3  3   1   7 
Anke 29 11 5  1  1 1 48 
Bekasi  1 5 1 1    8 
Cililitan    1 1 4   6 
Gudang 40  3 2 2    47 
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Panjang 
Grogol 2    2 1   5 
Kampung 
Baru 
5    10   1 16 
Kampung 
Melayu 
6     5 1 1 13 
Krukut 20 1 16     2 39 
Mangga 
Besar 
  2      2 
Mangga Dua 4  3 2     9 
Pagaraman 107 13 21 9 6 20 5 10 191 
Pajuangan 11  7      18 
Patekuan 10  20   1   31 
Patuakan 45 7 6   2 1 5 66 
Pakojan 84 2 17   2  7 112 
Pisang Batu 16 1 5      22 
Pluit 22  2      24 
Salemba 6  1    1  8 
Sunter 1 7 1   1  1 11 
Tanah 
Abang 
4  1 1     6 
Tanah Sareal 2  2    1  5 
Tangerang 3 9 2 1  2   17 
Tanjung 
Priuk 





15 103 18 1 13 8 30 285 
Total 517 67 226 36 24 52 19 59 1000 
 
 More than twenty-five different places are recorded in these samples. Each of them was 
inhabited by at least three different ethnicities. Pagaraman and Pakojan were inhabited by no 
fewer than seven ethnicities, most of who were actively involved in the slave trade. This 
demonstrates that the Ommelanden offered everyone, whatever their ethnic origin, freedom to 
settle.  
 Since Chinese men preferred Balinese concubines, many free Balinese of mixed parentage 
were in fact peranakan. They were counted as Balinese in the census and other official 
documents when they followed their manumitted mother if she chose to live in one of the 
Ommelanden Balinese kampung. 198   This was apparently also the case with the Moor, 
Mardijker, and Mestizo men who had Indonesian wives or concubines. Once they were 
widowed, these ex-wives and ex-concubines often married other people and moved to one of 
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the kampung in the Ommelanden. Children of mixed descent who followed their mother would 
be counted as members of their mother‘s ethnicity by the colonial administration. 
 The highest degree of mixed marriage occurred between the various Indonesian ethnicities. 
Mixed marriage was not encouraged by the colonial government, but nor was it expressly 
forbidden. Javanese Lieutenant Tsitra Naya, for example, was married to a Makassarese 
woman name Simba.199 Another Makassarese woman, Mamin, became the wife of the Buton 
Captain Abdul Djalaly. 200  Intje Cadier, a free Javanese living outside the Diespoort, was 
married to Norsay van Batavia, probably herself the offspring of a mixed marriage in 
Batavia.201 
 These examples show that kinship, similarity of ethnic background, and religious bonds were 
less significant in determining sexual patterns than simple geographical proximity. 202 
Miscegenation was easier in the Ommelanden because ethnic identity among Indonesian 
inhabitants was fairly weak and unarticulated. The history of the Indonesian Archipelago 
supports the impression that ethnic classifications were not central to social structure. 203 
Perhaps the children of mixed marriage would in their turn marry people from different ethnic 
groups. After some generations, the descendants of these people would lose their own ethnic 
identity and become simply Anak Betawi, children of Batavia. 
 
6. Law enforcement and criminality 
 
 Law and order in the Ommelanden depended on a mutual understanding between the 
Company and the kampung headmen. The vast territory covered by the Ommelanden and the 
limited number of Company officials stationed in this region meant it was virtually impossible 
to exert any direct supervision over kampung life. Direct administration was also hindered by 
the fact that the kampung had expressly been founded on the basis of different ethnic 
backgrounds. The most effective way to maintain law and order in the areas surrounding 
Batavia was by the delegation of authority to Indonesian officials.  
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 The Company decided to respect local law and hand the administration of most judicial 
matters over to the kampung headmen who were responsible for maintaining order in their 
kampung. Without a request from or the approval of the kampung headmen, colonial police 
officers had no right of entry to the kampung. However, the authority and competence of 
Indonesian officials did not extend to the serious crimes of murder, assault and grievous bodily 
harm, robbery, looting, and plunder. When these crimes were committed, either the baljuw or 
the landdrost had to be invited to take charge. 
 The perpetration of any sort of violence could mean that an inhabitant of Batavia had to 
stand trial before the Court of Aldermen. In some areas of Indonesia where the VOC had full 
authority, the institution and conventions of Romano-Dutch law were fully in force.204 In the 
Ommelanden, the implementation of this judicial system was combined with the customary 
law or adat of the Indonesian community. The colonial authority would not intervene in 
criminal cases as long they could be solved locally. 
 The legal system applied by the Dutch in their Asian headquarters and its rural surroundings 
therefore separated the people into those who worked for the Company and those who did 
not.205 The Raad van Justitie was the court to which the Company employees, their families and 
slaves were answerable. This court was presided over by a member of Raad van Indië (Council 
of the Indies) and staffed by high-ranking Company men with legal training. The Schepenbank 
(Court of Aldermen) was the court for the civilian population of Batavia and the 
Ommelanden. 206  This court treated Europeans, Chinese, and Indonesian people as equal 
before the law. The members of this court consisted of nine persons who were high-ranking 
Company officers and prominent European and Chinese persons but were not necessarily 
legal professionals. 
 The growing agricultural economy around Batavia transformed this region from virgin forest 
into plantation areas inhabited by various ethnic groups. The commercialization of agricultural 
activities transformed the rural subsistence economy into a market-oriented production area. 
Cash crops, most prominent among them pepper, sugar-cane, and coffee, were planted to 
supply the demands of the Company. This commercial-scale expansion of agricultural 
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production offered jobs to thousands of Javanese, as well as acting as a magnet for Chinese 
entrepreneurs and labourers.  
 Nevertheless, not all of the sojourners and new settlers earned their living from the rural 
economic activities. The fluctuation in the demand for sugar, for instance, could force 
thousands of workers in that industry out of their job. The same sort of fate could also befall 
people involved in other cash crop cultivation. As hundreds of newly manumitted and 
runaway slaves tried to find a place in the Batavian plantation economy, it was quite possible 
that some of them would fail to find employment. Joining up with other jobless people, they 
roamed around the countryside doing their best to survive. For the first time, the 
Ommelanden were inhabited by a significant number of unemployed people who posed a 
potential threat to law and order.  
 The Ommelanden was a heterogeneous society in the process of formation which had not 
yet reached a stage at which its inhabitants could formulate a clear communal identity. 
Intolerance, misunderstanding, and jealousy between people of different ethnic backgrounds 
could easily flare up, get out of hand, and result in crime. Nor were hatred and resentment 
foreign to people of the same ethnic stock, witness the murder of Bongil. The problem began 
on 18 February 1704, when Bangi, a Javanese from Bagelen, came to the house of another 
Javanese named Singa Gatti in Patoeakan. Since Singa Gatti was not at home and would not 
return until several days later. His wife, named Hongtse, asked Bongil to call again later. 
Hongtse had recognized Bongil as a friend of her husband and therefore it did not occur to 
her that Bangi might have bad intentions. Two days later towards afternoon Bangi came again, 
but this time he carried a keris (traditional Javanese dagger) in his hand. Singa Gatti still had not 
yet returned home. Without saying uttering a word, Bangi ran amok and attacked Hongtse. 
Fortunately Hongtse could escape this onslaught. She ran out of the house and called for the 
help. This entire incident had been seen by one of Hongtse‘s neighbours named Bongil who 
happened to be sitting on the bale-bale (traditional Indonesian bed) in front of his house. Bangi 
who was chasing Hongtse suddenly changed course and attacked Bongil. He stabbed Bongil 
injuring him so badly he died. 207  The investigation conducted by the bailiff revealed that 
Bangi‘s motive for running amok was to take revenge for a personal problem he had with 
Singa Gatti. 
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 The social stratification among the Asian populations in the Ommelanden was quite loose. 
People interacted socially without paying too much attention to their status. Marriage and 
romance between slaves and free people was a common occurrence. However, the close 
relationships between males and females of a different social status could sometimes end not 
in marriage but in adultery. This was what happened to the romantic relationship between 
Tsimpo van Bugis, a male slave belonging to the Chinese Tet Souwko, and Johinio van 
Batavia, the wife of Tan Kandjenko. Worried that Kandjenko would find out about their secret 
trysts, they thought up a plan to murder him. The plan was executed on 31 July 1707. On that 
day, at seven o‘clock in the evening, as Tan Kandjenko was sleeping, Johinio quietly opened 
the front door of her house for Tsimpo who had been hiding behind the fence. After the door 
was open, Tsimpo and Johinio clasping parang in their hands entered Kandjenko‘s bedroom 
and murdered him. This murderous couple had planned to marry, but unfortunately for them, 
their crime was discovered and they were sent to stand trial before the Schepenbank Court. 208   
 Most of the Ommelanden inhabitants depended on the sugar industry. It goes without 
saying that criminality in the Ommelanden often occurred on the sugar plantations since there 
were so many people gathered on those plantations to work as coolies. Here is one example: 
Santadjaya, a Javanese from Banjoemas, who worked as a private guard at the sugar-mill 
owned by Chinese Hoatko in Maroedja (Meruya), conspired with two other Javanese, Soeta 
Laxana and Soeta Marta, to steal some carts and buffalos from his employer‘s mill. His fellow 
Javanese also worked as private guards but not at the Hoatko‘s mill. They also stole sugar-cane 
from Hoatko‘s fields. Only Santadjaja was successfully captured at the end of August 1717; 
Soeta Laxana and Seota Marta managed to escape.209   
 It was necessary for the landdrost to exercise caution in maintaining law and order in his 
territories. When informed of a crime, he and his kaffers were immediately supposed to begin 
conducting an investigation and make the necessary arrests. If he did not act speedily, the 
person who had committed a crime could run away or evidence which might be used could be 
lost. Crimes in the environs of Batavia often tended to be committed in the remoter regions. 
In 1705, for instance, Cornelis Chastelein wrote about a Javanese who undertook a three to 
four day journey from a distant place to report a murder to the landdrost. Unfortunately, no 
serious action was taken by the landdrost. He did no more than to instruct the Javanese to bring 
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in the body of the victim and the murderer.210 This story serves to show how difficult it was to 
maintain law and order; especially if the officials were corrupt. In the same account, Chastelein 
wrote that the corrupt landdrost and his kaffers often put both the plaintiffs and the defendants 
behind bars. Consequently, both parties had to pay to gain their release. No Javanese or any 
people from other nations therefore wanted to sue one another.211 Under such conditions, the 
maintenance of security in the Ommelanden was bound to fail without the help of Indonesian 
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Landownership in the Ommelanden was dominated by high-ranking Dutch officials and the 
colonial government. Particuliere landerijen or private estates dated from as early as 1630 when 
the VOC had begun to grant parcels of land in the Ommelanden to its high-ranking officials. 
Estate owners were not only granted a freehold title to the land but were also given quasi-
feudal rights over its inhabitants, including the right to compulsory labour services 
(Herendiensten). Via leases, land rent and other payments, these estates generated substantial 
profits for their owners. Other groups of landowners were to be found among the Chinese, 
Mardijker and other Asian ethnicities, ranging from the rich merchant down to the small 
entrepreneur. The final group of landowners consisted of Indonesian peasants who had 
migrated from the North Coast of Java, the Priangan, and elsewhere in the Archipelago. The 
individual holdings of the last two groups were far less impressive than those of the first and 
often consisted of only a small plot of land.  
 
1. Reshaping the Ommelanden 
 
The first efforts to develop the Ommelanden commenced in the area immediately adjacent to 
the Ciliwung River. In the early days of Batavia, various plots along the Ciliwung River in the 
southern part of the city were already under cultivation for rice. 212  Besides paddy, other 
significant crops being planted were coconut palms, sugar-cane, vegetables, and fruit trees. In a 
letter to the Heeren XVII, dated 9 December 1637, Governor-General Antonio van Diemen 
mentions that 6,000 coconut palms had been planted in the area around Batavia.213 Sugar-cane 
was being planted by the Batavian Chinese in the 1630s. They took their example from 
Chinese sugar-cane planters in Banten214  and in Formosa. 
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 In the early decades of Batavia, the Company did not bother to formulate any special policy 
to regulate land development. Land would be leased or granted to anyone who showed his or 
her willingness to develop the Ommelanden as an agriculturally profitable area. This phase was 
marked by the predominance in the landownership of high-ranking Company officials. One of 
these pioneers was Director General François Caron who had earlier served as governor of 
Formosa, where he had also employed Chinese workers on his sugar plantations. 
Unfortunately, his pioneering efforts came to a premature end when he was summoned to 
return to Holland to face accusations of corruption. Other landowners were European 
vrijburghers, Chinese, and Mardijkers. The majority of the areas of land covering a huge area, 
called particuliere landerijen or landed estates, were owned by Europeans but some were in the 
hands of Chinese and Mardijkers, whose estates were usually less extensive.  
 The High Government was uncomfortably aware that it was attempting to set up a colony in 
an area encircled by enemies. Because of the precariousness of the situation, it was important 
for Batavia to be self-sufficient and to be able to produce all of its necessities in the immediate 
hinterland of the city. Well aware of this the Company encouraged landowners to turn their 
land into agricultural fields. Importantly, in those days of sail when sea voyages seemed 
interminable, the food and other commodities produced in the Ommelanden also had to be 
sufficient to meet not just the needs of Batavia but also to supply the VOC ships and other 
vessels anchored in the roadstead.215 In the eighteenth century, around 100 East Indiamen 
dropped anchor in the roadstead each year.216 Considering the large members of crew on 
board of these and other vessels, a plentiful supply of victuals had to be on hand to feed them. 
Transforming the Ommelanden into a production area was not something which could be 
accomplished overnight The general insecurity prevailing there and a lack of a spirit of 
entrepreneurship were the main reasons this region failed to live up to expectations until the 
second half of the seventeenth century.  
 The majority of the European landowners, especially the high-ranking Company officials, 
considered their landed estates in the light of long-term investments. Even though they owned 
huge estates and were not short of capital, they were not falling over themselves to develop 
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their land. One big stumbling block was that fairly sophisticated construction works which 
would turn the land into an area of agricultural production required a real spirit of agricultural 
entrepreneurship. Agricultural pioneers like Abraham Pittavin, Isaac de St. Martin, and Pieter 
van Hoorn, were specifically assigned land by the Company in the 1660s to boost the 
production of sugar in the Ommelanden, but most European landowners displayed no 
ambition to aspire to be agricultural entrepreneurs. They preferred to live the lives of the 
landed gentry, employing others to work the land. Consequently, they leased the land to 
Chinese, Mardijkers, or indigenous people, who usually turned it into paddy-fields or sugar 
plantations.217  
 As just said, before the Ommelanden could be transformed into an agricultural area, the 
construction of basic public works was essential. The geographical features were the factor 
which determined what sort of infrastructure was required. The land around Batavia was a 
low-lying alluvial plain traversed by parallel rivers which flowed from the western Priangan 
Mountains northwards to the sea. During the rainy season, the area in the vicinity of the rivers 
would be flooded by banjir and the road system would often be swamped with mud and 
become impassable. In the dry season, the soil would dry out and an abundance of irrigation 
water was needed for successful paddy or sugar cultivation.  
 The prime infrastructural requirement in such a landscape was canals. Excavating canals had 
a threefold purpose: it drained the land; improved the run off during the rains; and provided 
the earth with which the river banks could be effectively raised above flood level to act as 
levees. The development of the hinterland can really be said to have begun to expand when 
three canals were dug running in the direction of the eastern, western, and southern parts of 
the city. These canals connected the Ciliwung River which flowed through the city with the 
Anke River in the west and the Sunter River in the east. The undertaking of these excavations 
signalled the beginnings of a water transportation system which linked Batavia with its 
immediate hinterland via these canals The canal network was certainly important as a means of 
transportation and, over and above this, it also regulated the water management in the inner 
city and the drainage of the Ommelanden. 
 Although the Company administration supervised the water management closely at the time 
that Batavia was being built, the initiative taken to construct the canals in the Ommelanden 
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came from private entrepreneurs, who needed to transport the produce of their private estates 
to the city. In the early years, the Company administration was less than keen to put money 
into building large-scale infrastructural works in the environs of Batavia owing to the instability 
of relations with Mataram and Banten. This reluctance to commit Company money is why 
private entrepreneurs were encouraged to initiate canal construction. The administration only 
took over the management of the canals when the security of the neighbourhood was better 
established and the profitability of their operations had been confirmed. 
 One of the pioneers was Phoa Bing Ham, the third Chinese Captain of Batavia after Souw 
Benkong and Lim Lacco.218 In 1648, he dug a canal, first known as the Bing Ham gracht and 
later as the Molenvliet, running southwards from the city to his private land in Tanah Abang. 
Numerous waterwheels were built along this waterway which could be put to use as powder-
works, corn- and saw-mills, eventually giving rise to the name Molenvliet or Mill Race.219 Other 
canals which were excavated by private enterprise in the seventeenth century were the 
Ammanusgracht and Bacherachtsgracht on the western side of the city wall running towards the 
Anke Rivier, and the Ancolse vaart and Sontarsevaart running eastwards from the city to the 
Ancol and Sunter Rivier.  
 The bulk of the labour force employed to dig the canals was composed of slaves and corvée 
workers from Cirebon and its surrounding areas. The latter were also known as modder Javanen 
(mud Javanese). Every year, the Cirebon princes were obliged to send 200 modder Javanen to 
Batavia.220 Digging canals was an arduous, unhealthy job. Therefore, the inhabitants of the 
Ommelanden refused to undertake this work, even if it paid well. The modder Javanen dug, 
deepened, and widened canals and rivers when they showed signs of silting up. For instance, 
1715, when the mouth of the Ciliwung River silted up as a result of the eruption of the 
volcano Mount Salak, the Batavian government summoned 200 workers from Cirebon, 
Indramayu, and Gabang to dig it out.221 A year later, the Batavian government employed 
seventy labourers from Cirebon to dredge the river again. 222  Almost every year, the city 
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government had to hire labourers from Cirebon because the rivers and canals had to be 
periodically cleaned and dredged. 
 
 
Illustration 3: Digging or deepening a canal in Batavia in the early 18th century 
Source: Bea Brommer, Historische Plattegronden van Nederlandse Steden, deel 4 Batavia (Alphen aan den Rijn: De 
Stichting Historische Plattegronden, 1992), p. 9. 
 
 The construction of canals facilitated the transportation of logs and other building materials 
to Batavia and also made a large area of land surrounding the canals available for cultivation. 
Several years after the Bing Ham Gracht was dug, the Batavian government took over its 
management in order to assure the water supply to various flour-mills to the south of the 
city.223 In the course of time, other private canals were also taken over by the local authorities. 
By seizing the initiative to take control of the important canals in the Ommelanden, the 
Company could get a good grip on the supervision of the water transportation and 
simultaneously increase its income from the toll collection. 
 Water management extended far beyond the digging of canals, it also required other facilities 
such as: dikes, sluices, and ditches. During the dry season, the water volume of rivers dropped 
considerably. If the water were to be kept available for agriculture, obviously the canals had to 
                                                 
223 Raben, Batavia and Colombo, p. 58. 
 85 
be linked up with irrigation networks. During the rainy season, large floods or banjir were an 
ever present danger. In February 1724, the President of College van Heemraden, Wybrand Blom, 
reported that, the water level had risen suddenly because of heavy rain in the Batavian 
highlands. Many of the estates along the ’sHeeren Street had been inundated. This was not the 
first time such a flood or banjir had happened, because the Heemraden decided to open all the 
dikes and sluices which were located in the vicinity of ’sHeeren Street, a solution which had 
already been resorted to in 1717.224  
 Other essential public works which were undertaken were the construction of roads and 
defence works. During the term of office of Governor-General Joan Maetsuyker (1653-1678), 
several redoubts were built in the eastern (Fort Ancol and Jacatra), southern (Fort Rijswijk and 
Nordwijk), and western (Fort Anke and Vijfhoek) Ommelanden. 225  The purpose of these 
fortifications was to defend the city and to guard the rice-fields and sugar-cane plantations. 
Most of the outlying forts were located at the intersections of rivers and canals but, in order to 
connect one fort to another, the Company also constructed roads, although it depended on 
rivers and canals. Because almost all of the Ommelanden area was covered by forest until the 
middle of seventeenth century, trees had to be cut down, the undergrowth cleared land surface 
levelled before these roads could be constructed.  
 The road construction was financed from tax income. The Company administration 
collected many kinds of tax such as the Hoofdgeld der Chinezen (Chinese poll tax), market tax, 
canal toll tax, sugar tax, tax on gambling, fishing tax, tax on wayang (shadow puppet), tax on 
arrack and so forth and so on. The new road from Batavia to Tangerang, for instance, built in 
1685, was financed on the proceeds of the Chinese poll tax.226 However, the tax income from 
the Ommelanden was used not only to finance the infrastructural works outside the city walls, 
it paid for those required inside the walls as well. In 22 March 1708, the Batavian government 
published a decree requiring every sugar-mill in the Ommelanden had to pay a tax of 10 
rijksdaalders per year to support the construction of the new town hall.227  
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2. Land management 
 
Various schemes which set forth how the Ommelanden should be developed were presented 
by high-ranking Company officials. In 1675 Pieter van Hoorn, a member of the Raad van Indië 
and father of Governor-General Joan van Hoorn (1704-1709), proposed a plan to the 
Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker in which he presented an idea of how a colony based on 
agricultural activities could be built up. Van Hoorn said that the establishment of a colony 
depended on bringing in people who already had the requisite skills to clear and cultivate the 
virgin land in a new settlement area.228 The establishment of a colony was not unlike planting a 
tree, the fruits of which could not be expected until twenty years later.229 
 In his proposal, Van Hoorn argued that the colony should be freed from the burden of all 
taxes until it had had time to develop properly. The colonists should also be allowed the 
freedom of trade in various commodities which could generate profits for them. After the 
colony had grown and was well-established, it was time to send in women so that local 
population could increase naturally without being constantly dependent on newcomers.230 Van 
Hoorn plainly stated that the initial aim of the Company, first and foremost a trading 
organization, had not been to establish colonies and therefore the management of the colonies 
in the early decades of the Company presence in Asia had not yet been properly regulated.231 
 In connection with what had been proposed thirty years by Councillor Van Hoorn, in 1705 
Cornelis Chastelein, an extraordinary member of the Raad van Indië and the owner of the 
Depok estate, presented his ideas about how they government should go about building up a 
colony. Chastelein made the point that no colony can exist without a large influx of people. 
The initial efforts to make Batavia a colony in which Europeans predominated had so far not 
been a success. He criticized the Company for always putting its own (commercial) interests 
first and paying scant attention to the problems colonization brought in its wake. 232  He 
stressed that it was not an easy matter to ensure that a colony flourished and plenty of water 
would have to pass under the bridge first. People in the colony had to be allowed freedom to 
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trade in order to develop their own livelihood. Chastelein was critical of the fact that so far so 
little had been achieved by Batavia as the most important colony among all Dutch possessions 
in Asia.233 
 
Illustration 4: Cornelis Chastelein in front of his house in Srengseng 
Source: A. Heuken, Historical Sites of Jakarta (Jakarta: Cipta Loka Caraka, 2007), p. 231. 
 
 Chastelein offered some suggestions for populating the areas outside the city walls. His first 
idea was a recommendation that the population of Batavia migrate to the area surrounding the 
city. He proposed making a register of those in the city who had no gainful employment. 
These good-for-nothing layabouts were likely to irritate each other and engage in useless 
pursuits such as dabbling in the exploitation and the transportation of slaves. Rather than 
being allowed to become a nuisance in the city, these people should be set to work in the 
Ommelanden. His second idea for promoting migration to the Ommelanden was a proposal 
the Company abolishes the heerendiensten (corvée labour) for the Javanese, since these services 
were not important to the colonial government. A further objection on this point was that 
whenever the Company paid the labourers through their headmen, these lined their own 
pockets instead.234  
 Chastelein recommended that the rulers of Cirebon, the Priangan, and the neighbouring 
territories should be told that they were not to prohibit their people moving to the 
Ommelanden with their families. Wives should be encouraged to join their husbands ‗because 
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the women of these eastern nations carry out more work than their husbands‘.235 Chastelein 
explained that people of neighbouring territories had an obligation to contribute to the 
incomes of their rulers by handing over part of what they earned. They were forced to do this 
because their wives and children were kept at home as guarantees. Everyday, subjects of the 
local rulers were working on land located in the region under the Company jurisdiction. They 
exhausted the soil and they and the Chinese were destroying the Ommelanden forests by 
making swiddens on which to grow dry rice, gaga. To solve this problem, Chastelein advised 
the Company to welcome these settlers courteously and use them to populate the highlands of 
Batavia. 
 A third suggestion was related to the improvement of justice, law and order in the 
Ommelanden. It made little sense to try to administer the law when the Schepenen and the 
landdrost were living in town. The landdrost with his kaffers never ventured more than half an 
hour‘s walk away from the town. This meant that they never, or very rarely, visited the remote 
areas of the Ommelanden.236 Judges in Batavia were very ill-informed about the local situation. 
They sometimes needed one or two weeks simply to hear the testimony of the plaintiffs, 
leaving a window of time in which the wives and children of the latter, who had remained at 
home, might be harmed by the criminals. How poor the quality of law enforcement was can be 
observed from the fact that none of twenty-five cases of murder could be solved and that 
buffalo stealing was on the increase.237 In order to enforce the law, Chastelein recommended 
the Company act severely in its dealings with the criminals. People who committed a serious 
crime should be banished to the Cape. The kampung headmen should also be threatened that 
they would be treated likewise if they could not keep their own people under control.238 
 Chastelein proposed that a more responsible local government could be created if the 
kampung headmen were chosen directly by their own people. To ensure that these kampung 
were better organized, every ten kampung should in turn elect one headman who would preside 
over them. He could act as an arbiter in all kinds of petty felonies and minor cases. If very 
serious crimes were perpetrated, the latter could assist the landdrost and the Heemraden. The 
Company should take the Roman Empire, which was ruled by allowing the subjugated people 
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plenty of freedom in running their own affairs, as its example. This was precisely the principle 
which should be adhered to in the Ommelanden.239 
 The expansion of Batavia to the Ommelanden in the second half of the seventeenth century 
meant that the area falling under Batavian jurisdiction rapidly expanded. After the third war 
with Banten (1656-1659) had been concluded, leading to greater stability, the Company set 
about encouraging serious agricultural development in the Ommelanden. Once more the 
Batavian government was selling and granting plots of lands to Europeans, Chinese, 
Mardijkers and Indonesians in an effort to stimulate agricultural production. Since the amount 
of the land which could be sold or granted gradually shrank whereas the number of the people 
kept increasing, conflicts were inevitable. The growing number of conflicts over land 
boundaries and land rights prompted the Company to establish the College van Heemraden, a 
body which had the authority to solve land disputes, and could also manage and supervise all 
sorts of vital infrastructure such as roads, canals, bridges, and dams in the same way as 
Heemraden did in the Dutch Republic. 
 The College van Heemraden was set up by High Government Resolution of 19 September 1664. 
In the beginning it consisted of four persons; a landdrost or sheriff and three members of the 
High Government (Pieter Anthonisz Overtwater, Pieter van Hoorn, and Joan Thuysz). Three 
extra members were added in 1672 and at the same time the sheriff was also assigned a deputy 
and four servants to add to the six he already had.240 In 1684 the kapitains van de buitenforten 
were also appointed members of the Heemraden, and a year later two extra members were 
appointed; one of them was the fabrijk (clerk of public works).241 The Heemraden were drawn 
from the ranks of the Company officials and European citizens (burgers). If one of the 
members could no longer continue his duties, he was replaced by another person appointed by 
the Heemraden Board. Below is the list of Heemraden members from the year 1717:242  
 
Hendrik Zwaardecroon (chairman, member of the Raad van Indië) 
Philip Gyger (deputy-chairman, landdrost) 
Willem van Bossum (fabrijk) 
Hendrik Huysman (opperkoopman) 
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Hans Jurgen Roode (captain) 
Harmen Sluyter (burger) 
Pieter Uylkes (burger) 
Mattys Boeser (burger) 
Andries van Houten (koopman) 
 
 The High Government appointed one of the Raad van Indië members as a chairman of the 
Heemraden. This power of appointment is a clue that the Hoge Regering still retained a great deal 
of influence in this institution. 243  The position of chairman of the Heemraden was very 
prestigious and some of the Heemraden chairmen at the beginning of eighteenth century, among 
them Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Diederik Durven, Adriaan Valckenier, and Johannes Thedens, 
later became Governors-General. The landdrost, fabrijk, captain, opperkoopman, and koopman were 
each assigned their own competence after their appointment to the Heemraden. Even though 
the College van Heemraden was an institution which represented the Company interests in the 
Ommelanden, its members were selected from among the free burgers, usually prominent 
European citizens who lived in the Ommelanden.   
 The Heemraden possessed all the characteristics of local government such as assuming 
responsibility for surveying, for the improvement and maintenance of the public works, 
vigilance for detecting illegal logging and irrigation, rooting out illegal sugar-mills, not to 
mention registration, taxation, and administration. The burgeoning agricultural activity ushered 
in better security and therefore in 1678 the High Government appointed two landdrosten for the 
Ommelanden. The jurisdiction of the first landdrost was on the eastern side of Ciliwung River, 
while the second landdrost served on the western side. To avoid conflicts of authority, the High 
Government decided that the first landdrost was senior to the other.244  
 The Heemraden council was also designed to administer the rural area of Batavia where large 
private estates lands which belonged to high-ranking officials and rich burgers were located. Its 
jurisdiction covered all of the land located outside the city walls of Batavia for as far as the 
Company territory stretched.245 Since the end of the seventeenth century, this meant the area 
between the Cisadane River in the west and the Bekasi River in the east. The boundary on the 
                                                 
243 Gaastra, ―The Organization of the VOC‖, p. 27. 
244 Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811, Vol. 3, pp. 1-2. 
245 Ibid., p. 56. 
 91 
northern side was the Java Sea, while to the south the border was demarcated by three 
volcanos: Salak, Gede, and Pangrango. In 1680, the High Government entrusted the Heemraden 
with the job of the mapping of landownership in all of the districts in the Ommelanden. 246 
  The day-to-day administration of the Heemraden was the business of a secretary. Besides the 
secretary, the Heemraden employed a number of other officers: a beadle, one or more land 
surveyors and junior land surveyors, and two clerks. When a new secretary was appointed, the 
former secretary would hand all the collected and indexed archives over to him. The Heemraden 
secretary was also the custodian of the old and new Ommelanden maps.247 The meetings of 
the Heemraden were held on Saturdays twice to four times a month. However, if there was an 
important case which had to be dealt with immediately, the board would hold an extra session 
on Wednesdays as well. 
 The High Government Instruction of 23 July 1680 248  stipulated three main tasks to be 
undertaken by the Heemraden. The most important had to do with landownership. When the 
Company wanted to sell or grant land, it was the duty of the Heemraden to advise the Company 
about the proposed transfer. The members of the board had the judicial authority to intervene 
in and solve conflicts arising from disputed land boundaries and landed property and they had 
to sanction all transactions pertaining to the conveyancing and leasing of land. Therefore, to 
obviate any conflicts about land and to guarantee legal security, all trading in and purchasing or 
leasing of land in the Ommelanden had to be reported to the Heemraden. If a dispute 
threatened to become serious, the Heemraden could bring it to the attention the Raad van Justitie. 
The second duty with which the Heemraden were entrusted was to supervise and maintain all 
the public works in the Ommelanden. The money to carry out this task came from the income 
derived from the taxes and details of the work and its financing had to be reported to the High 
Government at least once a year. Finally, the Heemraden were in charge of public security. It 
was their duty to support the landdrosten in the execution of their duties. So that they would be 
assisted in this task of maintaining law and order in the Ommelanden, it was within the power 
of the Heemraden to nominate candidates for the position of district head (wijkmeester), after 
which their candidature would be confirmed by the High Government. 
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 By the end of the seventeenth century, when the Ommelanden had become more law-
abiding, increasing numbers of Dutch people ventured to build country houses and run landed 
estates there. There was a large-scale cultivation of the land and sugar plantations were 
established, mostly by Chinese farmers and entrepreneurs. In the same period, attracted by the 
security and the economic opportunities offered in the area, many Javanese also migrated to 
the Ommelanden to settle and establish rice-fields and market gardens. It was the 
responsibility of the Heemraden to supervise and keep a check on these developments. To assist 
them in this undertaking, they employed a landmeeter or surveyor so that they could obtain a 
precise picture of the landownership in the environs of Batavia. The first surveyor to work for 
the Heemraden was appointed in 1698.249 
 The chief duties of the surveyor was mapping the new plots or making sketches of land and 
keeping the records land registration up- to-date. Another of his jobs was to measure the size 
of an area of land in private ownership. These data provided a convenient basis for tax 
gathering. The surveyor was called upon to give an expert opinion when land was disputed. He 
had an allowance of 15 rijksdaalders per month from the Heemraden.250 This allowance did not 
include payment for any special assignments he might have to undertake. For instance, the 
surveyor was paid 4.24 rijksdaalders for surveying a piece of land or garden located close to 
Forts Zoutelande, Noordwijk, and Rijswijk. If he were required to draw a big map the 
Heemraden would pay him as much as 3 rijksdaalders.251  
 The landmeter‘s reports are hard to trace in the Archives, but the following one drawn up by 
Boudewijn Jansz Vonk in 1732 pertaining to several private estates in the Ommelanden seems 
quite representative. It contains a survey of the private land possessed by Governor-General 
Diederik Durven in Topassong Parang and Kamal. Both areas of private property were located 
north of the Mokervaart, and west of the Angke River.252 The sketches made by Vonk show 
swamps, trees, bamboo forest, and the Kamal River flowing in a northerly direction.  
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Illustration 5: Private land possessed by Governor-General Diederik Durven in Topassong Parang and Kamal 
Source: Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Maps Collection, VEL. 1241 
 
 On this sketch a sugar-mill surrounded by a sugar-cane plantation can be seen located on the 
banks of the Kamal River. Around the plantation are the trees which could be felled for 
firewood. A mulberry plantation is also depicted; mulberry leaves are the only food silkworms 
will eat.253 Paddy-fields stretch on either side of the Kamal River in the southern part of this 
private estate. The detailed sketch makes it possible to form some idea of private land 
management in the Ommelanden in the early eighteenth century. A similar pattern of land 
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3. The distribution of land 
 
Prior to the 1680s, the High Government did not pursue any specific policy about landed 
property. Considerations to do with the allocation of the land depended largely on the 
availability of vacant land and its distance from the city. The upshot was that pieces of land 
were irregular in size and a plot of land could be owned by several persons. In the absence of 
canals and roads, the most sought-after land was that located to the south of the city in the 
vicinity of the Ciliwung River. The territories east and west of Batavia were marshy and 
unsuitable for agriculture and settlement. Land only became useful after roads and a drainage 
system of canals and ditches had been constructed. 
 In the early eighteenth century, the legacy from the previous period was still obvious. 
Various areas of land is all shapes and sizes were owned by Europeans, Mardijkers, Chinese, 
and indigenous people and any regularity in the pattern was hit and miss. The overall pattern 
of landownership can be seen on a map from the Heemraden Collection.255 A glance at this gives 
the impression that the Dutch owned the best land situated closest to the city. The majority of 
these properties were situated on the river banks or canals, giving them access to 
transportation and water for agricultural enterprises. Most of the land owned by Chinese and 
Mardijkers was located fairly far from the city. By and large, their properties were also to be 
found alongside the rivers or canals. The High Government granted the land farthest away 
from the city to indigenous leaders and their followers.256 These leaders held the land as fief, 
but had no right to own landed property outright.257 In most instances, the land granted to 
these leaders was used to create kampung.258  It is important to note that, under the First 
Ordinance of 8 April 1639, the fief status of a land under the jurisdiction of Batavia could 
transform into private property or eigendom after it had been cultivated.259 
 Landed estates or particuliere landerijen were almost invariably the property of Europeans and 
Chinese and Mardijkers. Soon after the establishment of Batavia in 1619, land in its immediate 
environs itself was granted in loan or in usufruct. Since safety could not yet be guaranteed in 
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the environs of Batavia in this period, the land was not yet granted as private property. A 
Placard of 1 April 1629 stated that people could transfer their land grant to a third party.260 A 
few years after the peace treaty with Banten was signed in 1684, the Company allowed its 
citizens to purchase land in the Ommelanden.261 Some high-ranking Company officials seized 
the chance to establish landed estates. Cornelis Chastelein, an extraordinary member of Raad 
van Indië in 1696 and 1697, purchased the Seringsing and Depok estates, located in the 
southern part of the Ommelanden. Another councillor, Abraham van Riebeck who later 
became a Governor-General (1709-1713), bought a plot of land in Pondok Poetjoeng in 
1701.262 A sketch made by Surveyor Jans Vonk in 1732 provides the information that Wouter 
Hendrix, also a Council member, possessed a landed estate on the eastern side of the Cakung 
River.263 
 Landed property reaped its owner a host of profits. Besides the advantage of being a secure 
investment, a landed estate offered a regular income in the form of rents payable in both 
money and kind. Some estate owners required their tenants to pay their rent in cash, which in 
actual terms meant compelling the tenants to sell their crops to them. The tenants acquiesced 
in this demand because the markets in Batavia, where their crops would probably fetch a better 
price, were too far away for them to undertake the journey there. Most of the tenants in the 
Ommelanden were Chinese entrepreneurs. Land rent paid in kind served the keep the estate 
owner furnished with supplies and could free him of the necessity to buy commodities as rice, 
vegetables, timber, and fish at the market. If the landed property was sufficiently large, the 
surplus produce from the estate and rents paid in kind could also be sold at the market and 
generate extra financial benefits. The estate owners were not the only ones to profit from 
agrarian income provided by their property. Renting land was also a promising proposition for 
Chinese entrepreneurs. Without actually purchasing land –which would have required huge 
capital sums -- they still could make their share of profit in the agrarian sector. 
 A resolution of the Heemraden pertaining to some landed estates in the Ommelanden throws 
light on the management of an estate at the beginning of eighteenth century. One of these 
landed estates, located on the northern side of the Mokervaart, to the west of Angke River, 
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belonged to Governor-General Diderik Durven.264 This estate was a hub of some industrial 
and agricultural activities which boasted two sugar-mills, various sugar-cane and rice-fields, and 
a mulberry orchard. Besides the cultivated areas, it was rich in bamboo groves, forests, and 
some swamps and ponds. Part of the Durven estate, named Cengkareng, located between 
Mokervaard and sea coast, was leased to Ni Keng Ko for a period of twenty-seven years at 
2,000 rijksdaalders per annum. Another plot of land, located to the west of Angke River, was 
leased to Li Hoey Ko. The size of this area was 500 square roeden and its lease cost 100 
rijksdaalders per year.  
 The majority of the big landed estates had direct access to the main roads or canals which 
connected the city with the interior. Cornelis Chastelein‘s landed estate in Depok, for instance, 
was located close to the road from Batavia to Buitenzorg (Bogor). Jan Andries Duurkoop‘s 
estate in Tanjung West, around 30 kilometres south of Batavia, was also located not far from 
this road. A big estate usually consisted of a country house, a forest, morasses, irrigated rice- 
and cane-fields, sugar-mills, various kampung for the indigenous inhabitants, market gardens, 
fish ponds, and pasture for cattle. In the eighteenth century, the most fashionable location for 
country houses with big estates was the Jakarta weg, the road running southeast from Batavia in 
the direction of the outlying Fort Jacatra. 265  Some of these mansions were recorded for 
posterity by Johannes Rach, a Danish painter who worked for the VOC. Rach‘s drawings 
depict Baroque-style mansions with elaborate façades, gateways, and gardens complete with 
fountains and statues.266  
 Big estates were naturally inhabited by their owners and their families with their servants and 
slaves, but were also home to a number of other people who had already been living there 
before the land had become an estate or by new settlers who usually worked on the land as 
small peasants. The estate owner permitted these people to cultivate rice and vegetables or to 
exploit fish ponds. The tenants had to pay a tax called tjoeke, which usually amounted to as 
much as 20 per cent of their harvest. During the Company era, the estate owners held 
complete authority over their property and the people under their jurisdiction. Indeed they 
wielded police powers over all and everybody to do with their estates. In their maintenance of 
law and order, the owners usually employed private guards called opas, centeng, or jago, under the 
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supervision of a mandor. However, if a serious crime was committed, the owner could invite 
the landdrost to intervene to solve the problem. The absolute authority of the estate owners 
lasted until 1806, when the government introduced legislation to control abuses of power.267  
 
 
Map 4: Private estates close to Batavia 
Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia (London: Curzon Press, 2000), p. 94. 
 
 Establishing government control over the private estates presented an enormous problem. 
Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the colonial government was unable to prevent 
serious abuses of their power by the estate owners and their guards simply because it was too 
weak to impose any sanctions.268 The tjoeke was collected by the estate private guards. This 
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power placed these guards in the position of intermediaries between the owners and the 
peasants who made their living from the land. The guards often fleeced the peasants by 
collecting extra money and goods. Heavy extortion could ultimately elicit resistance from the 
peasants. There are plenty of popular nineteenth-century stories about local heroes who 
robbed the estate owners and fought against their henchmen.269 
 One of the most famous ‗social bandits‘ in the nineteenth-century Ommelanden was Si 
Pitung.270  He is the hero of the orang Betawi and was one of the Robin Hoods who roamed 
around Batavia and its surrounding countryside. According to one folk story, Pitung was 
forced to turn to robbery after the money he had received from selling his father‘s goats in 
Pasar Tanah Abang had been stolen. His efforts to recover the money from the thief 
established his reputation as a jago.271 Pitung was born in Pengumben, a village in Rawabelong 
south of Batavia. He became notorious after he had robbed a wealthy landowner in Marunda 
named Haji Sapiudin in 1892.272 
 In order to keep an up-to-date overview of landownership, the Heemraden presented regular 
reports about land in private hands. For instance, in May 1702 the Secretary of the Heemraden 
drew up a report about landownership in Tugu,273 an area located west of Batavia. Tugu had 
been granted to Batavian Mardijkers who had expressed a wish to settle in the Ommelanden 
by the Company but were by no means the only people living there. Europeans, Chinese, and 
indigenous people also owned plots of land in this area. They had received their land as a grant 
from the Company or had bought it from the Mardijkers. Majoor Dirk Thomas, a military 
officer, was granted a plot of land (Number 2) by the Company on 26 January 1696. Another 
plot of land (Number 66) belonged to the Chinese Que Kianko. He had bought his land from 
a descendant of the Mardijker Domingo Rodrigo. Mamoe van Macassar, the widow of Jentief 
Moda da Costa, bought a plot of land (Number 69) from the Mardijker Joseph de Crux.  
 In total 117 plots of land in Tugu were registered on the Heemraaden list, almost half of them 
indeed owned by Mardijkers (40%). One big plot could be divided into smaller plots, and be 
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owned by several people. Plot Number 82, for instance, was divided into two parts: one half 
belonged to Pieter Aertsz and Carel Carelsz and the other half was owned by Joan Cops. Plot 
Number 88 was divided into no fewer than six parts and the owners of this plot were: 
Domingo Swaris, Anthony Soirde, Francis van Bengale, Lourenz Salomonsz, Carel Gerritsz, 
and Antony Ferera. Since some plots had been divided into smaller plots, the total number 
amounted to more than 117: 
 
Table 4: List of landownership in Tugu274 
 
 Number of Plots Percentage 
Mardijker 51 40 
European 35 27 
The Company 9 7 
Chinese 2 1,6 
Indigenous 16 12,6 
Other Asian 6 4,8 
Unknown 9 7 
Total 128 100 
 
 Other Asians who possessed properties in Tugu were Moors and Papangers. Unknown 
landed properties were those owned by persons whose identity was not clear. For example: 
Plots 109 and 110 were owned by the widow of Captain Harmen Egbertsz.275 The identity of 
the widow is blurred since the Heemraden list does not mention her name. The Company also 
still possessed some plots of land in Tugu, for example, Plot Number One. The income from 
this plot was reserved for the benefit of the Batavia Poorhouse or Armenhuis by the Company. 
Other Company lands were the plots Numbers 100 to 103, which had previously belonged to 
Kapitan Jonker of Manipa. After his revolt and subsequent death in 1696, the plots were taken 
back by the Company and leased out to various persons.  
 In the course of the years, the Batavian government granted and sold many plots in the 
Ommelanden, but it remained the biggest landowner. The Company lands were scattered all 
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over the Ommelanden and consisted of forests, paddy-fields which were leased to the 
indigenous peasants, sugar-cane plantations leased out to Chinese sugar entrepreneurs, and 
kampung allocated to the indigenous kapitans and their followers. The Company land located 
close to the Sunter River, for instance, was allocated to the Balinese kampung under the 
Kapitan Kiay Ieman Singa Lodra. According to the report made by Landmeeter Bartel van der 
Valk of 2 June 1702, almost everyday day some recalcitrant people cut down coconut palms 
and stole other agricultural produce from this kampung. In order to prevent further loss and 
ensure greater stability of law and order, the landmeeter asked the Company permission to put 
this kampung under his direct supervision.276  
 
4. Land utilization 
 
The idea behind the development of the Ommelanden was to provide Batavia with its daily 
necessities and to victual the ships which called there. Consequently, land was utilized for such 
purposes as paddy cultivation, sugar-cane plantations, vegetable, coconut, and market gardens, 
sugar-mills, pasturage for cows and buffalos and other useful purposes. Nevertheless, it would 
be fair to say that paddy and sugar cultivation were the main agricultural activities which drove 
the development of the local economy and affected ecology in the Ommelanden. Paddy-fields 
and sugar plantations require fertile land, supplemented by an abundance of water, ample 
human resources, and the requisite technical skills. The Ommelanden met all these 
requirements.  
 The paddy cultivation was in the hands of indigenous peasants, who were Javanese, 
Sundanese, and people from Banten. A 1694 report from the head of Jatinegara district, Aria 
Surawinata, reveals that two general categories of rice were cultivated, namely: padi gaga and 
padi sawah. The first was a slash-and-burn, dry cultivation of thirty-two varieties of dry rice; the 
second was a wet form of which there were thirty-four varieties.  
 The bulk of the paddy gaga cultivation was carried out on the well-drained upland soils where 
the trees and undergrowth had been burned after they had been cut down which suited it. 
These upland areas varied from fairly low hills to mountainous terrain. Without the enormous 
effort of building rice terraces, paddy sawah, on the other hand, had to be cultivated in the 
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lowland areas, on deltaic soils near sea level. This type of rice required soil which would be 
covered by shallow water for most of the year. Therefore, Paddy sawah was usually planted in 
polders in the vicinity of the river banks. 
 Aria Surawinata‘s report mentions that the period of cultivation for the two types of rice 
varied from between two-and-a-half and five months. Paddy koas and ketak kutik, for instance, 
were a fast-growing variety and required only two-and-a-half months before they were ready to 
harvest. Paddy katoembaran needed four months to ripen. Most of the paddy, fifty-eight 
varieties in all, including salak, dewata, wonkalan, malaman, required four-and-a-half to five 
months to reach maturity. The report is quite detailed and provides the information that, 
besides white rice, the Javanese peasant was cultivating red rice (for instance, padi dedapan, 
gadonhan, panpanaren) and glutinous rice (for instance, padi ketan lomboe, gadje, holik). Interestingly, 
Aria Surawinata‘s list mentions that there were three types of rice used by the Company too as 
horse fodder: paddy grogol, tzjokrom, and omas.277 
 The growing number of paddy-fields in the second half of the seventeenth century made it 
feasible, indeed profitable, to impose a tax on the paddy cultivation. This tax was called de 
tiende pady which meant that the owner of every paddy-field in the Ommelanden had to 
contribute 10 per cent of his harvest to the Company warehouses. This tax was introduced by 
the Heemraden in 1685.278 To organize the implementation of de tiende pady, the College van 
Heemraden appointed one of its members supervisor of the levy and gave him the title: de 
Commissaris tot en over de Zaken van de Inlander.  
 When it transpired that it was difficult to monitor the collection of paddy without the 
assistance of the indigenous leaders, in 1689 the Heemraden assigned two Javanese captains --a 
Captain for the Eastern Side and the other was a Captain for the Western Side of the Ciliwung 
River-- to support de Commissaris tot en over de Zaken van de Inlander in supervising and enforcing 
the tax on paddy. In the undertaking of their duties, the two Javanese captains were assisted by 
thirteen lower-ranking Javanese officers. Those Javanese officers who were successful in 
collecting de tiende pady were often awarded by the Company with land.279 The annual amount 
of revenue paddy collected and delivered to the Company warehouses was duly reported to the 
Hoge Regering by the Heemraden. 
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 The majority of the sugar-cane plantations and the sugar-mills were run by the Chinese. 
They had already developed the traditional sugar industry in Banten, Jayakarta and other port 
cities in the North Coast of Java long before the establishment of the Dutch East India 
Company. Before the Chinese immigrants introduced their own cane cultivation technology to 
Java, the Javanese had been producing and consuming sugar in the form of palm sugar (gula 
jawa), which was made from the sap obtained by tapping the trunk of the Palmyra palm (aren). 
Although the latter is much better nutritionally, cane sugar was more in demand than palm 
sugar on the international market. 
  Since sugar-cane also requires an abundant supply of water to grow, the best place for 
cultivating this plant was on the land located close to a river. Therefore in the Ommelanden 
most of the sugar-cane plantations were located in the vicinity of the paddy-fields. These two 
crops had a symbiotic relationship. The expansion of sugar plantations would inevitably bring 
an expansion of paddy-fields in its train. This tendency was supported by the fact that the 
irrigation works which were developed for one could also be utilized to irrigate the other. 
From the point of view of manpower, sugar plantations required a huge influx of labour for 
harvesting. Therefore, peasants who worked on the rice-fields could work in the cane-fields 
during the sugar harvest. This temporary, seasonal work on the sugar plantations would 
provide peasants with extra income. 
  The bulk of the land used for sugar production was owned by the Company or by 
European citizens. Consequently, the Chinese sugar growers who wanted to cultivate the land 
either had to lease or buy it. Tan Siamko, for instance, leased some Company land located on 
the river bank in Matraman. He planted sugar-cane and when it had ripened he asked the 
Heemraden permission to harvest it. Although Tan Siamko had leased the land, this did not 
exempt him for paying the Heemraden 10 rijksdaalders for permission to harvest the sugar-
cane.280 Another example is Soey Pieko‘s request to the Heemraden for the licence to operate his 
three sugar-mills and work his thirty-four sugar-cane plantations, which were located west of 
Batavia, on the Cengkareng landed estate. He had bought them at an auction held by the 
College van Schepenen. The Heemraden gave their permission on condition that, if those properties 
were to be leased to other persons in the future and that the tenant had to ask the Company 
permission if he wanted to mill the sugar-cane harvested from them.281  
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 Sugar-cane was in high demand. Almost all of the vacant land in the Ommelanden suitable 
for sugar-cane cultivation was utilized. Lim Poanko, for instance, asked authorization from the 
Heemraden to utilize acreage of land for a sugar plantation. The land had previously belonged to 
Capitain Jonker and was located close to Tanjung Priok. He wanted to lease the land for the 
next three years. The Heemraden acceded to Lim Poanko‘s request on condition that each year 
he would pay the Company 300 rijksdaalders.282  
 Sugar-cane was not only planted on the Company lands or landed estates; the river banks 
were also a prime spot for its cultivation. Adriaan Thamesz, the quartermaster (wijkmeester) of 
Blok G, delivered a report to the Heemraden in which he stated that the curbs of the road 
beside the Pesanggrahan River had been illegally planted with sugar-cane at the several places. 
He also reported that the river was silting up because of the amount of garbage and the logs 
which were being thrown into it. Considering the road was used every day and the flow of 
Pesanggrahan River had to be kept up, the Heemraden decided to cut down all the sugar-cane 
along the road and ordered the local wijkmeester to remove the garbage and logs from the 
river.283      
 Fruit, vegetables, and coconuts were cultivated in orchards, gardens and groves located close 
to the kampung. They were even cultivated by the kampung inhabitants in their own compounds. 
Mango, mangosteen, sour lime, grapefruit, tamarind, durian, watermelon, banana, and 
pineapple were some of the fruit which used to be cultivated for both home consumption and 
sale at the market. Orchards were a profitable business and therefore in demand and, before 
renting such land, the prospective lessee would count the number of fruit trees planted on it. 
For example, Sedelebe, a Moor, leased a plot in Klein Marunda to a Chinese named Oey 
Tsoanko for two years. The area was not mentioned, but it was planted with several sorts of 
fruit trees such as mangosteen, grapefruit, soursop, coconut, as well as sugar-cane and 
vegetables. Oey Tsoanko had to pay a rent of 52 ½ rijksdaalders a year.284 Joannes Ens, the 
former baljuw of Batavia, leased a piece of land to Oey Tsianko. The land was located in 
Tanjung Priok and it was planted with coconuts, mangos, sour sops, and grapefruits. Oey 
Tsianko rented the land for a period of five years and he paid 200 rijksdaalders annually.285 The 
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annual rent of Joannes Ens‘ land was more expensive than Sedelebe‘s perhaps because it was 
larger, although it was not as well stocked with fruit trees or other plants.  
 It was possible to rent fruit trees without actually renting the land. This was a more 
affordable proposition. Hermanus Kolde de Horn and Fredrik Ribalt both owned land in 
Peninggaran by the side of the Pesanggrahan River. They leased fruits trees on their land to 
Mrs Appolonia Davids for two years, at a rate of 24 rijksdaalders a year. When her lease had 
expired, Mrs Davids had to return the fruit trees in good condition.286  
 Another commercial plant cultivated in the Ommelanden was betel (sirih). Betel leaf 
combined with slaked lime and areca nut from the Pinang palm is still used by indigenous 
people for chewing (menyirih) after meals to stimulate digestion. The leaf also has medicinal 
purposes and plays a role in various traditional ceremonies. Betel vines were cultivated by 
indigenous people and by the Chinese. Tan Tsoenio farmed betel vines in sixty gardens on his 
land along the banks of the Anke River. He rented his garden to Gouw Hoeko and Gouw 
Tinko for two years. Each tenant rented thirty of Tan Tsoenio‘s gardens on condition that, if 
some of the betel vines dried out or rotted, they had to replace them with new ones. The rent 
of the thirty gardens was 35 rijksdaalders a year.287 Jacob Jacobsz, a Christian inlandse burgher, 
leased his betel vines to Tsoa Siongko for two years. The betel plants were scattered among 
the fruit trees on his land in Tugu. With the exception of some which grew on the moerengas 
trees, the betel plants were rented for 13 rijksdaalders per year.288 
 Small factories also became part of the picture of economic enterprise in the Ommelanden. 
The city of Batavia and the Company required some local factory products for their day-to-day 
necessities. The high demand for building materials, household items, and strong liquor 
encouraged some entrepreneurs to establish brickworks and tile-yards, lime-kilns, potteries, 
and arak distilleries. Before commencing an enterprise, an entrepreneur required a licence from 
the Heemraden.289 This application process was an instrument by which the Heemraden could 
monitor and control the number of factories in the Ommelanden. They felt it was necessary to 
limit the number of factories in order to prevent entrepreneurs from bankruptcy and control 
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unbridled competition; nevertheless, never losing sight of the fact that they were smoothing 
the way to providing the Company with cheap manufactured products.290  
 The manufacturing of bricks, tiles, and pottery was often combined in one workplace, which 
consisted of kilns and ovens inside a hut, roofed with tiles or sago palm leaves. The firing 
process required by all three products was time-consuming and required large quantities of 
firewood. It produced a thin smoke. The factory products were brought to the city on small 
boats (perahu) plying the rivers or canals. One obvious reason most of the factories were 
located by the sides of rivers. Te Hoeko, for instance, requested permission from the 
Company to establish a new pottery factory, to be located on a piece of land bordering the 
Molenvliet. He rented the land from Jo Tsilauw, and built a sugar-pot factory for which he had 
obtained a licence from the Heemraden two years earlier.291  
 On 4 February 1719, Jap Tong Lauw asked the Heemraden permission to operate a tile-yard 
and brickworks on his own private land, on the west bank of Krukut River. He had inherited 
the land from his father, Jap Keeko, who in turn had inherited it from his father, Jap Sitse. The 
grandfather had received a licence to operate a tile-yard and brickworks on the same land in 
January 1695, but the licence had expired at his death. Three weeks after the request was 
lodged, the Heemraden granted the licence.292  
 
5. The value of the land 
 
The value of the land was determined by its location and the condition of the soil: namely, 
whether it was fertile or not. The value of land in a good location --close to the city, rivers or 
canals-- was naturally high. The same went for fertile lands that were suitable for paddy fields 
or sugar cane plantations. The value of land farther away from the city or not located on the 
river banks or canals could be increased by building new infrastructure. Some good examples 
are the Chinese Kapitan, Phoa Bingham who dug the Molenvliet in 1648, a member of the 
Raad van Indië, François Caron, dug the Anciolse Vaart which connected his private estate in 
Ancol with Batavia. Other canals were also excavated by private initiative, among them the 
Amanusgracht and the Bacheraghtsgracht which made a link between the Anke River and Batavia, 
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and the Sontarse Vaart which connected Sunter with the city. In the course of time, the 
runnings of all of these canals were taken over by the Company.293  
 Each landowner who required a deed of property had to register his ownership with the 
Heemraden. Registered lands would be taxed annually. In most instances, the percentage of the 
estimated value of the land taxed is not known but several illustrations which reveal the 
amount of tax levied at specific locations can be provided. According to a report submitted to 
the Heemraden by Landmeter Bartel van der Valk in October 1697 294 , the Balinese Kapitan 
Lampidia owned a piece of land on the bank of the Grogol River 104 roeden295 wide  and 250 
roeden long in the north and south. The Heemraden estimated that Kapitan Lampidia should pay 
tax of as much as 40 rijksdaalders annually. The land belonging to Burger Dirk Bartelsz located 
on the side of Pesanggrahan River was taxed at 80 rijksdaalders. The width of the land was 400 
roeden on both the northern and southern sides, and the length was 680 roeden. Mrs Jeronima 
Marinus, widow of Simon Simons, paid an annual tax of 150 rijksdaalders on her land located 
between Pesanggrahan River and Santiga Springs. The width of the land was 1250 roeden, while 
its length was 1280 roeden.  
 The buying and selling of land in the Ommelanden was actively indulged in by every ethnic 
group which lived in that area. The conveyancing of sales and purchases usually had to take 
place in the presence of a notary and then announced to the Heemraden so that the deed could 
be legalized. Though the Dutch were the biggest landowners, Chinese, Indonesians, and 
Mardijkers were also actively involved in purchases and sales of lands. Most of the plots which 
were traded were fields, sugar-cane plantations, market gardens, or land on which fishponds 
were located. 
  A plantation belonging to a Chinese named I Sanio was located close to the Fort Vijfhoek 
to the southwest of the city wall. This plot was 12 roeden wide and 49 roeden long. Sou Hienko 
bought this plantation for 220 rijksdaalders making a down payment of 60 rijksdaalders. The 
remaining 160 rijksdaalders were to be paid two months later.296 Another example was the land 
located in Kota Bambu, west of Tanah Abang sold by Sayit from Bali to two Balinese women, 
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Tjeramsan and Nyai Boedoek, for 315 rijksdaalders. The area of land was 29 and its length was 
176 roeden.  
 The Company itself also sold land. For instance, on 25 March 1713, the Heemraden published 
a resolution which announced the sale of the VOC swamp land in Ancol to a Papanger named 
Jan Anginang. The land measured 30 by 70 roeden, and was sold for the low price of 20 
rijksdaalders.297 On basis of the many transaction recorded in the Minuut-akten van verschillende 
aard, we have to draw the conclusion that leasing was far more frequent than buying or selling 
land; an indication that the inhabitants of the Ommenlanden preferred to lease land for their 
agricultural endeavours rather than buy it. The farmers and entrepreneurs who were pursuing 
ventures in the Ommelanden were people with limited capital but who played an active role in 
production. 
 The majority of tenants were Chinese entrepreneurs who owned sugar-mills. Among them 
was Tan Tsoenko who rented a piece of land from Joan Harman, an opperkoopman who worked 
in Batavia Castle. Joan Harman‘s land could be reached after a 6-hour walk in a southwesterly 
direction from the city wall and was located somewhere between the Angke River and Santiga 
Springs. The width of this plot was 300 roeden. Its length was not clear. Tan Tsoenko wanted 
to build a sugar-mill there and plant sugar-cane on it. He rented Joan Harman‘s land for five 
years and paid 180 rijksdaalders per annum.298  
 Other tenants were farmers who planted paddy. Patimalela, a Bandanese, rented a piece of 
paddy-field from a Mardijker named Alexander van Coylang. It was located close to the Sunter 
River and measured 10 by 250 roeden. It was leased for two years. This farmer did not pay the 
rent in cash, but with a portion of his harvest. Each year, Patimalela had to pay 60 bunches of 
paddy with each bunch weighing 12 cattijs.299 Pieter Anthonys, a sergeant, rented out a fishpond 
and a piece of land attached to it for one year to Oey Tecko and Wayahan Sampalang. This 
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6. Conflicts about land 
 
Landownership in the Ommelanden increased considerably once the Batavian government had 
been able to establish law and order there at the end of the seventeenth century. During this 
period people from the city of Batavia and the surrounding regions came in droves to turn the 
virgin land into sugar plantations, paddy-fields, and gardens. Before the Heemraden were 
established, the government had only little or no control over the use of land and the 
conveyance of landownership.  
 Every new inhabitant of the Ommelanden could easily lay claim to virgin territory. Without 
giving as much as a second glance at the legal procedures, the new settlers built small houses 
(pondok) and began to cultivate the land. Most of these new settlers were Javanese from 
Mataram, Bantenese, and Sundanese from Priangan. It was impossible for the government to 
expel all the illegal settlers, since their number kept on rising all the time. In the long run, the 
Batavian government learned to live with them since these settlers proved to be harmless. As 
long as the illegal settlers did not create problems and the land on which they settled had not 
yet been granted to anyone else, the administration allowed them to stay. Only after the 
Heemraden began to operate effectively in 1682, did the government gradually commence 
strengthening its grip on landownership in the Ommelanden.  
 The legal status of individual landownership was divided into two categories: land in public 
possession and donated land. The public land belonged to the Company but was given in use 
to people who had acquired the proper rights to utilize it. The onus was on the owner to 
maintain roads, bridges, and ditches located in the vicinity of the land. He or she was also 
required to pay a tithe if the land was cultivated with paddy. Donated land was that handed out 
in the form of grants with the right of ownership to an individual by the Hoge Regering. The 
recipient of a land grant would be presented with an acte van donatie, and then an erfbrief.301 
Sometimes persons who received donated land had to pay a sum of money, but usually they 
were granted the land free of charge. 
 The existence of these two categories of landownership could lead to conflicts. Most of the 
landowners who owned their own land were indigenous peasants and gardeners who had 
settled on the land which it was still virgin soil and had turned it into paddy-fields or market 
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gardens and orchards. When the land became profitable, other people frequently tried to seize 
it. They would request an acte van donatie from the Hoge Regering in order to acquire the land as a 
grant. If the request was approved, the indigenous peasant living on the land risked losing his 
or her land, which was on quite the cards because the legal status of a land grant was stronger 
than the land which people had taken possession of.  
 A land conflict could arise when the owner of repossessed land would fight his land being 
handed over to a third party. For instance, a land conflict arose between Narrapatty, a 
Makasarese lieutenant, and Anthony de la Cores, a Christian Papanger. Narrapatty had a piece 
of land of which he had taken possession by the side of the Tangerang River He had cultivated 
paddy on his land for thirty years, and his possession of the land was authorized by the 
Heemraden since he paid the tithe regularly to the Company. Some time in 1702, Anthony de la 
Croes, who owned a piece of land located alongside Narrapatty‘s, grabbed 12 roeden of 
Narrapatty‘s land. It is not clear whether the 12 roeden indicated the acreage of the land or the 
length of the strip seized by De la Croes. Narrapatty brought this case before the Heemraden. 
To resolve the quarrel, the Heemraden assigned the landmeeter Bartel van der Valk to investigate 















                                                 








If it were ever to develop successfully in an economic sense, it was obvious that Batavia would 
require a large labour force. Aware of this shortage, the Company imported large numbers of 
slaves from South Asia and elsewhere in Indonesia and also recruited in abundance a host of 
Chinese and Javanese labourers. The slave trade in the Indonesian Archipelago had existed 
long before the arrival of Europeans and in fact Eastern Indonesia replaced South Asia as 
chief supplier of slaves for Batavia soon after the fall of Makassar in 1667. In the 
Ommelanden, even though they might only be able to afford two or three slaves, the majority 
of the slaves were owned by Balinese, Chinese, and other Indonesian ethnicities and the 
numbers of these slaves far exceeded those owned by Dutch citizens. 
 The bulk of the relatively cheap ‗free‘ labour was recruited from China and the North Coast 
of Java. The bulk of the Chinese labour force was recruited from the provinces of Fukien and 
Kwangtung in southeast China and these men were put to work in various jobs in the sugar 
industry. Javanese labour came from the Priangan and Cirebon to work as paddy cultivators, 
woodcutters, cattle herds, and plantation workers. 
  
1. The demand for manpower in the Ommelanden  
 
After struggling through sixty years of intermittent wars and armistices with Banten and 
Mataram, the Company eventually gained firm control of the environs of Batavia. Until that 
moment, despite the rather disturbed conditions, there had been two phases of economic 
development in the Ommelanden encouraged by the Company. The first serious efforts to 
increase agricultural production were undertaken in the 1640s but suddenly came to an end in 
1656 in the wake of raids in the vicinity of Batavia by Bantenese soldiers. Unquestionably, it is 
no empty claim that the economic development of the Ommenlanden in this first phase was 
 111 
pioneered by Chinese sugar entrepreneurs and rice cultivators.303 The years between 1659 and 
1683 witnessed a revival of the Ommelanden economy in response to the renewed 
development of the sugar industry. This time such Dutch entrepreneurs as Abraham Pittavin, 
Isaac de St. Martin, and Pieter van Hoorn were encouraged by the Company to take the 
initiative.304 
 Although the sugar industry was revitalized during this second phase, it and other 
agricultural activities continued to be a rather risky venture because the relations with Banten 
and Mataram were still unstable. The real economic potential of the Ommelanden could not 
be developed until the principality of Cirebon conceded sovereignty to the Company in 1681 
and peace contracts were signed with Mataram (1677) and Banten (1683). The latter treaty 
solved all its problems for Batavia. With the exception of the sultanate of Banten itself, the 
Company now governed all of West Java through the medium of contracts.    
 Having achieved this result, the commercial and agricultural interests of the Company in the 
areas surrounding of Batavia expanded rapidly. As the economic activities intensified, the need 
for manpower to be put to work in a whole range of activities in the newly pacified region rose 
proportionately. If the establishment of settlements or kampung in the surrounding areas of 
Batavia was mainly the consequence of encouragement by the Company because of the threat 
posed to security prior to 1684, most people who now came to settle did so on their own 
initiative, seeking employment in the sugar industry, brickworks, arak distilleries, cattle herding, 
or engaging in wet-rice cultivation.  
 A large area of the Ommelanden had not yet been cleared and settled until the middle of the 
seventeenth century, consequently the population was still small. The first census of 1673 gives 
the information that no more than 9,311 people resided outside the city walls. Among these 
people were 3,680 Mardijkers, 3,343 slaves, and the rest were Europeans (313), Mestizos (101), 
Chinese (392), Moors and Javanese (928), Malays (251), and Balinese (303).305 Because of the 
sparseness of the population, especially in the areas at a distance of more than one-day‘s walk 
from the city, it was an uphill battle to develop the Ommelanden as a commercial and 
agricultural area which could be economically beneficial to Batavia.  
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 An abundance of manpower would be required if successful economic development were to 
take off. In an initial attempt to solve this problem, the Company brought in bands of native 
militia men and their families from various places in the Archipelago and settled them in the 
immediate surroundings of Batavia. However, these soldiers often had to leave their kampung 
to join in the Company military campaigns, their total number was not enough to populate the 
region and provide an adequate, stable work force. Consequently a large part of the potentially 
productive land lay idle. 
 The best long-term solution to this situation was to increase the population by immigration 
and to offer prospective agricultural entrepreneurs favourable terms. The main obstacle to 
adopting the first approach was that it was difficult to control the influx of immigrants from 
China and closer to home from Banten and Mataram. Many of the Chinese immigrants 
entered Batavia illegally and the immigrants from the latter two regions often occupied land 
which already belonged to the Company or to other persons. Another hurdle was the lack of 
initial capital for opening up the land and establishing the essential infrastructure. Fortunately, 
the end of seventeenth century witnessed a sugar boom so it was not that difficult to find 
entrepreneurs who were willing to invest their money in agricultural activities. Moreover, by 
making the move to establish the College van Heemraden, the High Government committed itself 
to endorsing the orderly development of the Ommelanden infrastructure. 
 The main interests of the Company lay in the field of commerce and therefore, in most 
cases, the Batavian government preferred to limit its involvement in the organization of 
agricultural and industrial products and its attempts to control the supply of labour. The sugar 
industry and arak distilleries in the Ommelanden had long been run by Chinese entrepreneurs, 
while the cultivation of paddy and various vegetables in the same region was in the hands of 
indigenous peasants. There were, however, some exceptions in the cultivation of some of the 
cash crops, notably the nutmeg production in Banda Archipelago with slave labour and coffee 
and indigo cultivation in the Priangan in West Java. Here special arrangements had to be made 
by the Company to ensure that it controlled production. 
 To fulfil the demand for manpower in Batavia, the colonial government employed thousands 
of slaves. As early as 1645, it was noted that neither the Company nor the European 
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community in the Archipelago could survive without slave labour.306 In 1694, there were 215 
Company slaves working in the dockyard on the small island of Onrust. Another 953 slaves 
were employed in various jobs inside the city of Batavia. In the same year, the Company also 
hired 579 slaves from the civilian population.307 The colonial recruitment of slave labour to do 
the manual work and to bolster manufacturing was in fact an extension of the slave system 
which had existed since time immemorial in Southeast Asia but which was quite different from 
the system of chattel slave labour on the American plantations. Nevertheless, the colonial 
government did take a hand in regulating the system by imposing its own legal institutions and 
measures. 
 As organization and institution, the Company might have been the first formal slave-holder 
of its kind in Asia. Over time under its aegis, extensive slave trade networks developed in the 
Indian Ocean which encompassed all VOC settlements from the Cape of Good Hope in the 
west to the Moluccas in the east.308 Every year the Dutch purchased or hired hundreds of 
slaves for jobs which could not filled by the recruitment of either European or locally hired 
free labour. The small number of Europeans in Batavia and the high cost of hiring free 
labour309 made Batavia a city dependent on slave power. The majority of these slaves worked 
as house servants, artisans, coolies, and canal dredgers. Some slaves provided the labour for 
the Company industries such as the gunpowder-mills.   
 Individuals living under Company administration also had slaves; many actually owned quite 
large numbers. In the Ommelanden the greatest demand for slave labour was from civilians. In 
the last quarter of the seventeenth century, when this region came under the jurisdiction of the 
Batavian government, private entrepreneurs took the initiative in developing the agricultural 
and industrial sectors. The High Government inventory from the year 1696 provides the 
information that in between 1660-1695, 181 rural factories were built in the areas surrounding 
Batavia consisting of 116 sugar-mills, thirty-three brickworks, ten limekilns, and twenty-two 
saw-mills.310 Most of these enterprises were got off the ground by private, predominantly 
Chinese, entrepreneurs. Of the 116 sugar-mills, for example, ninety-six were built by Chinese, 
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eleven by Mardijkers, seven by Europeans, and two by Javanese.311 Without doubt, some of the 
labour used to build and later to work these rural factories was provided by slaves. 
Unfortunately there are no representative sources available which shed light on the division 
and composition of labour in these rural factories. 
 Local agriculture also required slaves as manpower. Various phases of the work in the sugar- 
and rice-fields and the market gardens, such as ploughing, sowing, and keeping the fields or 
gardens safe from the ravages of wild boars, but especially the harvesting, demanded a large 
supply of manpower. In this instance, the bulk of the demand for slave labour was from 
indigenous farmers. Thousands of slave sales in the Ommelanden, which were recorded in the 
notarial archives of Batavia, show that most of the slave buyers in the Ommelanden were 
indigenous people. Compared to the Dutch and Chinese, they were small-scale entrepreneurs 
but there were many of them. The majority of these indigenous agriculturalists were rice 
cultivators and market gardeners. In contrast to Dutch and Chinese entrepreneurs, they could 
only afford to buy two or three slaves and often shared the same dwelling with their slaves. 
 Despite the employment of slaves as manpower, the total demand for a labour force in the 
Ommelanden could not be satisfied. The solution was to recruit labour from elsewhere. One 
of the main sources of relatively cheap labour was the influx of Chinese migrant workers. The 
majority of them were natives of the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung in southeast China. 
Several push-and-pull factors drove the Chinese workers to the Nanyang (the Chinese term for 
the South Seas or insular Southeast Asia). The story of their migration is a historical cocktail of 
waxing maritime trade, unstable political condition at home, great population pressure, and a 
limited amount of available land for agriculture in their home villages. The number of Chinese 
immigrants who entered Batavia and its immediate vicinity increased considerably after the 
Kangxi Emperor restored maritime trade with Southeast Asia in 1684 under the motto 
‗prosperous people through trade‘.312 This policy was an opportunity which spurred thousands 
of migrant workers from the southeast Chinese coastal provinces to take a passage to Batavia 
and look for jobs in flourishing agriculture of the Ommelanden.  
 By coincidence, the year 1684 also marks the moment the Company finally gained firm 
control of the Ommelanden and, concomitantly, the upper hand over neighbouring Cirebon 
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and the Priangan. The integration of these regions under the sovereignty of Batavia and the 
Company hegemony over the Pasisir created ideal conditions for the recruitment of yet 
another, much cheaper source for labour: the Javanese bujang (young male worker). Attracted 
by the progress in the sugar and rice cultivation which was going ahead by leaps and bounds, 
large numbers of Javanese seasonal workers moved to the Ommelanden to work on the sugar 
and rice plantations. The influx of this source of Javanese labour was difficult to control since 
no system had been put into place to supervise their entry. The problem was exacerbated 
because the porous borders of the Ommenlanden were too extended to be properly patrolled 
by the limited number of Company troops. Despite these hurdles, the colonial authority did 
make an attempt to administer the Javanese by allocating plots of land in order to concentrate 
their settlements. It was really a wasted effort, since the Javanese were inclined to choose to 
settle scattered throughout the rural area. 
 In the Ommelanden, the usual practice of the bujang was to offer their labour to sugar 
entrepreneurs as a group. In their dealings with the entrepreneurs, these labourers were 
represented by one person who probably was the same man who also acted as their overseer 
(mandoor). Most of these people who represented the bujang were free men and some of them 
were lower-ranking Javanese officers such as sergeants or vaandrigs. A Javanese vaandrig by the 
name of Singa Dria Crocot, for example, signed a contract with a Chinese sugar-miller, Poa 
Keengko, to deliver twenty-two Javanese labourers to work at Keengko‘s sugar-mill in 
Paccabangan. 313  Another Javanese officer, Sergeant Prana Wangsa, was committed to 
delivering twenty-one labourers to a sugar-mill in Panghadagam (Pengadegan) when he signed 
a contract with the mill owner, Qua Koko. 314  It seems that most of the men who were 
recruited by the Javanese officers were actually inhabitants of the kampung over which these 
officers had been appointed. 
 In 1686 and 1687, in anticipation of the growth of rural economic activities and the 
increasing flow of migrant labourers, the Batavian government prepared hundreds of hectares 
of Company land in the Ommelanden for the construction of new kampung and the opening 
up of agricultural areas.315 This initiative was welcomed with open arms by the kampung leaders. 
They put in petitions for grants of the Company land in order to provide their followers with a 
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source of income. The end of the seventeenth and the beginning of eighteenth century were 
marked by a rapid growth of population and a vigorous expansion of agricultural areas. The 
favourable land policy just happened to coincide with the sugar boom and turned out to be a 
strong magnet attracting thousands of Chinese and Javanese labourers to come to settle in the 
Ommelanden. This situation created an ideal atmosphere for the successful expansion of the 
Ommelanden economy in the half century between 1684 and the 1730s. 
 
2. The slave trade in the Ommelanden 
 
Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century eyewitness accounts provide evidence that the slave trade 
in Southeast Asia was well established long before the Europeans became involved in it. In 
1516, Duarte Barbosa mentioned that ships sailed from Melaka and Java to Timor to purchase 
sandalwood, horses, honey, wax, pepper, and slaves.316 In a 1597 report, a Dutchman named 
Lintgensz mentioned that women in Bali were bought and enslaved.317 A Spanish source of 
1609 says that the indigenous people of the Philippines often traded slaves like any other 
article of merchandise, from village to village, from province to province, and indeed from 
island to island. 318  However, these accounts from the sixteenth and the beginning of 
seventeenth century need further definition: a slave is a ‗saleable‘ person who is regarded as the 
property of the buyer.319  
 Slaves, captives, and forced labourers were the primary sources of labour in Southeast Asia 
long before the use of indentured labour was developed under colonial rule in the nineteenth 
century. Slavery was also an urban phenomenon in pre-modern Southeast Asia. As centres of 
commerce and hubs of economic activities, Southeast Asian emporia required manpower; a 
need which was satisfied by the large-scale importation of slaves.  
 Before the Europeans dominated Southeast Asian waters, port principalities like Melaka, 
Aceh, Banten, and Makassar had already become centres of a slave trade stretching over long 
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distances from Papua New Guinea to the Coromandel Coast and from Sumbawa to 
Philippines. In this period a slave was considered as a luxury item. Owing to the high price 
demanded for them, most of the slaves were owned by the local elite and the wealthier 
members of the society. In other words, owning a slave was also a symbol of social status. 
 The arrival of the Dutch in the Indonesian Archipelago obviously did not commence the 
slave trade in this region, but it undoubtedly influenced the activities of the local trading 
networks. As the major commercial hub in Southeast Asia, Batavia gained a reputation not 
only as the centre of the trade in spices, textiles, and ceramics but also a centre of slave 
trade.320 Since Batavia was the rendezvous for an Asia-wide transit trade, this entrepôt was not 
the final destination of all slaves arriving there. Slaves were exported to various Company 
settlements in Asia, among them the Banda Archipelago, the Moluccas, and Cape Town. 
Nevertheless, Batavia itself remained the main collection point for the slaves who were found 
in the Dutch possessions in Asia.321 
 The places of origin of slaves in the Archipelago did not change drastically from what they 
had been before and after the arrival of the European. Most of the slaves originated from 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Buton in the north and Bali, Sumbawa, Flores, Timor, and Papua in 
the east, where the inhabitants had not yet been converted to Islam and where usually there 
was no strong centralized political authority. The supply of slaves from the Indonesian 
Archipelago to Batavia fluctuated in response to local political and economic conditions. 
Famines in those regions caused by natural and human disasters and wars between local 
potentates generated people who were (often quite willingly) sold as slaves to indigenous or 
European slave traders. 
 However, in the first thirty years of the existence of Batavia, the majority of the slaves came 
from Bengal, Malabar and other South Asian regions. They were acquired or captured from 
the Portuguese and their number increased when more slaves began to be sent from Melaka 
after its conquest in 1641.322 Many of these slaves had already converted to Christianity and 
spoke a Creole-Portuguese among themselves. In this period, Batavia still had to depend on 
supplies from distant places since it did not have direct control of the slave trade in the 
Archipelago which was still largely in the hands of private Asian and European traders. In fact, 
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the Company preferred slaves from distant places because the greater the distance from their 
homelands, the less the possibility of slaves absconding from any situation they found 
intolerable.323 
 Eastern Indonesia only began to replace South Asia as the main source of slaves after the fall 
of the powerful Makassar sultanate of Goa in southwest Sulawesi in 1667.324 Before that year, 
only a small number of slaves had been imported into Batavia directly from Sulawesi. The 
trading network of Makassar now fell under Company control. Lists of VOC slave populations 
in the main towns on Java during 1680s suggest that the largest single ethnic groups (over 30 
per cent) among the Company slaves was made up of the Buginese and Makassarese. 325 
Because Makassar had traditionally been the port of embarkation for slaves from Sulawesi 
itself as well as from Kalimantan, Buton, Sumba, Sumbawa, Solor, Mandar, and other islands 
in Nusatenggara, not all the slaves from this port town were native Makassarese but were 
natives from all over Eastern Indonesia. In the VOC documents, there are plenty of references 
to the troublesome and rebellious character of the Bugis slaves from South Sulawesi. This 
character trait was certainly rooted to some extent in their strong Muslim identity but was also 
a consequence of the facts that these ethnic groups continued vigorously to resist their social, 
political, and especially commercial displacement by the Dutch and they maintained their 
unswerving loyalty to their allies to Sulawesi.326  
 Bali was also an important slave supplier for Batavia. From the middle of the seventeenth 
until the early nineteenth century, it consistently exported a significant number of slaves to the 
VOC headquarters; the total volume is roughly estimated to be 100,000 to 150,000 slaves.327 
Besides their own superfluous subjects, the Balinese kings also exported many slaves who had 
come from other islands in Eastern Indonesia such as Lombok, Sumba, and Sumbawa.328 As in 
the case of the export of slaves from Makassar, this explains that the port of departure of the 
ship which transported slaves did not necessarily indicate the place origin of the slaves. During 
the VOC period the vast majority of slave exports from Bali, via the ports of Kuta and 
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Buleleng, went to the Batavia market.329 The control of this export was in the hands of Chinese 
merchants and Balinese slave traders who transported the slaves and sold them to Batavian 
Chinese, Dutch free burgers, and free Indonesians. The domination of Chinese and non-
Dutch slave traders in the Balinese slave export from Batavia gives the impression that the 
Company was not the ‗main player‘ in the displacement of these Balinese slaves.   
 The sudden rise in the number of slaves imported from within the boundaries of the 
Indonesian Archipelago stirred up some unease in the higher echelons of the Company. 
Therefore, in order to avoid the growth of feelings of solidarity and concomitant slave revolts, 
steps were taken to stop the concentration of slaves from the same place of origin in Batavia 
and the Ommelanden. Such fears were also the thinking behind the decision of the Batavian 
government to restrict slave imports from certain areas and to try to differentiate the supply 
regions. This policy became evident in October 1688, when the government issued an 
ordinance decreeing the prohibition of the import of slaves from the Eastern Archipelago 
without the explicit permission of the authorities.330 In this same ordinance, the import of 
slaves by Indonesian traders was forbidden and in practice the slave trade was restricted to 
Company officials or to other traders who had been granted an exclusive licence. All the 
informal slave trade between Batavia and Bali was prohibited so as to guarantee the 
implementation of the decree.331 Yet, no matter how hard the Company tried to limit the 
import of slaves from the Archipelago, the restrictions on slave imports from Eastern 
Indonesia were gradually relaxed when the demand for slave labour rose to new heights in the 
1720s.332 Makassar and Bali were to remain the main suppliers of slaves for Batavia. 
 In economic terms, a slave was not an important commercial commodity for the Company. 
In contrast to the Dutch West India Company (West-Indische Compagnie) which traded between 
West Africa and the West Indies, the Dutch East India Company did not regard the slave trade 
as its core business. In the eighteenth century, when the slave trade was substantially higher 
than it had been in the seventeenth century, it accounted for only 0.5 per cent of the total 
value of Company trade.333 This reckoning does not include the private slave trade carried on 
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by Company servants, free burgers, Asian slave traders, and indigenous people who were 
subjects of the VOC. Therefore, although the slave trade was of little financial importance to 
the Company itself, the inhabitants of Batavia became big slave traders. 
 
 
Illustration 6: Slave auction in Batavia, c.1800 
Source: Anthony Reid (ed.), Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia (St. Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1983), p. 298. 
 
 The Company left the shipping of slaves to Batavia in the hands of private entrepreneurs 
and contented itself with levying taxes on this activity. In 1720, for every female slave sold at 
the market in Batavia, the vendor was expected to pay a tax of around 10 rijksdaalders and the 
same amount was levied on a male slave two years later.334 Anthony Reid states that about 
1,000 slaves were imported into Batavia annually in the seventeenth century. This number 
increased to about 3,000 during the eighteenth century.335 The census records of 1709, 1719, 
and 1739 show that the percentage of slaves amounted to 33.8 per cent, 29.7 per cent, and 28 
per cent of the total population of the walled city and its surroundings.336  
 To understand how the slave trade was conducted in the Ommelanden, it is necessary to 
scrutinize the collection of the notarial archives in the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia 
(National Archive of the Republic of Indonesia/ANRI) in Jakarta. This collection is one of the 
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primary sources for research into the social and economic life of Batavian society.337 Reliable 
information about slave trade in Batavia and its environs is available because the notaries 
scrupulously recorded sales, manumissions, and leases involving slaves. Notarial documents 
which are useful to research into slavery can be divided into various categories and include 
wills, attestations, trade contracts and other documents relating to the transfer of slaves.338 
What are known as akten van transport contain precious information about the names, sex, 
ethnic origins, and domiciles of the people, the vendor, buyer, and witness, involved in slave 
transactions. Akten van transport also provide the name, sex, ethnic origin, and price of the slave 
as the object of this transaction. 
 Buying and selling slaves was a daily activity among the people in the Ommelanden. A visit 
to a notary for the purpose of having an akte van transport drawn up could be undertaken by 
anyone and the sum involved was trifling.339 The ratification of a slave transfer in front of a 
notary provided legal proof of the transaction. A visit to a notary was not confined to the 
Europeans and Chinese who formed the high and middle strata in Ommelanden society, 
indigenous people who often could only afford one or two slaves were also among his 
clientele. Most of the names documented in the akten van transport are fairly common which 
makes it difficult to link the people involved with the names mentioned in other primary 
sources. 
 The following examples are taken from the akten van transport left by Notary Carel Schoute. 
He was among the longest serving notaries in Batavia. His office was open from 1723 to 1736. 
Unlike the papers preserved by other notaries, most of the documents in Schoute‘s archives 
provide pretty complete information about the persons who were involved in the slave trade. 
Schoute‘s notarial documents, which we shall take as examples, are all related to slave 
transactions between indigenous people. As historical sources the akten van transport are 
hampered by certain limitations, because they only record information about the purchase of 
slaves. They do not offer any other information which might cast light on the profession of 
the vendor and buyer, the motivation behind the transaction, the age of the slaves and their 
skills. Nevertheless, this kind of source is useful because it provides early information about 
the identity of some ordinary people who lived in Batavia and the Ommelanden.  
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 An examination of the residence of slave vendors and buyers reveals that there were at least 
two different ways of buying and selling slaves in the inner city and its environs. The first of 
these involved paying a visit to slave markets or slave auctions. After buyers and sellers had 
met and agreed on a price, they went to a notary to record their transaction. This was the 
preferred way of doing business between people who lived in different places and those who 
were unacquainted with each other. The second method was resorted to by people who were 
already acquainted and did not necessarily go to the slave market, but had their transaction 
recorded directly by a notary. This usually worked out well among those living in the same 
neighbourhood. For example, Catip Assan (vendor) and Niaey Abieba (buyer), both living in 
Anke, engaged in a transaction on 29 January 1729. Two people who lived in Pagaraman, Intje 
Oesin (vendor) and Wayahan Coelandie (buyer), engaged in another transaction on 2 February 
1729. Meanwhile, Niey Griese (vendor) and To Assing (buyer), both living in Patuakan, 
engaged in a transaction on 2 June 1729.340  
 Not all of the slave sellers and buyers who are mentioned in the akten van transport came from 
the city and its surroundings. Some of the most active slave vendors were nahkoda (ship‘s 
captains) and slave sellers who came from outside Java. For instance, Tjamba, a Wadjonese 
who lived in Makassar, is recorded as having sold two Bugis and one Mandarese slave on 
November 8 1723 for the sum of 255 rijksdaalders.341 A Balinese nahkoda, Bapak Dama, sold 
three Balinese slaves with a total value of 242 rijksdaalders on the February 2 and 9 1728. 
Meanwhile, between February 5 and March 13 in the same year, another Balinese nahkoda, 
Bapak Warnie, sold thirteen Balinese slaves with a total value of 1083 rijksdaalders.342 These 
three people have been chosen at random to represent the many slave sellers from outside Java 
active in the slave trade of Batavia. 
 A survey of about 1,000 samples of contracts concluded between 1723 and 1731 clearly 
demonstrates that six groups of people were most active in the slave trade. They were the 
Chinese and five ethnicities from elsewhere in the Indonesian Archipelago. As Tables 1 and 2 
shows, the Balinese are revealed to be the most active sellers and buyers, followed by Chinese, 
Bugis, Malays and others. In general, the number of male slave sellers was higher (60.8%) than 
female (39.2%). Interesting evidence appears when the male and female slave sellers in certain 
                                                 
340 ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3953, Minuut Akten van Transport (MAT) Notary Carel Schoute, 27 January, 2 
February, and 2 Juny 1729. 
341 ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 8 November 1723. 
342 ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 2 February and 13 March 1723. 
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ethnic groups are compared. The most active female slave sellers were the Makassarese (67%). 
A high percentage was also found among the Sumbawanese (50%) and Balinese (46%), while 
the lowest percentage of female sellers was among the Chinese (20%).   
 
Table 5: Ethnic origin and sex of slave sellers from 1,000 samples, 1723-1731 
 
 Female sellers Male sellers Total Percentage 
Bali 231 265 496 49.6% 
Bugis 22 58 80 8% 
Chinese 44 177 221 22.1% 
Java 11 21 32 3.2% 
Makassar 26 13 39 3.9% 
Malay 28 44 72 7.2% 
Sumbawa 6 6 12 1.2% 
Others 24 24 48 4.8% 
Total 392 608 1000 100% 
 
 Using the same source, the evidence which can be gleaned about slave buyers turns out to be 
slightly different. The percentage of Balinese buyers was higher than the percentage of 
Balinese sellers. The reason for this discrepancy is that the number of Balinese female buyers 
was higher than those of the male buyers. The percentage of female slave buyers was as 
follows: Makassarese (62%), Balinese (51%), Sumbawanese (47%), Javanese (44%), Malay 
(42%), Bugis (23%), and Chinese (23%). A nice piece of evidence which shows that women in 
the Ommelanden of Batavia were independent actors in the local economy and that they 
played an active role in the interaction process among the ethnicities. 
 
Table 6: Ethnic origin and sex of slave buyers from 1,000 samples, 1723-1731 
 
 Female buyers Male buyers Total Percentage 
Balinese 265 252 517 51.7% 
Bugis 16 51 67 6.7% 
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Chinese 52 174 226 22.6% 
Javanese 16 20 36 3.6% 
Makassarese 15 9 24 2.4% 
Malay 22 30 52 5.2% 
Sumbawanese 9 10 19 1.9% 
Others 17 42 59 5.9% 
Total 412 588 1000 100% 
  
 The figures in Tables 1 and 2 show that the Balinese were not only the largest category of 
slaves but were also to the fore as buyers and sellers as well. The same sample reveals that the 
percentage of Balinese slave buyers and vendors was even higher than that of the Balinese 
slaves (see Table 3). This record also makes clear that Balinese sold slaves from Bali and from 
other ethnicities as well, a statement which is equally valid for the Bugis, Makassarese and 
Malay. There were no Chinese slaves, so the Chinese could only buy slaves from other 
ethnicities. The Sumbawanese people presented a different case. Their percentage as slaves was 
higher that of slave buyers and sellers. These pieces of evidence demonstrate that ironically the 
slave trade was a most effective medium for ensuring the ethnic mixing of the Ommelanden 
people. 
 The various names appearing in the akten van transport also show identity changes among the 
people who were involved in the slave trade. This tendency is found mainly among the groups 
known as the Geschooren Chineesen (Shaven Chinese). Even though they were officially 
categorized as Chinese, some of them had ceased to use Chinese names, but had adopted 
Malay names like Dul Rain, Intje Mansoer, 343  Intje Alam, and Intje Dul; 344  names which 
indicate that they were Muslim converts. The government of Batavia identified a Geschooren 
Chinees as a Chinese who cut his hair short, hence no longer wore the pigtail forced on the Han 
Chinese in China by the Manchu Ch‘ing. Most of them had been born in Batavia as children of 
mixed-marriages between Chinese men and indigenous wives. A tendency to use Malay names 
was also prevalent among the Balinese. Since the seventeenth century, many Balinese who 
lived in Batavia had converted to Islam. They chose Malay names like Abdul Soekoer, Intje 
                                                 
343 ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 7 October and 22 November 1723. 
344 ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3953, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 24 January and 3 February 1729. 
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Sayhiet, Intje Ali, Abdul Carim, and Abdul Jabaar.345 The use of Malay names by Chinese and 
Balinese is a clue that Islam gave a communal identity to the Ommelanden inhabitants to some 
degree at least.  
  
3. Slave Identity 
  
 Some evidences concerning slave origins can also be abstracted from the akten van transport. 
More than 75 per cent of slaves sold in the Ommelanden of Batavia came from Eastern 
Indonesia: Bali, Sulawesi, Sumbawa, and Mandar. The percentage of slaves originating from 
Bali and Sulawesi amounted to 50 per cent and 18 per cent of all slaves were from farther east. 
As has been mentioned above, Bali and Makassar (Sulawesi slaves were sent to Batavia from 
Makassar) were not necessarily the places of origin of the slaves but could well have been 
simply the transit ports for slaves from remoter areas in Eastern Indonesia. Bearing this in 
mind, the real number of Balinese and Sulawesi slaves can be estimated as slightly lower and 
the percentage of slaves from other places in Eastern Indonesia slightly higher.  
 
Table 7: Place of origin of slaves from 1,000 samples, 1723-1731 
 
Place of origin Number Percentage 
Bali 397 39.7% 
Batavia 47 4.7% 
Buton 38 3.8% 
Malay  22 2.2% 
Kalimantan 6 0.6% 
Maluku 5 0.5% 
Mandar 57 5.7% 
Manggarai 26 2.6% 
Papua 7 0.7% 
Sulawesi 140 14% 
Sumbawa 86 8.6% 
                                                 
345 ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3953, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 18 October, 8, 15, and 29 November 1723. 
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Total 1000 100% 
 
 
 The Sulawesi slaves came from Bugis, Makassar, Mandar, and Toraja. Slaves purporting to 
come from Sumbawa actually originated from Manggarai (in Flores), Dompu, and Sumba. 
Malay slaves came from Riau, Minangkabau, Bengkulu, all in Sumatra, Mindanau in the 
Philippines, and Johor on the Malay Peninsula. Of course there were also Batavian slaves born 
to slave parents in Batavia. I came across only two Javanese slaves in the akten van transport. 
The reason their number is so few is that, according to Javanese adat, in principle a Javanese 
could not be enslaved and the Company, anxious that there should be no concentrations of 
slaves of any one ethnicity, discouraged the import of Javanese slaves. However, at the 
beginning of eighteenth century many Javanese called modderjavanen (mud Javanese) were 
dispatched by their noble Javanese masters from Cirebon to Batavia and its surrounding areas 
to work as contract labour excavating and deepening the canals of Batavia. The modderjavanen 
were not technically slaves although their conditions were not much short of slave labour. It 
would be much more accurate to describe them as bonded labour.  
 The large contingent of Eastern Indonesian slaves supports the hypothesis that slaves as far 
away from Batavia as possible were preferred. With their places of origin so distant and their 
ethnicities so diverse in origin the likelihood that they would band together and conspire 
against their masters was slim.346 This is the reason the non-Javanese, especially Balinese as well 
as various people who were transported from Makassar, formed the majority of Batavian and 
the Ommelanden slaves. 
 The akten van transport also document the custom prevalent among the Ommelanden 
inhabitants of changing the name of the purchased slave. This name change tended to occur 
especially when the buyer was from an ethnicity different to that of the seller of the slave (or 
of the slaves themselves). The new names were usually ones common among the buyer‘s own 
ethnicity. For instance: a slave from Sumbawa named Paddy saw his name changed into 
                                                 
346 Susan Abeyasekere, ―Slaves in Batavia: Insights from a Slavery Register‖, in Reid (ed.), Slavery, Bondage and 
Dependency, p. 286. 
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Calong by a Balinese buyer named Marga.347 A Malay, Intje Rasiep, changed his slave‘s name 
from Trima of Manggarai to Daulat. A Chinese, Siauw Tsoenio, changed the name of his slave 
from Lanckier of Gorontalo to Laytiam.348 Probably slaves who changed owners several times 
had to accept several name changes. In the akten van transport are also recorded slave names, 
which do not reflect their bearers‘ ethnic origin such as Tsoelan van Boeton, Catjong van 
Papoea, and Moejoer van Baly. 349  The name changes were undoubtedly a contribution to 
eradicating the slave‘s own ethnic identity. 
 The percentage of male and female slaves based on 575 samples in akten van transport was 
51.3 and 44.5 per cent. The sex of some (4.2%) is unknown. Most Balinese and Sulawesi slaves 
were male, while the majority of the Batavia (descendants of slaves who had been brought to 
Batavia in the seventeenth century) and Mandar slaves were female. Most akten van transport 
recorded the sex of the slaves. Had they not done so, it would have been difficult to recognize 
the sex of a slave. Male and female slaves, in particular Balinese, sometimes used the same 
names such as Marga, Tabanan, Perean, and Sideman, which referred to their place of origin in 
Bali.  
 
Table 8: Sex of slaves from 575 samples, 1728-1731 
 
Place of origin Female Male Unknown Number 
Bali 101 135 8 244 
Batavia 17 14 5 36 
Buton 9 8   1 18 
Malay / 
Sumatra 
4 6  10 
Kalimantan 1 2  3 
Maluku 2 1  3 
Mandar 21 9 1 31 
Manggarai 2 8 1 11 
Papua 1   1 
                                                 
347 ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3953, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 28 January 1729. 
348 ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3958, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 5 Juny and 13 Juny 1731. 
349 ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 4, 10 January, and 23 February 1724. 
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Sulawesi 28 41 2 71 
Sumbawa 22 21 2 45 
Timor 1 3  4 
Others / 
Unknown 
47 47 4 98 
Total 256 295 24 575 
 
 The price of a slave was determined by his/her age, skills, and physical appearance. Slaves 
who were skilled cooks, carpenters, or musicians were more valuable than unskilled slaves. 
Adult slaves and good-looking slaves were also more expensive than child or elderly slaves. 
Alas, there is no information in the akten van transport about the conditions which determined 
the price of a slave, but there are some clues to the pricing of the slaves. The Balinese were 
usually more expensive than the other slaves. The average price for a Balinese was 70 to 80 
rijksdaalders. Sulawesi and Sumbawanese slaves were valued at 60 to 70 rijksdaalders. Most of 
slaves from the other places in Indonesia could be bought for less than 60 rijksdaalders. Of all 
slaves mentioned in the notaries‘ papers consulted, Melan of Tangap was the most expensive. 
This slave was sold by a Balinese woman named Patima to a Javanese named Intje Camar for 
the price of 140 rijksdaalders. Ma Soeboe of Sumbawa was the cheapest slave. She was bought 
by a Javanese named Bappa Padjar from a Sumbawan slave seller named Abdul Cassim for the 
price of 20 rijksdaalders.350 Young women slaves were in high demand, perhaps because they 
were increasingly desired as mistresses by the overwhelmingly male population of European 
and Chinese immigrants.351  
 
4. The Influx of free labour 
 
In the context of early-modern Southeast Asia, Batavia was not much different from other 
port cities such as Melaka, Banten and Makassar, in the sense that a large influx of labour 
migration was required to accomplish a whole range of tasks which were beyond the capacity 
of the existing population of the city and its environs. In an emporium like Batavia, 
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commercial activities and the economic development of the port city and its hinterland were 
dependent on a continuous stream of immigrants to supply sufficient cheap labour.  
 The influx of migrants over a long period imbued the colonial city and its environs a plural 
character in which people of different ethnic origins and backgrounds lived side by side in the 
same geographical unit. Thanks to this influx of migrants, the Ommelanden of Batavia was 
gradually populated. The colonial census of 1679 registered 13,593 inhabitants living outside 
the city walls of Batavia. In twenty years, in 1699, this number increased to 49,688 and twenty 
years later in 1719 to 65,436.352  
 The commercial and agricultural expansion of Batavia created many new job opportunities in 
the rural sectors. There were plenty of local inhabitants or migrant labourers waiting to fill job 
opportunities when they arose. Sooner or later, everybody could find a place in the socio-
economic setting of the Ommelanden. The Europeans, who never surpassed 2 per cent of the 
total population, were the governing and political elite and possessed gigantic socio-economic 
power disproportionate to their number. The free Mardijkers who made up about 12 per cent 
of the Ommelanden population in 1709 originated from South Asia and elsewhere in the 
Archipelago. Their ancestors were probably slaves because their number grew significantly in 
the wake of the increase in manumissions in the late 1670s and 1680s. 353  After being 
manumitted, most of them were absorbed into the Ommelanden population and earned their 
living as rice cultivators, gardeners, and as labourers in the rural factories.  
 Besides the slaves, Moors, Mestizos, and various ethnic groups from elsewhere in the 
Archipelago formed about 59 per cent of the total population in 1719. Among these groups, 
the Moors and Mestizos were often found as merchants, landowners, and small entrepreneurs. 
They and the Chinese usually played a role as middlemen in the socio-economic landscape of 
the Ommelanden. Various indigenous groups from elsewhere in the Archipelago came to the 
Ommelanden as recruits serving in the Company auxiliary army or militia. When they were not 
participating in military campaigns, they worked as rice and sugar cultivators, gardeners, 
woodcutters, or rural factory labourers. Through their presence, the cosmopolitan character of 
Batavia was extended beyond its walls and spread throughout its surroundings. 
 Chinese labourers came to Batavia by sea as migrant workers. During the Company period, 
Batavia was one of the many ports in Southeast Asia which were served by the Chinese junk 
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trading network. The maritime links between China and the Nanyang ushered in a period of 
reciprocal prosperity both for the Chinese merchants and for the settlements at which the 
junks and wangkang anchored. The steady supply of Chinese commodities carried by Chinese 
shipping became a crucial factor in the continuation of the prosperity of Batavia.  
 The junk trade supplied the city with various kinds of Chinese merchandise, including silk, 
paper, porcelain, and tea. Nevertheless, the most important ‗commodity‘ carried on the 
Chinese ships was the labour force, represented by the hundreds of Chinese migrants and 
sojourners who were sent to Batavia every year. Among these passengers were merchants and 
a contingent of such craftsmen as carpenters, shoemakers, tailors, and blacksmiths. But the 
majority consisted of workers looking for jobs and opportunities to make a fortune in the 
biggest Dutch emporium in Asia. They intended to stay in the Nanyang for a long time and 
not to return to Tang Shan, the mountain of Tang, until they had become wealthy. 
 The majority of the Chinese immigrants were Fukienese and Cantonese who had embarked 
at the ports of Amoy and Canton. The southeast provinces of China did have some 
manufacturing industries, most notably crude ceramics, ironmongery, and textiles and cash 
crops like tea and sugar were cultivated there.354 Hence the Fukienese and Cantonese were 
tailor-made to respond to the demand for labour in the Ommelanden, where the largest 
demand was from the booming sugar industry. The Chinese migrant workers did not just bring 
their labour; they also brought with them an entire array of social institutions such as clan and 
dialect associations, trade guilds, Chinese religion, and secret societies. Through the 
intercession of these institutions the new immigrants had access to housing, occupation, 
protection, and entertainment. 
 Among the Dutch establishments in the Archipelago, only in Batavia were the Chinese able 
to form a large community. In other Dutch colonial settlements, their number was restricted 
by the authorities. In the city of Ambon ninety-one Chinese men registered as inhabitants in 
1694, while in 1724 Makassar there were fewer than forty Chinese inhabitants. 355  In 
comparison, the total population of Chinese living in Batavia and its surrounding areas in 1699 
amounted to as many as 8,074.356  The acceptance of a large Chinese population under it 
authority by the Batavian government was soundly based. The government was well aware that 
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Batavia was different from other colonial settlements in Indonesia in the sense that here, and 
especially in the Ommelanden, the Chinese as assumed the role of pioneers and provided 
manpower for various economic activities. 
 Between 1684 and 1740, economic activities in the Ommelanden continued to attract a great 
number of Chinese immigrants. This period coincided with the heyday of the junk trade which 
Leonard Blussé states took place between 1690 and 1740.357 In 1689, there were 2,333 Chinese 
officially registered in the Ommelanden. This number increased to 7,550 in 1719 and two 
decades later to 10,574 in 1739.358  
 Despite their indisputable uses, some efforts were made by the government to control the 
increasing number of Chinese. On 21 May 1690, the High Government decided to issue an 
edict listing the number of Chinese who had annually arrived on junks from China since 1684. 
All the Chinese who had arrived before 1683 would be permitted to reside in Batavia and the 
Ommelanden, as long as they were duly registered with their officers. 359  In 1730, the 
government published a placard decreeing that all Chinese and Indonesian ships which put in 
at Batavia had to be registered.360 This regulation was an attempt by the government to control 
the number of migrants who arrived in Batavia by sea, but these attempts were less than 
fruitful. Although river estuaries in Batavia were guarded by Company patrols, many migrants 
still managed to slip into Batavia illegally. They went into hiding in the Ommelanden and 
earned a living there as cheap labourers in sugar-mills and other rural factories. 
 Arousing less public interest, Javanese labourers also stealthily slipped into the rural areas of 
the Ommelanden over the borders with Banten and Mataram. The pressure of having to 
comply with compulsory labour demands, tax burdens, natural disasters, famines or epidemics, 
and frequent civil unrest, especially in Mataram, can be counted among the push factors 
compelling the Javanese to leave their birthplaces and move to the remote areas of Batavia in 
search of a better life. Many of these refugee Javanese were from a peasant background and in 
the rural areas around the city they worked as rice cultivators and provided labour for the 
sugar and other rural industries. They also ran orchards and market gardens and some found 
employment as woodcutters, and buffalo herds. 
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 The influx of immigrants was an essential factor in providing the Ommelanden with a labour 
force, because the natural reproduction of the local population was insufficient to replenish 
itself and create demographic growth. The Javanese immigrants who arrived from the east 
were natives of such densely populated areas on the North Coast of Java as Kerawang, Bekasi, 
Cirebon, and Tegal. Those who moved in from the west came from Banten. From the south 
came the Sundanese from the highlands of the Priangan. Many of these Javanese were seasonal 
workers, who came to the Ommelanden to earn extra during the sugar and paddy harvests. 
 Between 1684 and 1740, the Javanese grew to become the largest group of inhabitants in the 
Ommelanden. Their influx as cheap labourers can also be traced back to some extent in 
Batavian notarial archives. Some records show how the Javanese struggled to find their niche 
in the local economy. Since registering a contract was not terribly expensive, many Javanese 
found their way to the offices of notaries to record their legal contract with their employer. 
 Our first example regards a group of Javanese who found jobs as labourers in the sugar 
industry. They were represented by Wiera Soeta, a Javanese from Cirebon, who signed a 
contract with a Chinese sugar entrepreneur, Tan Kimko, on 9 December 1709. In the contract, 
Soeta committed himself to delivering twenty Javanese workers to Kimko‘s sugar-mill in the 
next sugar harvest season. He also promised to organize the division of labour at the sugar-mill 
and to supervise his fellow workers. Kimko‘s sugar-mill was located on a bank of the Cakung 
River. The Chinese sugar-miller agreed to pay a monthly salary of as much as 2.5 rijksdaalders to 
Wiera Soeta and 1 rijksdaalder to every Javanese sugar worker. 361  The notarial archives of 
Batavia contain numerous documents like this and provide ample evidence that many Javanese 
seasonal workers did come to the Ommelanden during the cane-cutting and processing season. 
This pattern was to be repeated until the end of eighteenth century. In 1779, Jan Hooyman 
noted that an abundant stream of bujang from Cirebon and Tegal found their way to Batavia 
every year in search of a job at the sugar-mills.362  
 The next example is a contract concerning Javanese woodcutters. On 16 April 1729, two 
Javanese, Wangsa Dita and Carta Naya, signed a contract with a Chinese, Ko Kongko, for the 
delivery of 200 roeden of firewood to Kongko‘s sugar-mill in Srengseng. The complete quanitity 
of the firewood had to be delivered within four months and for every roede Dita and Naya 
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would receive a payment of 1.87 rijksdaalders or 90 stuivers.363 It seems highly likely that other 
Javanese helped Wangsa and Carta to draw up their contract. Unfortunately there is no 
information about their number or who they were. 
 For instance, it does really seem as if the Javanese recorded in the following contract was 
working alone. The document was drawn up between a Javanese who worked as rice cultivator 
and Mathijs Beurs, a burgher of Batavia. Tsitra Naya, a Javanese from Tegal according to the 
contract, worked in Beurs‘ rice-field which was located in Srengseng. The area of this 
rectangular rice-field was 12 petaks long on every side. Naya, and probably his fellow workers, 
had to carry out all kinds of agricultural labour from preparing the land for planting and 
cultivating rice to gathering the harvest. He had to tie the harvested rice up into bundles and 
deliver it to Beurs‘ house in Batavia. When all of those jobs were finished, he would receive a 
payment of 18.5 rijksdaalders.364  
 
5. Slave occupations 
 
A slave could undertake all kinds of work, domestic or external. Slaves were used in a wide 
variety of occupations, but besides their economic value, socially they also served as status 
symbols and as such were ostentatiously displayed by dignitaries as an indication of the height 
of the position they had achieved in the social hierarchy. Besides carrying out agricultural 
duties, a female slave could be used as concubine and a male slave could be employed as 
personal guard and soldier. The highest-ranking company officials and the richest citizens of 
Batavia sometimes owned up to 300 slaves. Free inhabitants and small agricultural 
entrepreneurs in the Ommelanden were restricted in the number of slaves they could own, 
perhaps as few as two or three. Unlike the Batavian elite who regarded slaves as show pieces to 
display their prestige, small entrepreneurs and free inhabitants of the Ommelanden used slaves 
mainly as a means of production. 
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Illustration 7: Slaves worked in the garden behind the residence of Governor-General R. de Klerk 
Source: Max de Bruijn and Bast Kist, Johannes Rach 1720-1783, Artist in Indonesia and Asia (Jakarta: National Library 
of Indonesia, 2001), p. 56. 
 
 The large number of slaves who were present in the Ommelanden shows that slavery in 
Batavia was not a phenomenon confined to the city itself. Many slaves were employed in 
agriculture in which they worked as paddy and sugar cultivators, gardeners, and cattle herds 
(cows, buffalos, and goats) far away from the city. Slaves also laboured in gunpowder-mills, 
noxious sulphur and saltpetre refineries, arak distilleries, saw-mills, and sugar-mills. Domestic 
slaves would cook, wash, clean, nurse, and guard their owner‘s property. In the absence of a 
well-established free labour force, it was also customary for people to use slaves as assistants in 
business and retailing; even to hire them out to others for these purposes.365 Slaves were hired 
out as construction workers (to build houses, roads, bridges, and dams), carpenters, furniture-
makers, and to be employed in other kinds of handicrafts. Slaves could also be entertainers and 
were trained as musicians, singers, and dancers. Slave musicians were the height of fashion and 
accompanied European ladies on their leisurely boat trips along the canals of Batavia.366 
 Unfortunately, information about the skills of slaves was not entered into the akten van 
transport, although it is well known that Chinese bought slaves to employ them in their sugar-
mills. Seventy-nine Chinese entrepreneurs are recorded as having opened sugar-mills in the 
Ommelanden of Batavia in 1710.367 The akten van transport does mention various Chinese sugar-
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mills owners who sold their slaves. A Chinese named Que Tsipko, who owned a sugar-mill 
and lived in Krukut, sold two slaves named Laytsim and Layhoe to another Chinese named 
Njo Soenko on May 9 1729. Around a fortnight after this transaction, another Chinese Lim 
Thoanko, a sugar-mill owner who also lived in Krukut, sold a slave named Sity of Toradja to a 
Chinese named Oey Leeko.368  
 The will of Cornelis Chastelain, Raad Ordinaris van India, who died in June 28 1714, gives 
another illustration of the use of slaves in the Ommelanden. In his will, Chastelain manumitted 
150 slaves and left them three pieces of land located in Mampang, Depok, and Caranganyar.369 
Among these freed slaves were mandors (overseers), carpenters, peasants, livestock farmers, 
housekeepers, and gamelan players.  
 In 1833, it was recorded that a private estate in Citrap employed 320 people of whom 117 
were slaves. The owner of this private estate was Augustijn Michiels, the headman of the 
Mardijker people in Batavia. The slaves in the Citrap house worked as gardeners, grooms, wood 
foragers, ronggeng dancers, topeng dancers, and gamelan players.370 The number of slaves owned 
by Chastelain and Michiels shows that owners of private lands and mansions in the 
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A hot climate, fertile soil, and an abundance of water determine where sugar-cane can be 
cultivated successfully. The plants are native to the humid tropics and require an abundance of 
heat and water all year round for the best results but water mainly is absolutely essential to 
sugar cane during the first six-months of its initial growth.371 A tropical region with high 
rainfall is therefore the ideal place in which to establish sugar plantations. In areas of low 
rainfall, the cultivation of sugar cane requires irrigation. The Ommelanden of Batavia was 
blessed with all these requirements. To grow satisfactorily the lowest temperature limit for 
sugar cane is 21 °C, and the highest between 27 °C and 38 °C.372 Soils are also important to 
sugar cane, but not as essential as either temperature or water. Because the plant can tolerate 
various types of soils, it could be grown on the red clay Ommelanden soil without any 
problems. Sugar cane is vulnerable to disease and can also fall prey to attacks by rodents and 
insects. Rats infest cane-fields and by gnawing the stems they damage the crops. Another 
potential threat in the Ommenlanden was posed by wild boars, which invaded sugar-fields and 
deracinated the young cane. If sugar plantations were to be protected from the depredations of 
wild boars, bamboo fences had to be built around the plantations.  
 In the 1630s, sugar cane cultivation in the Ommelanden was taken up by the Chinese of 
Batavia, who were imitating the example of Chinese sugar cultivators around Banten.373 The 
Chinese method of cultivating of sugar cane was relatively simple but time-consuming. It 
consisted of clearing the fields and then planting, weeding, and cutting the cane equipped with 
simple tools and using unsophisticated techniques. Axes, hoes, and mattocks were used to 
clear the land and prepare the soil for planting. A short bladed klewang was used to cut the 
cane. After a piece of land was selected for a sugar plantation, first it had to be cleared using an 
                                                 
371 J. Alexander and P. Alexander, ―Sugar, Rice and Irrigation in Colonial Java‖, in Ethnohistory, Vol. 25, No .3, 
summer 1978, p. 210. 
372 J.H. Galloway, The Sugar Cane Industry. A Historical Geography from its Origins to 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 14. 
373 De Jonge (ed.), De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag, Vol. 5, p. 233. 
 137 
axe to fell trees and shrubs. Once cleared of this vegetation, a hoe and sometimes burning off 
were used to prepare the ground. The field was then ready for planting. Sugar cane is a 
perennial plant and once planted a field can yield four or five good harvests before replanting 
is necessary.374 
 
1. Batavian sugar and the Intra-Asian trade 
 
Of all the economic activities in the Ommenlanden, the sugar industry was one of the most 
important. From the very earliest days of its presence in Asia, sugar had been an important 
commodity for the VOC, to be sold on the European market and also in large quantities in the 
intra-Asian trade. Although sugar was so dominant, many other commodities were traded by 
the Company in the intra-Asian markets, including silk and porcelain from China, copper from 
Japan, spices from Eastern Indonesia, and textiles from India. Creating trading links 
connecting Japan at one end and Persia at the other, by the second half of the seventeenth 
century the Company had firmly established an intra-Asia trading network, which covered 
almost all of the important entrepôts in the regions of the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and 
South China Sea.  
 Sugar from Asia had attracted the attention of the Gentlemen Seventeen as early as 1616. In 
that year, they demanded a fair amount of Asian sugar to be used both as ballast for 
homeward-bound ships and subsequently to be sold in Europe as a profitable commodity. At 
that time, because of its high quality sugar from China dominated the intra-Asian trade in this 
commodity. The Company directors explained that only the Chinese white, candied, and 
powdered sugar was suitable for use in the Amsterdam refineries. This 1616 demand was a 
prelude to the Asian sugar boom in Europe. Initially, as long as it still depended only on the 
sugar imported from China the Company had difficulty in meeting the high demand. By 1649, 
the European market was already absorbing 2.5-3.0 million pounds of Asian sugar. This 
success and the satisfactory profits which sugar made on the European market encouraged the 
Company to support sugar cultivation and processing in two areas under its control: Taiwan 
(Formosa) and the Ommelanden of Batavia.  
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 The rise of sugar as an important commodity in the Company repertoire happened to 
coincide with a decline in the demand for pepper in 1650. Asian sugar was an alternative 
commodity much sought after on the Amsterdam market and demand for it remained fairly 
high until 1655, when the price fell because of a large quantity of cheap sugar from Brazil 
where various new areas of sugar production were being developed. Finally, Asian sugar lost it 
allure for the Company directors in Amsterdam, not least because large quantities of sugar 
were lost owing to leakage during the long voyage from Asia to Europe. Nevertheless, the 
price fall on the European sugar market did not have a great impact on Batavian sugar 
production because various outlets in the intra-Asian trade could replace the sugar market in 
Europe, as the commodity was in high demand in Persia, Surat, Bengal, and Japan.  
 Before the Ommelanden of Batavia emerged as a production region, the Formosan colony 
(Taiwan) was the most important area for sugar production under Company control. Sugar 
cultivation in the island was stimulated by the Company from the early 1630s and it succeeded 
in raising exports from 200 tons in 1636 to 1,300 tons in 1660. However, in 1662 the Dutch 
were expelled from Taiwan by the Ming loyalist, Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga). The Zheng clan 
continued the Company policies of promoting the sugar industry, resulting in an annual export 
of 18,000 tons by the time the Qing gained control over Taiwan in 1683.375 
 The loss of Taiwan forced the Company to pay more attention to the possibilities offered by 
the Ommelanden. At that stage, agricultural activities in those areas was still vulnerable, never 
more so than when the war broke out again between the Company and Banten in 1656. Ten 
sugar-mills and twenty-three brickworks located at some distance from the city were 
destroyed.376 For several years security in this area was touch and go and most of the sugar-
mills were abandoned. New efforts to reactivate the sugar industry were undertaken when the 
peace contract with Mataram was signed in 1659. Other events in the last half of the 
seventeenth century helped to create a favourable atmosphere in which the sugar industry 
could flourish. In 1677, Kerawang became part of the jurisdiction of Batavia. This region was 
located on the eastern side of Batavia and the relatively dense population there could provide a 
workforce for the sugar industry. Six years later, a final peace treaty which guaranteed greater 
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safety of the borders of Batavia with the neighbouring sultanate was signed between Batavia 
and Banten. 
 When the Qing army seized Taiwan from the Zheng family, the maritime prohibition edict 
of 1656 – ‗forbidding even a plank to drift to sea‘ – was lifted in 1685. This edict was one of 
the measures taken by Qing dynasty in its war against the Zheng clan which derived its main 
income from maritime trade. Soon after the ban was lifted, scores of Chinese junks sailed to 
Batavia bringing large numbers of Chinese immigrants who contributed to the labour force in 
the sugar industry and importantly brought with them a wealth of expertise. The availability of 
land, labour and capital, the security, and the favourable policy by the Company now set the 
stage for the Batavian sugar boom.377 
 In intra-Asian trade Batavian sugar had to compete with sugar from other production areas. 
The most formidable competitors were Southern China (especially Fujian), Taiwan, and 
Bengal. In Southeast Asia there were also sugar production areas in Siam, Quang Nam (South 
Vietnam), Tonkin (North Vietnam), Cambodia, and Manila. Most of their exports went to 
Japan directly or indirectly, as this empire had not yet begun to produce any sugar of its own. 
Japan was in fact the biggest sugar market in East Asia during the seventeenth century. Data 
collected in the period of 1637-1683 reveal that the annual import of Japan averaged 950 
tons.378 In 1658 the Company sold 780,000 pounds (about 354 tons) of Taiwanese sugar to 
Japan.379 The records from 1663 showed that Japan imported 94 tons of sugar from Siam, 43 
tons from Cambodia, 76 tons from Quang Nam, and 33 tons from Tonkin.380 Batavia sold 500 
tons of sugar on the Asian market in 1664, but it is unclear how much of this went to Japan. 
Ten years later 445 tons of Batavian sugar was recorded as being sent to Nagasaki.381  
 By the end of the seventeenth century, Persia emerged as the biggest market for Java sugar 
(of which Batavia was the largest producer), pushing Japan into second place. 382  The 
importance of those sugar markets lasted until 1722 when the overthrow of the Safavid 
dynasty initiated a more disturbed period in the history of Persia and, as a reaction, the export 
of sugar to Persia declined. The same happened with sugar imports to Japan as a consequence 
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of import substitution when sugar began to be produced on the southernmost island of 
Kyushu. Different difficulties arose when other sugar markets opened up in the intra-Asian 
trading network in such places as Surat, Mocha, Sri Lanka, and Bengal. When the Company 
began to trade sugar to those areas, Bengali sugar was still cheaper than Batavian sugar. 
However, by the end of the seventeenth century the Company was successfully able to offer 
Javanese sugar at a reasonable price, while the prices of Bengali sugar tended to increase.383 
The upshot was that the South Asian sugar market eventually became one of the largest 
purchasers of Batavian sugar. The ability of the Company to gain a large share in the Indian 
sugar market was a fundamental contribution to the rapid development of the Batavian sugar 
industry at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
 During the same period, after a long hiatus, the European market demand for Asian sugar 
also picked up again. In 1700, 43 tons of Batavian sugar was sent to Europe. This high 
demand continued and reached its peak during 1724-1727 when more than 2,000 tons of 
Batavian sugar was exported annually to the home posts in Holland.384 This quantity was 
repeated once again in 1732, when 2,618 tons of Batavian sugar was sent to Europe, but after 
that Dutch demand tended to tail off again. Sugar production and export came to an abrupt 
temporary stop in 1740, when the Chinese rebellion broke out in Batavia. A policy of fixed 
sugar prices and the firm monopoly of the Company on sugar exports from Batavia had led to 
the bankruptcy of many Chinese sugar enterprises. A number of sugar-mills were closed and 
thousands of labourers lost their jobs. The Chinese were the main victims; not only because 
the sugar-mills were almost wholly Chinese owned and worked by Chinese labour, but also 
because a great part of the Chinese community depended directly or indirectly on this 
industry.385 These worsening conditions in sugar production created tremendous social unrest, 
resulting in the Chinese rebellion in the Ommelanden, and the subsequent Chinese massacre in 
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2. Local growth, restrictions, and decline  
 
Before the establishment of Batavia in 1619, a small-scale sugar industry had already been got 
off the ground by Chinese entrepreneurs in several Javanese port towns along the north coast 
of the island, among them Banten, Cirebon, Tegal, and Jepara. Jan Pietersz Coen, the founder 
of Batavia, was aware of his heavy reliance on the Chinese certainly to populate Batavia with 
craftsmen, shopkeepers and merchants but first and foremost to throw themselves into the 
challenge of turning the surroundings of the new colonial town into a profitable agricultural 
area. In his letters to the Company Directors in Amsterdam, he repeatedly refers to the success 
of Manila and the way in which that city had been able to profit from its Chinese 
inhabitants.387 With his sights set on increasing commercial activities in Batavia, he tried with 
might and main to persuade the Chinese in Banten to leave that port town and move to 
Batavia. The majority of these Chinese were involved in the Banten pepper trade, although 
some of them had also had experience in the local sugar industry. 
 In the early days of its presence in the Indonesian Archipelago, the attention of the 
Company concentrated on the highly sought-after spices, but it was not long before awareness 
that sugar also was a commodity with great commercial potential impinged on the Directors, 
even though the sugar industry was still developing only haltingly in the first half of the 
seventeenth century.388 Incentives were not long in coming; those Batavian Chinese who chose 
to take the plunge into agriculture were exempted from individual taxes and were assured that 
the Company would buy their sugar and rice at a guaranteed price.389 Of course, every rose has 
a thorn and, because the sugar market in Batavia was monopolized by the VOC from the 
beginning, the sugar-millers were obliged to deliver their white sugar to the Company.390 
 Any further expansion and development of the sugar plantations was delayed for several 
decades by outbreaks of intermittent war between Batavia and Banten but, after the final 
subjection of Banten in 1683, the industry began to grow rapidly. The Company introduced 
restrictions on the sugar price, production quota, and the number of sugar-mills which were 
licensed to operate. Those restrictions were important because the Company tried to adjust the 
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sugar production in areas under its control to accommodate to the fluctuating demand from 
the Asian and European markets. 
 The Company claimed the right to purchase all first class (cabessa) and second class (bariga) 
sugar, but it disclaimed all rights to the inferior third class sugar (pee) which therefore was 
traded privately by Company servants and Chinese.391 Always concerned about the quantities 
of sugar which were delivered to its warehouses, the High Government in Batavia often 
debated delivery prices during its policy meetings. The implementation of this price policy was 
very simple: when sugar production increased, the Company would reduce the purchasing 
price, but this would rise again when sugar production dropped. 
 
 
Illustration 8: The Company‘s sugar warehouse in Batavia 
Source: Francois Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën, Vol. IV-I (Dordrecht: J. vam Braam, 1724-1726), p. 237. 
 
 In 1710 the Batavian government was complaining to the Gentlemen Seventeen in 
Amsterdam that it had to pay large sums for every pikul of sugar which was delivered to the 
Company warehouses if a constant sugar supply were to be guaranteed. The Directors 
responded to this complaint by suggesting that the Batavian government should nurture and 
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encourage the sugar industry, since it was the most profitable segment of the economy in 
Batavia They also explained that, with the exception of saltpetre, no other product provided as 
good a ballast in homeward-bound Company ships than sugar.392  
 Market considerations and the markets were not the only factors which determined the price 
of sugar. Sugar production was also liable to be affected by local considerations. On 9 October 
1705, for instance, the Batavian administration agreed to raise the purchase price of powder 
sugar to 3.5 rijksdaalders for the cabessa and that of sugar candy to 7 rijksdaalders.393 The Hoge 
Regering reached this decision in response to an urgent request of the sugar-millers, who argued 
that the price of firewood had risen so exceptionally high that they could no longer make a 
profit without rising of the fixed prices. How this situation came about is easily explained. 
The process of boiling sugar juice to crystallize sugar devoured enormous quantities of 
firewood. As a result, the rapid development of the sugar industry in the Ommelanden at the 
end of the seventeenth century was a prelude to massive deforestation. A 1701 report provides 
us with the information that by that time virtually all of the trees around the Ciliwung River 
basin from its upper course and continuing downstream had disappeared.394 This implies that 
the local administration was not able to control illegal logging. To fell trees on Company land 
required authorization, but even with this proviso most of the logging activities occurred 
haphazardly. 
 The efforts of the High Government to nurture and encourage the sugar industry were 
bound to run into problems if the number of sugar-mills increased too rapidly. The 
proliferation of sugar-mills inevitably led to overproduction. To solve this problem, on 10 
October 1710, the High Government issued an edict prohibiting the establishment of any new 
sugar-mills over and above the existing 131.395 This policy was combined with the regulation 
that sugar entrepreneurs had to obtain a licence from the Company if they wanted to buy or 
establish a new sugar-mill. The economic policies of the High Government were nothing less 
than a continual balancing act. 
 Permission from the High Government was also required whenever sugar-millers decided to 
relocate a sugar-mill. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, several sugar-millers moved 
their mills lock, stock and barrel farther away from the city to areas which still had ample 
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supplies of firewood. On 25 July 1716, for instance, the Chinese Lieutenant Li Jonko asked 
permission to relocate his two sugar-mills. Those mills stood on the land belonging to Willem 
Muller on the bank of the Ciliwung. Li Jonko moved the mills to his own land on the bank of 
the Tangerang River.396 Ouw Koako wished to move his sugar-mill in Condet from the land 
belonging to the old Chinese Boedelmeester Tan Tsayqua to an area farther south, called 
Cijantung.397 The Chinese Lieutenant Ni Locqua asked the Heemraden permission to move his 
sugar-mill from his land in Tanjung and reassemble it on other land in Rawa Pasang on the 
bank of the Bekasi River.398  
 Throughout the eighteenth century, sugar consumption in Europe increased enormously. In 
this period, England expanded its imports from roughly 10,000 to 150,000 tons a year.399 The 
mounting demand for sugar in Europe was partly attributable to the great popularity of tea and 
coffee. Sugar had permanently replaced honey as a preservative and principal sweetener.400 To 
fulfil this demand, the sugar-producing areas throughout the world grew more sugar than ever 
before and consequently the price of sugar declined. This was unfortunate as the nature of the 
product and the mediocre storage facilities made it impossible to store sugar for long periods. 
Therefore, whenever a sudden increase in demand occurred, the Company was sometimes 
even forced to buy extra sugar from the northeast coast of Java or from nearby Banten. 
Nevertheless, the import of Javanese sugar had to be carefully watched, as it could threaten the 
sustainability of the Batavian sugar industry. In 1711, when Batavian sugar production reached 
its peak, a group of sugar-millers complained about the import of sugar from the northeast 
coast of Java to Batavia.401 They requested a total stop on these imports, because they asserted 
that their own businesses were threatened with ruin. Without having an internal market of its 
own, the Company had to sell Batavian sugar on the highly competitive free sugar markets of 
Asia and Europe. In order to maintain its position on these markets, the Company was under 
constant pressure to keep the local sugar industry on a tight rein for the dual purpose of 
increasing the efficiency of its operations and lowering the production price. One of the 
mechanisms used to control the sugar production was to fix the production quota of every 
sugar-mill. In 1710 the Company required 40,000 pikuls of powder sugar to fulfil the Asian and 
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European demands. Since there were 131 sugar-mills operating in that year, the Company 
decided that each sugar-mill should not provide the Company warehouses with more than 300 
pikuls of powder sugar.402  
   The fluctuating sugar price arrangements, the licence policy, and production quota 
eventually dimmed the allure of the sugar industry in Batavia. This decline was already 
apparent in 1710. Two sugar commissions were formed in 1710 and 1728 to solve that 
problem. The report of the first commission, written by Hendrik Zwaardecroon and 
Christoffel van Swol, is very comprehensive and contains important information.403 A second 
report, compiled by Joan Everhard van der Schuur and Rogier Thomas van Heyningen, with 
proposals suggesting how to redress the problem was not carried out in a consequent manner. 
The number of sugar-mills in the Ommelanden decreased from about 135 in 1734 to eighty-
seven in September 1740. 
 
3. Land reclamation and plantations 
 
The landscape of the Ommelanden of Batavia which was traversed by various rivers was very 
suitable for development as a plantation area for the sugar industry. Its western border was the 
Cisadane River, while the Citarum River bordered its eastern side. To the south rose the 
Priangan Highlands. In between these two border rivers, a number of other rivers flowed from 
the hinterland to the Java Sea: the Angke, the Pesanggrahan, the Grogol, the Krukut, the 
Ciliwung, the Sunter, the Cakung and the Bekasi. All these streams contributed to the 
development of sugar industry. The sugar cane plantations and sugar-mills in the Ommelanden 
were located on their banks, because the rivers provided the main infrastructure for 
transporting the sugar products from sugar-mills to the Company warehouses near the coast. 
The river current was also used to drive the sugar-mills. In other words, water was also used as 
a resource in the sugar production process. Consequently, the development of the 
Ommelanden was determined by the river system, especially in the initial period before a road 
network had been built.  
Early agricultural activities got underway in the 1620s when a few plots of lands along the 
Grote Rivier outside the southern city wall were planted with coconut palms. In a letter dated 9 
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December 1637, Governor-General Antonio van Diemen mentioned that some 6,000 coconut 
palms were being cultivated in the areas under the jurisdiction of Batavia.404 Constantly faced 
with the problem of providing food for Batavia, the Hoge Regering adopted a policy of 
stimulating rice cultivation in the Ommelanden of Batavia, because it did not want to be at the 
mercy of rice imports from the areas under the control of Mataram. For a few years after the 
war with Mataram in 1628-1629, the rice cultivation was even moved inside the city walls so 
that it might be protected. When relations improved, rice cultivation outside the city, 
undertaken by Chinese and Javanese inhabitants, took off again. However, the rice production 
of the Ommelanden was not sufficient to feed the inhabitants of the city and the troops 
garrisoned in Batavia Castle. Until 1646, when the Company was able to conclude a peace 
treaty with Mataram which could also guaranteed a stable supply of rice, a large quantity of rice 
had to be imported from elsewhere.405  
The duo of the sugar cane plantations and paddy-fields played a prominent role in reshaping 
the landscape of the Ommelanden. Plenty of water from the rivers was used for irrigation 
purposes. A sugar cane plantation had to be located close to sugar-mills, because after the cane 
was harvested, it had to be delivered to the sugar-mills as soon as possible, before it dried out. 
Manpower or carts pulled by buffaloes were the common means of transporting the sugar 
cane to the mills situated near the rivers.   
If a sugar plantation was to be profitable, it was important to manage the natural resources 
around the plantation properly. There were at least three principal types of land which were 
needed to run a sugar-mill successfully: fields for cultivating sugar; land for growing supplies 
for the labourers; and a forest reserve to supply the timber for construction purposes and, of 
course, to be used as firewood for the boiling houses. Sometimes grazing land for the 
buffaloes was also required, but at most of the Batavian sugar-mills buffaloes were fed with 
sugar cane leaves.406 Because the transport of sugar cane and firewood created extra costs, the 
ideal organizational set-up was a mill and its boiling houses surrounded by sugar plantation, 
situated not too far away from a forest or from grazing land, and, of course, a river or canal to 
transport the sugar to the Company warehouses. 
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As an example of how estates in the Ommelanden were organized, it is a good idea to take a 
look at the Rawa Pasang, Suka Pura, and Tagal Pandas estates, all the properties of Wouter 
Hendrix, extra-ordinary member of the Council of the Indies. These estates were located on 
the eastern side of the Cakung River. According the sketch of these estates made in 1732 by 
Surveyor Boudewijn Jansz. Vonk, three sugar-mills were located on the bank of the Cakung 
River. Behind the sugar-mills stretched the sugar plantations and, on the other side of the river 
bank, lay paddy-fields, and another sugar plantation. The sugar-mills and the plantation were 
surrounded by a dense forest. These estates had been subject to taxation by the College van 
Heemraden since 1729.407  
The land in the areas around Batavia had been granted or were sold to Company officials 
who often subdivided the property, selling off portions to other Europeans, Chinese, or 
indigenous people. Much of this land was transformed into sugar plantations. The huge estates 
with various crops cultivated on their land were called landerijen. From Jans Vonk‘s sketches, it 
is possible to see that, as well as sugar cane and paddy, mulberry trees were also cultivated. At 
the beginning of eighteenth century, the Company also tried to introduce sericulture to Java 
and the mulberry leaves were needed to feed the silk worms. With the encouragement of the 
Company, dozens of mulberry orchards were established on the private estates surrounding 
Batavia, but after several years of experimentation, this industry failed to develop. 
Information about the exact size and shape of the sugar plantations is very sparse. Besides 
some figurative sketches that made by Surveyor Boudewijn Jansz. Vonk, which show the 
natural environment of the Batavian sugar-mills, there are no other illustrations depicting the 
layout of sugar plantations. Nevertheless, the archives yield scattered information about the 
size of the estates on which sugar plantations were usually located. Land in eighteenth-century 
Batavia was measured in roeden. One roede is equal to 3.68 metres.408 A roede was not used only 
to measure land but also to measure quantities of firewood. The following evidence gives an 
impression of the size of the land where sugar cane was cultivated. A (Javanese) Company 
soldier named Madé rented his land in Lebak Bulus to a Chinese sugar-miller, Liem Oenko, for 
50 rijksdaalders per year. The land was 100 roeden wide and 400 roeden long. Liem Oenko‘s sugar-
mill was located on this area of land. Madé‘s land was rented out for two years and five 
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months.409 Some plots on Governor-General Diderik Durven‘s estate were also planted with 
sugar cane.  His land was located at Topassang Parang on the western side of Anke River. The 
area planted with sugar cane measured roughly 300 roeden by 600 roeden.410  
  The first sugar plantations extended in a southerly direction following the course of the 
Ciliwung River, but their location was gradually moved away to the other rivers to the east and 
west of the city. According to a report drawn up by a Chinese officer in 1711, among the 131 
Batavian sugar-mills, fifty were located on the Ciliwung, twenty-three on the Pesanggrahan, 
eleven on the Anke, eight on the Cakung, seven on the Cisadane, and the rest were scattered 
over various other locations.411 The large number of sugar-mills which operated along the 
Ciliwung River caused rapid deforestation and a decrease in soil fertility in the areas close to 
this river. Therefore, in the second half of the eighteenth century most of the sugar-mills were 
relocated to the other rivers. A Heemraden resolution of 1767 mentions that of a total of eighty-
two Batavian sugar-mills, twenty-two were located on the Sidane, fifteen on the Bekasi, nine 
on the Anke, nine on the Pesanggrahan, six on the Mokervaard, five on the Ciliwung; the rest 
were dispersed along other rivers.412  
 
4. The sugar entrepreneurs 
 
The majority of sugar-mills owners were Chinese entrepreneurs but some VOC servants also 
felt the urge to try their entrepreneurial wings and they were the driving force who determined 
the development of the sugar industry. One of these pioneers was the Chinese entrepreneur 
Jan Con. A letter from the Batavian government to the Company Directors in Amsterdam 
dated 9 December 1637 states than Jan Con was able to produce as much sugar on his own 
plantation as the whole quantity being produced in Banten.413 In order to support Jan Con‘s 
enterprise, in 1638 the Batavian government gave him a lease of land outside the city on the 
condition that he planted nothing but sugar cane. Nevertheless, this promising start ended in 
disappointment. In 1638 only 22.5 pikuls of white sugar from the Ommelanden of Batavia, 
instead of the planned 2,000 pikuls, could be shipped to the Netherlands. A year later, the 
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Ommelanden sugar productivity was even more disappointing. The 1639 harvest was 
destroyed by a spell of long dry weather and whatever survived the drought was stolen.414  
     Another prominent initiator of the sugar industry was Phoa Bingham. He was appointed 
the leader of the Chinese community with the title of captain by the Batavian government. 
Bingham possessed extensive sugar cane fields in Tanah Abang, and in 1648 he dug a canal 
which connected his land to Batavia. Other Chinese officers ran numerous sugar plantations 
right up to 1740. In 1699 Captain Lim Keenqua, for example, was given a licence to set up two 
sugar-mills on his land in the Ommelanden. Nie Hoe Kong, the Chinese captain at the time of 
Chinese rebellion of 1740, had no fewer than fourteen mills which he had inherited from his 
father on his estates.415 Being a sugar lord was not a privilege restricted to the Chinese officers, 
various private Chinese entrepreneurs, most of them from the sugar-producing province of 
South Fujian in China, also took the plunge. They knew how to cultivate sugar cane and ran 
sugar-mills with the credit facilities received from rich Chinese merchants in Batavia city, from 
whom they usually also rented the mills.     
 In the early eighteenth century, although the sugar production was on the decline, there were 
still plenty of sugar-mills in operation but the number of sugar-mills significantly decreased 
after the Chinese massacre in Batavia in 1740. The Hoge Regering archives provide the 
information that in 1710 there were 130 sugar-mills operating in the Ommelanden,416 while in 
the 1741 there were only nine left.417 Only ten years later, some 100 sugar-mills were again in 
operation in Java, eighty in the Ommelanden, eleven on Java‘s East Coast, five in Cirebon, and 
four in Banten.418  
 
Table 9: Number of sugar-mills in the Ommelanden 1648-1750 
 
Year Number of sugar-mills Production (tons) 
1648 -- 288 
1651 -- 600 
                                                 
414 Blussé, Strange Company, p. 64. 
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417 ANRI, MGR No. 590, 15 September 1741, fol. 462. 
418 ANRI, MGR No. 612, 31 December 1750, fol. 293. 
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1652 20 741 
1660 10 -- 
1710 131 6.422 
1713 128419 -- 
1734 135420 -- 
1740 87421 987 
1741 9 370 
1750 50 -- 
 
 An aspirant sugar entrepreneur needed a good deal of investment capital and plenty of 
experience. As a first step, he had to acquire a piece of land, either as a grant if he had the right 
connections or by buying it if he did not. He needed a workforce which meant that he had to 
hire or buy slaves on the open market. He also needed to build or buy mills and boiling houses 
for processing the sugar. When this was in order, as well as acquiring draft animals he had to 
make sure he had an adequate number of carts, hoes, and other agricultural implements. Other 
expenses for which he had to prepare were legal fees to buy a licence to operate the sugar-mill 
and a sufficient investment fund to cover the running costs of a sugar-mill for upwards of at 
least two years until the first returns came in from the sale of the sugar from the first harvest. 
A sugar-mill could be bought for approximately 1,500 to 3,500 rjksdaalders,422 depending on its 
production capacity and how completely it was equipped. Meanwhile, for the process from 
which the sugar would be produced, a sugar-mill required twenty to twenty-six labourers. 
Those labourers were paid between 60 and 80 rijksdaalders a month.423 The price of fire wood 
to boil the cane juice amounted to 1 or 2 rijksdaalders for every roede.424 
 A plantation owner had to apply for a licence from the College van Heemraden before he could 
establish or operate a sugar-mill. The process of obtaining this sugar-mill licence certainly 
required him to put his hand in his pocket, even though it is not clear how much exactly an 
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entrepreneur had to pay. Lin Tsouko, for example, requested a sugar-mill licence from the 
Heemraden on 5 June 1734. He needed the licence because he had just bought a sugar-mill 
which was located on the banks of the Pasanggrahan River, at a place named Pondok 
Pucung.425 Another example of a request for a sugar-mill licence came from Ong Jamkong. 
This Chinese sugar-miller bought a sugar-mill located in the southern Ommelanden, at a place 
named Condet.426 The sugar-mill which was granted a licence was included in the list compiled 
by the Heemraden and would be regarded as a legally licensed sugar-mill. A sugar-mill without 
licence would be considered as illegal. One of the illegal sugar-mills which were discovered by 
the Heemraden belonged to Oey Koenko and he was forced to pay a penalty of 100 
rijksdaalders.427   
 Not all of the sugar-millers owned a sugar plantation. Occasionally it was more profitable to 
lease a sugar plantation or even to rent just the sugar stoelen (canes) from the plantation owner. 
Company Senior Merchant Johan Harman Brandouw, for example, leased his land which was 
located on the bank of the Anke River to the Chinese miller Tan Soeko. Tan Soeko built a 
sugar-mill on it. The land was farmed out for five years and every year Tan Soeko had to pay 
180 rijksdaalders.428 Yet another example is that of Chinese sugar planter Bhe Seengko who sold 
his 20,000 sugar staelen to Auw Oenko. Those sugar canes were planted on the land belonging 
to the Chinese Boedelmeester Bepequa in Bekasi. Auw Oenko had to pay 200 rijksdaalders for 
these sugar plants. 429  These two pieces of evidence indicate that a sugar-miller had some 
alternative choices if he did not want to buy a sugar plantation.  
 Other expenses which a sugar-miller could expect to pay were those for the buffalo-herder 
(oppasser der kerbouwen). At the Batavian sugar-mills buffaloes were used for such varied tasks as 
transporting sugar cane from the plantation to the sugar-mill, pushing or pulling a pulley to 
rotate the mills, and pulling sugar carts to the perahu or sampan waiting on the river to transport 
the sugar to the Company warehouses. Almost all of the sugar-mills in the Ommelanden listed 
buffaloes in their inventory. The average cost to herd one buffalo per year was 1 rijksdaalder.430 
To guarantee that the sugar-miller and the herders would attend to their respective duties 
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properly, both parties would visit a notary and sign a contract. However, most of the contracts 
were signed only by a sugar-miller and a person representing the herders. Chinese sugar-miller 
Soey Kieuko signed a contract with a Javanese, Marta Dita. The contract mentions that the 
latter would provide two persons to herd the thirty-five buffaloes of the first party. The 
buffaloes were stalled at Soey Kieuko‘s sugar-mill which was located in Tanjung in the 
southern Ommelanden. Every year Soey Kieuko had to pay 35 rijksdaalders to the herders and 
the payment would rise if the number of buffaloes were to increase. It was written in the 
contract that, if some of the buffaloes were stolen, lost, or killed by tigers or snakes, the herder 
would have to pay 10 rijksdaalders for every buffalo to its owner.431 Since every sugar-mill 
needed more than twenty buffaloes, it was important to the sugar-millers to conclude a 
contract with the herdsmen to protect their vital livestock.  
 When he had the necessary land, capital, labour, technical skills, and machinery, plus 
accessible markets, a sugar entrepreneur could make substantial profits. His first task was to 
accumulate enough capital to pay for clearing the land, cultivating crops, establishing buildings, 
buying the requisite tools and implements, and for carrying the cost of funding all of the 
production process until the cane could be harvested. He had to recruit and pay overseers and 
skilled labourers to work in the sugar-fields and in the mills. He also had to allocate sufficient 
money to ship the sugar to the warehouses, if he did not own any small boats himself, and had 
to wait months for its sale each year. Therefore, financing sugar production remained a tricky 
business for most of the entrepreneurs since the price of sugar was fixed by the Company.   
 It is possible to make a rough guess at how much capital was required to operate a regular 
sugar-mill during the harvest season. The expenses for hiring labourers and buffalo herders are 
derived from data about a sugar-mill belonging to Poa Kengko located at Pakembangan close 
to the River Anke, and the other two pieces of evidence come from other sugar-mills:  
 
The average price of a medium sized sugar-mill: 1,500 rijksdaalders 
The expenses incurred by twenty-three for labourers per-month: 66.5 rijksdaalders432  
The lease of a sugar plantation per year: 50 rijksdaalders433  
The expenses involved in providing 20 roeden firewood per month: 20 rijksdaalders434  
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The hiring of oppassers for herding forty buffaloes per year 59 rijksdaalders435  
Total 1695.5 rijksdaalders 
 
 This estimate calculates only the basic costs required to operate a medium-sized sugar-mill. 
These costs do not include such other expenses as the sugar-mill licence, the transportation of 
the cane to the mill, the accommodation for the labourers, the repair or the purchase of new 
equipment for the sugar-mill and so on. The expenses for labourers and firewood are 
calculated on a monthly basis because a sugar-mill only operated and produced sugar during 
the harvest season. It was important for a miller to pay his labourers fully at the end of the 
season. Failure to do so meant he would have problems recruiting labourers for the following 
season. Considering that there were more than one hundred sugar-mills operating in the 
Ommelanden at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a skilled labourer had no difficulty in 
moving from one sugar-mill to another. The expenses incurred for the firewood could vary 
depending on the distance between the sugar-mill and the forest in which the firewood was 
collected. 
 The total cost would decrease if a sugar-miller chose to rent sugar stoelen rather than run a 
sugar plantation himself. For example, the Chinese sugar-miller Lim Oensay leased 15,000 
sugar stoelen which were being cultivated on his land in Salemba to Oey Goanko. He leased 
those sugar stoelen for five years, for which he received 15 rijksdaalders annually.436 The Mardijker 
Jan da Silva leased his land at Toegoe with the 15,000 sugar canes on it to a Chinese sugar-
miller Kung Joncko, who leased the canes for four years, for which he had to pay 10 
rijksdaalders each year.437 This kind of evidence illustrates the truth of the assertion that an 
enterprising sugar-miller had various avenues open to him to reduce the costs of production. 
 Although most of Batavian sugar-millers ran no more than one or two sugar-mills, some of 
them owned more than three sugar-mills. Unquestionably, during the sugar boom at the 
beginning of eighteenth century, it was usual for a Batavian sugar-miller to purchase or set up 
more than one sugar-mill. The Chinese miller Pou Poanko, for example, bought two sugar-
mills located in Trogong, on the bank of the Pesanggrahan River, from the Chinese merchant 
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Go Tsilauw. The price of these sugar-mills amounted to 3,000 rijksdaalders.438 Meanwhile, on 10 
May 1721 Captain Que Bouqua requested the permission of the Heemraden to establish two 
sugar-mills on his land in Bekasi.439 Certainly, European sugar-millers usually had more than 
two sugar-mills. Joan François de Witte van Schooten, a member of the Batavian Raad van 
Justitie, owned 6 sugar-mills, which were located in various places, two around Fort Noordwijk, 
two to the west and two the south of the Seringsing Estate.440  
 The real profits to be made in the sugar industry came from the sugar production itself, but 
money was also to be had in buying and selling sugar-mills. An entrepreneur willing to take a 
risk would make his money by investing in a cheap sugar-mill and subsequently selling it to 
somebody else at a higher price. In fact, sometimes he did not even need to spend his money 
to make a profit. Ho Peecko, for example, bought a sugar-mill owned by three Chinese: Tsoa 
Piauko, Qua Tsiko, and Lim Liongko. This mill was located in Pondok Serap on land 
belonging to Kapitan Mangus. The price of the mill was 900 rijksdaalders. Since the three 
Chinese owed a sum equivalent to this to a lady named Mejuffrouw Caetje, they were anxious to 
sell the mill to pay off their debt.441 Five days later, Ho Peecko sold that same mill to another 
Chinese named Oey Toanko for no less than 2,000 rijksdaalders. Ho Peecko wanted the 
payment to be made in two parts: 1,100 rijksdaalders to be paid to him and 900 rijksdaalders to 
be paid to Mejuffrouw Caetje.442 Obviously Ho Peecko did not pay his debt until he found a 
buyer to whom he could sell the mill at a higher price.  This example illustrates how a sugar-
mill broker could use his experience and networks to make a healthy profit from the sugar 
industry.  
 Since running a sugar-mill required a sizable amount of money and managerial skills, only 
experienced entrepreneurs with a large amount of capital at their disposal could do business in 
the sugar industry. This is the reason that only few indigenous people from Batavia or the 
Ommelanden were involved in this industry. The indigenous sugar-millers were limited to the 
kapitan or other leaders of indigenous ethnic groups. Among them was Kapitan Daeng Matara, 
the leader of the Bugis community, who sold his sugar-mill in Condet in 1700.443  
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5. The sugar production process 
 
A typical sugar-mill consisted of a number of huts constructed of wood or bamboo, roofed 
with a palm-leaf thatch or tiles. Those huts were used as storehouses, for milling the sugar 
cane, and boiling the juice, as a buffalo stall, or perhaps as simple lodgings for the labourers 
during the harvest time. Where the actual milling was done two or three cylinders made from 
wood, stone, or iron stood in the middle of the hut. These cylinders or large flat stones, which 
were turned around by the kerbau crushed the sugar cane. The crushed cane yielded the cane 
juice. The boiling house contained a number of ovens or fireplaces constructed of earth and 
lime. On top of these furnaces were large kettles for boiling down the juice. Batavian sugar-
mills were also equipped with buffalo sheds, carts, buffaloes, axes, sledgehammers, shovels, 
iron saws, a number of perahu for transportation purposes and so on.444 The size and number 
of these pieces of equipment varied from one mill to the other.  
 Newly planted cane needed fourteen to eighteenth months to mature to a state at which it 
was ready to be cut for processing into sugar. If it survived the dangers of wind, fire, long dry 
seasons, and foraging animals, the cane grew to a height of between five-and-a-half and seven 
feet before it was ready to be harvested. Once cut, the cane would produce a new crop or 
ratoon about every twelve months, although the amount of liquid which could be extracted 
declined after the third or fourth cutting. Because of these circumstances, sugar planters paid 
careful attention to the age, condition, and status of the cane-fields. In a harvest season, ten to 
twenty labourers would be employed by a sugar-miller to cut the cane and take it to the sugar-
mill. The number of labourers required for harvesting sugar cane depended on the size of the 
sugar plantation. Some of the labourers would be detailed to bring the harvested cane to the 
sugar-mill in carts pulled by buffaloes. In the sugar-mill, the cane was stacked in piles outside 
the milling house. There two or three labourers would strip the leaves from the canes and cut 
the stalks into the required size. Cleaned and cut, the stalks could be taken to the milling house 
to be crushed to produce the juice.   
 The sugar production process in the sugar-mill was carried out under the watchful eye of an 
overseer (mandoor), who usually also supplied the workers for the sugar-mills. They bore full 
responsibility for the process of sugar production. During harvest time, the overseer was 
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responsible for supervising the production of eight pots (passos) of sugar juice during the day 
and another eight pots at night. Hence, every twenty-four hours, the workers were expected to 
produce at least sixteen pots of sugar juice. If the amount of the production remained below 
target, the mill owner was not obliged to pay any salary for that day.445 As a result, the sugar-
miller kept a careful record how many pots were delivered to the kettle house every day, and at 
the end of the season he settled the account. Prior to the development of cold storage and the 
railway in the nineteenth century, ideally sugar cane had to be processed within forty-eight 
hours after harvesting. Although sugar cane could be kept in storage for some time, it easily 
dried out when harvested by hand and stored under the usual pre-industrial agricultural 
conditions. At harvest time, a sugar-mill would therefore be a hive of activity. It worked non-
stop twenty-four hours a day for a month or more, during what was known as the ‗suiker 
campagne‘. 
 Sugar cane is hard and brittle, therefore steady pressure and a crushing force is required to 
extract its juice. In Java, the vertical two-roller cane-crusher made of stone seems to have 
become standard equipment.446 The sugar industry in the Ommelanden was developed by 
Chinese immigrants and therefore the technology used to crush sugar was Chinese technology. 
The first detailed description of Chinese sugar manufacture in the seventeenth century occurs 
in T’ien-Kung K’ai-Wu (composed 1634-1636, printed 1637): 
 
The (vertical) roll crusher used for crushing cane in sugar manufacturing is erected as 
follows: Take two wooden boards measuring five feet long, two feet wide, and one-half 
foot thick. At the ends of each board holes are bored to accommodate the supporting 
posts (for the upper board which is placed horizontally several feet above the lower). 
The upper ends of the posts protrude a little bit above the upper board, while the lower 
ends extend two or three feet below the lower board and are buried in the ground, so 
that (the whole apparatus) will be stable. At the centre of the upper board two openings 
are made, through which two large rollers (made of very hard wood) are placed one next 
to the other. It would be best to have the rollers measuring seven feet in circumference. 
One of the rollers is three feet long, the other four and half feet. Affixed to the 
protruding end of the latter one is a curved pole made of bent wood, measuring fifteen 
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feet in length; this is attached to an ox that pulls it in a circle (and thus turns the rolls). 
The surfaces of both rollers are deeply corrugated or cogged; the cogs of one roll fit into 
the grooves between cogs of the other. The sugar cane which passes between the two 
toothed rollers is pressed and crushed. This is on the same principle as the cotton gin. 
As the cane is pressed the juice runs off. The residue is fed into the crusher again 
through the receiving hole on the rollers, and after having been crushed three times all 
the juice in the cane will be pressed out. The bagassee is used as fuel. 
 On the lower board two depressions one and one half inches deep are hollowed out 
to receive the bottom end of the rollers. The board is not perforated, and therefore it 
catches the juice. An iron pellet is affixed to the centre of the bottom end of each roller 
to facilitate rotation. The cane juice flows into an earthenware jar through that has been 
cut in the board.447 
 
 Apart from the wooden mill mentioned in the text, the Chinese also developed a stone 
mill. The stone-roller mill was a unique Chinese development and Chinese immigrants 
transferred knowledge of it overseas.448 It is very possible that the stone-roller mills used in the 
Ommelanden were imported from China. The vertical two-roller cane-crusher made of stone 
was not only used in the Ommelanden, but was also in other places in Java, Vietnam, and 
Thailand.449 
 The process of crushing the sugar canes using the vertical stone roller was carried out 
by one or more labourers. The cane was passed through in bundles ranging from just two or 
three canes up to a dozen. The amount of time needed to crush the cane between the rollers 
depended on the skill of the labourers. Too many layers crushed together would create 
problems because the bottom canes would absorb some of the liquid squeezed from those on 
top of them and because the harder the pressing, the more pieces of stalk fibre and other 
impurities were deposited in the liquid. Although the work at the rollers was repetitive, it 
demanded expertise and great attention. The cane had to be placed into the rollers at the right 
speed and in the right quantity, if not the rollers might break or the cane would not be pressed 
thoroughly enough.  
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Illustration 9: Traditional Chinese technology of crushing cane with vertical-toothed roll crusher 
Source: Sung Ying-Hsing, Chinese Technology in the Seventeenth Century, T’ien-Kung K’ai-Wu, translated from the 




Illustration 10: A sugar-mill in Tangerang in the beginning of 20th century 
Source: F. de Haan, Oud Batavia Platenalbum (Bandung: A.C. Nix & Co., 1935), b 35. 
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 The juice extracted from the canes, the sugar water, flowed in to an earthenware jar or a 
huge pot. After a pot was filled with juice, it would be taken to the boiling place. The amount 
of juice which could be extracted depended on the variety of sugar cane and the efficiency 
with which the mill worked to extract it. Sometimes a sugar-miller did not even boil the juice 
himself but would sell it on the open market. A Chinese sugar-miller Oey Tsinsay, for 
example, sold 400 pikuls of sugar water to Ong Soncko. The first party received 40 rijksdaalders 
for every 100 pikuls of juice he sold, and that price included the transport of the juice to the 
second party‘s sugar-boiling furnace.450  
 In the kettle house juice would be boiled for a certain amount of time until it crystallized. 
Producing crystallized sugar after extracting the juice was a complicated process. The greatest 
hurdle was the threat of rapid fermentation as the juice was in full contact with air. Therefore 
the workers had to begin boiling the juice almost immediately after it was extracted. To obtain 
the best quality, the work in the boiling place had to be co-ordinated with that in the mill and, 
one step further back, with the harvesting to avoid either wastage of the juice or time-
consuming delays. The temperature while boiling had to be carefully controlled, because heat 
could change the structure of juice. Using too high a temperature to concentrate the juice 
would inevitably result in the whole batch turning into burnt, not crystallized syrup. To judge 
the exact moment when sugar syrup was done required considerable expertise before the 
advent of industrial technology when temperature controlled pans for boiling were invented. 
After boiling, separating the sugar crystals from the sugar syrup and drying the sugar required 
yet another skill.  
 The process of boiling the juice would produce two kinds of sugar of different quality. White 
sugar of the best quality was called cabessa and darker sugar of lower quality was called bariga. In 
1725 the price of cabessa was 3 ½ rijksdaalders per pikul, while bariga was 3 rijksdaalders per 
pikul.451 Cabessa sugar could be sold directly to the public but bariga was often used as a mixture 
for the basis of arak.452 The sugar industry was closely associated with Chinese arak distilleries, 
because bariga or molasses constituted the main raw material in the preparation of this 
alcoholic drink, which also contained fermented rice. The busiest time during the year for the 
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sugar industry was from March until May, because the sugar was required to be ready for the 
departure of the China-bound Junks at the end of June or early July.453    
 During the harvest, sufficient quantities of firewood were essential. To guarantee its supply, 
a sugar-miller rented a patch of forest and hired people to cut down the trees. The payment 
for the firewood was reckoned on the basis of how many roeden of wood were produced within 
a certain time period. The Javanese lieutenant Wardicka was paid 150 rijksdaalders for cutting 
150 roeden of wood within nine months.454 Wardicka and his people had to carry the firewood 
from a forest in Tandjoeng in the south of the Ommelanden to a sugar-mill belonging to Oey 
Quanko and Tsieuw Tsieuwko in Condet. The land leased by sugar-millers to fell the timber 
was not always the property of Batavian inhabitants, but sometimes belonged to the Company. 
A Chinese miller Tan Zayqua, for example, took 195 roeden of firewood from a plot of 
Company-owned land called Maraberos. That firewood had to be transported to his sugar-mill 
via the Ciliwung River, and for every roede of firewood Tan Zayqua had to pay the College van 
Heemraden ½ rijksdaalder .455   
 The value of a sugar-mill was not determined by the building of the mill itself, which was not 
particularly expensive because it consisted of only two or three wood, iron, or stone cylinders, 
but by its equipment. To give an illustration: Oey Toanko bought a sugar-mill in Pondok Serap 
equipped with one warehouse, five small petak, some water buffaloes, sugar cane and others 
implements for 2,000 rijksdaaalders,456 whereas I Tsiako had to paid 3,500 rijksdaalders for a 
sugar-mill in Kramat equipped with two warehouses, two small petak, forty water buffaloes, 
twenty-eight laksas sugar cane and all of the implements required to run it properly.457 Detailed 
information about the implements used in a sugar-mill can be found listed on the premises of 
Susana Staal, which stood on the western side of the Ciliwung River. There were forty-eight 
different kinds of tools in her sugar-mill.458  
 By and large, Batavian sugar-mills were cheap to build and easy to repair. They could even be 
moved about from place to place without too much difficulty. Their drawbacks were their low 
capacity, the poor job they made of pressing the cane, and they operated slowly. As a 
                                                 
453 Dobbin, Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities, p. 54. 
454 ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 2093, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 7 October 1704.  
455 ANRI, RCH No. 9, 5 June 1706, fol. 206. 
456 ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3264, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 1 April 1711. 
457 ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3267, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 4 May 1712. 
458 ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3269, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 5 November 1712. See appendix 5 for the 
complete inventory of Susana Staal‘s sugar-mill. 
 161 
consequence, the quality of the sugar was adversely affected by the time it took to crush the 
cane and to extract the juice into the boiling pans. In short, it could be said that the sugar 
boiling process was an enormous and wasteful consumption of firewood, human labour and 
cattle. 
 
6. Management of labour 
 
The large number of sugar-mills operating in the Ommelanden acted as a magnet for large 
numbers of migratory labourers from various places on the North Coast of Java, such as 
Cirebon, Tegal Pekalongan, even from the mainland of China. The sugar-millers preferred to 
use labourers from distant places because they were less likely to complain about the arduous, 
unpleasant work than those who happened to live close to Batavia. In Dutch sources, Javanese 
migrant workers were called bujang. In their search for employees, Chinese sugar-millers had to 
look for middlemen who could supply Javanese labourers. These middlemen were appointed 
to represent them by the labourers themselves. After a sugar-miller and a supplier reached an 
agreement, they went to a notary to sign a contract if they needed a guarantee. According to 
the archival evidence from the office of notary Cornelis Veenendael, most of the contracts 
signed were between Chinese sugar-millers and Javanese labour suppliers, which suggest that 
most of Chinese labourers worked in sugar-mills without any Dutch contracts. 
 The majority of the workers employed in the sugar-mills and sugar plantations were 
Javanese. The skilled jobs related to the sugar production tended to be done by Chinese, and 
accordingly they were paid higher than the Javanese.459 The average workforce required to run 
a sugar-mill during the harvest season at the beginning of the eighteenth century consisted of 
nineteen to twenty-six labourers460 for one shift, while at the end of the eighteenth century and 
the early of nineteenth century these numbers were to increase to 150 to 200 to produce 1,000 
or 2,000 pikuls of crude sugar.461 The smaller number of labourers required by the sugar-mills 
at the beginning of eighteenth century is an indication that these were small enterprises, 
probably with smaller productivity compared to the sugar-mills of the later period. 
                                                 
459 G.R. Knight, ―From Plantation to Paddy Field: The origins of the Nineteenth Century Transformation of 
Java‘s Sugar Industry‖, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1980, p. 179. 
460 ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 2090, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 24 June 1701 and Notarieel Archief 
No. 2397, MAVA Notary Jan Seullijn, 25 April 1713.   
461 Knight, ―From Plantation to Paddy Field‖, p. 180. 
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 During the harvest season, various tasks awaited the workers. For example, there was a 
division of labour among twenty-five labourers hired by the Chinese sugar-miller Li Poanko. 
Six men crushed the sugar cane, six men boiled the juice, ten men cut the sugar cane on the 
plantation and brought it to the sugar-mill, two men stripped the leaves off the sugar cane and 
fed the leaves to the buffaloes, and one man carried water from the river to the sugar-mill. 
Every month Li Poanko was faced with a wage bill of 66 rijksdaalders.462 The division of labour 
among the twenty-six workers at the sugar-mill of Harman Sluyters, a member of the College 
van Heemraden, was rather different. Here, sixteen people harvested the sugar cane on the 
plantation, six people crushed the sugar cane, and four people boiled juice. This workforce was 
paid 100 rijksdaalders a month.463 These records revealing the division of labour in these two 
sugar-mills provides precise information about what kind of jobs had to be undertaken during 
the process of sugar production.  
 One obvious point is that the work in the sugar-mill required more labourers than the work 
in the cane-fields. The information also clarifies the fact that the workers who cultivated the 
cane were not those who later harvested it, because the latter were hired with the men who 
worked in the sugar-mill during harvest season. It is quite possible that there also were sugar 
labourers who specialized in sugar cultivation, since sugar staelen had to be planted once every 
five years. In the harvest season, a sugar-mill operated twenty-four hours a day, so it required 
at least two shifts of labourers.    
 Since most of sugar-mills in the Ommelanden were located in isolated places, far away from 
the city, it was important to the sugar-millers to provide accommodation for their labour force 
during harvest season. This basic accommodation was located close to the mill. Most of the 
sugar-mills provided small houses for workers, called rumah petak or pondok. In the sugar-mill 
inventory, these smallish cabins are sometimes simply referred to as woningen. According to the 
inventory of Pou Poanko‘s sugar-mill which was sold to Go Tsilauw, there were two woningen 
listed among all the other amenities.464 In the inventory of Tsoa Piauko‘s sugar-mill which was 
sold to Qua Tsiko and Lim Liongko there were five woningen,465 while the sugar-mill which I 
Tsiako bought from Jo Tsia had two woningen.466 It was also usually up to the sugar-miller to 
                                                 
462 ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 2092, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 22 Juny 1703. 
463 ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 2397, MAVA Notary Jan Seullijn, 19 April 1713. 
464 ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3262, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 18 April 1710. 
465 ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3264, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 27 March 1711. 
466 ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3267, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 4 May 1712. 
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provide the labourers‘ food. The sketches made by Surveyor Boudewijn Jansz. Vonk in 1732, 
show that the sugar-mills were often close to the paddy-fields. The rice produced in the paddy-
fields was probably meant to provide food for the labourers.  
 Even though some sugar-mills utilized slaves as a workforce, most of the sugar-millers 
preferred to use hired labourers. Free labour was much cheaper than slaves. The average price 
required to buy a strong, healthy male slave in the early eighteenth century amounted to about 
60 rijksdaalders. At harvest time, around twenty-five workers were needed if a sugar-mill were 
to operate properly. If a sugar-miller did prefer to use slaves, his choice would cost him a 
pretty penny. The expense of for hiring a team of workers for one month was about the same 




























In conclusion it is perhaps an interesting exercise to compare the history of Batavia with two 
prominent sister cities in Southeast Asia: namely, Melaka and Singapore. These three maritime 
trading cities flourished successfully at different periods and were all commercial entrepôts 
administered for long periods by Europeans. All three were established at strategic locations: 
Batavia near the Sunda Strait, and the other two port cities located along the Straits of Melaka, 
the two thoroughfares between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Despite their 
similarities, as commercial port towns Batavia, Melaka, and Singapore have been studied from 
rather different angles.  
 Legend has it that Melaka was founded in 1402 by Parameswara, a prince from Palembang, 
who had been forced to leave his homeland after an attack by the Javanese in 1391-1392. 
Around a century later, Melaka emerged as the ultimate Malay harbour principality which was 
visited by merchants from scores of nations from all over Monsoon Asia who lived and traded 
in peace under the benign governance of its ruler. The success of Melaka as an entrepôt 
became a model for other Southeast Asian port principalities which adopted its principles of 
governance in the centuries which followed. In 1511, Portuguese forces under the command 
of Alfonso de Albuquerque conquered Melaka. The Estado da India used this port city as a 
centre from which to control the maritime traffic passing through the Straits of Melaka.467 In 
1641, the Dutch conquered Melaka from the Portuguese. Under VOC rule, Melaka became a 
substantial exporter of tin and importer of Indian cloth but, as a commercial centre, it always 
remained secondary to Batavia. In 1795 the Dutch surrendered Melaka to the British. It was 
restored to the Dutch in 1818 but, under the terms of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, this 
port city was definitively ceded to the British. 
 Recent archaeological evidence confirms that Singapore already served as a meeting point for 
traders from all over the Archipelago centuries before Thomas Stamford Raffles turned it into 
                                                 
467 The Estado da India or the State of India was the name given by the Portuguese Crown to the Portuguese 
imperial enterprise in Asia. This state was not a unitary state but a collection of forts, fleets, and communities 
which stretched from East Africa to Japan. See George Bryan Souza, The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and 
Society in China and the South China Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 12. 
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a free port under the British flag in 1819.468 Immediately after this take-over, Singapore began 
its growth into the biggest port city of Southeast Asia, mainly owing to Chinese 
entrepreneurship. The city on its tiny island lacked natural resources and had to depend on 
entrepôt trade, exchanging British manufactured goods, Indian opium, and Chinese wares for 
tropical products from the Indonesian Archipelago and other parts of Southeast Asia. 
Geographically speaking, Singapore was excellently positioned to do just this; well situated 
between the trade winds in the days of sail, and economically supported by a sound policy free 
of commercial tariffs and few restrictions. 
 The history of Batavia shares some of the elements of both Melaka and Singapore. First 
known as Sunda Kelapa, in the fifteenth century this port town served as the principal outlet 
for pepper from the Hindu kingdom of Pajajaran. In 1527, the sultan of Cirebon dispatched a 
military expedition under the command of Fatahilah to conquer Sunda Kelapa. The new ruler 
renamed the town Jayakarta, meaning ‗complete victory‘, and a few decades later the town 
became the vassal of the sultanate of Banten. Local rule changed once again in 1619 when 
Governor- General Jan Pieterszoon Coen, in charge of the VOC, razed the town of Jayakarta, 
and built Batavia on its ashes. After that, Batavia became the hub of the VOC trading network 
in Asia and developed into one of the most prominent Asian port cities. After a short British 
interregnum, 1811-1816, Batavia became the capital of the Netherlands East Indies and since 
1949, as Jakarta, has been the capital of the Republic of Indonesia. All three cities indubitably 
had Asian roots in some way or another, but they were urbanized under colonial rule.   
 Curiously enough, only a few studies have been done on the hinterlands of these three cities. 
Throughout its existence as an entrepôt, Melaka never really had a sizeable hinterland. Under 
Portuguese rule, it remained an enclave in the kingdom of Johor. As mentioned above, 
Singapore is an island lacking in natural resources. For the provisions necessary to its 
existence, this British possession had to rely on the supply of foodstuffs and other raw 
materials from elsewhere. Singapore has never outgrown the island on which it is situated. By 
contrast, Batavia had a hinterland of its own, the Ommelanden, which I have shown in this 
study, was developed during the second half of the seventeenth century and the first half of 
the eighteenth century. Batavia/Jakarta has now grown into a metropolis of more than 12 
                                                 
468 About the history of Singapore which commenced 500 years before the arrival of Thomas Stamford Raffles in 
1819 see Tan Tai Yong, Kwa Chong Guan and Derek Heng, Singapore: A 700-Year History. From Early Emporium to 
World City (Singapore: The National Archives of Singapore, 2009). 
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million people generally known as Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok Tangerang, and Bekasi) 
more or less congruent with the boundaries of the erstwhile Ommelanden. 
 In this study, I have shown that the interaction between man and nature in the Ommelanden 
irrevocably changed the landscape of this region from a wilderness of tropical forests into an 
agricultural area dominated by sugar cane and paddy-fields. Water control and irrigation were 
very essential to the development of transportation and agricultural activities. The hydraulic 
infrastructure which was laid out under VOC rule slowly but surely shaped the regional 
landscape over the years. Nevertheless, the various kinds of water control introduced by the 
Dutch, which included canals, dams, ditches, and sluices, never fully succeeded in preventing 
Batavia and the Ommelanden from inundation by the seasonal banjir. The uncontrolled 
development of private dams and sluices and the rapid deforestation actually worsened the 
problem of flooding. Even nowadays the flood problems in Jakarta and its surrounding areas 
during the rainy season have not been satisfactorily solved.  
 Certainly, the health situation deteriorated. The first malaria epidemic swept Batavia in 1733, 
spreading death among the inhabitants of the town. Several explanations have been given for 
the ecological degradation and insalubriousness of Batavia, but it is my personal opinion this 
sanitary problem was caused mainly by the lack of knowledge about the worsening ecological 
environment of Batavia and the lack of control exercised over the economic activities in the 
Ommelanden. 
 No well-organized administration had existed in the surroundings of Jayakarta prior to the 
establishment of the Company authority. To plug this gap and to administer the multi-ethnic 
society of Batavia and its environs, the Company decided to implement a mixed administration 
combining local traditions and institutions and administrative conventions derived from the 
Dutch Republic. The Dutch rule in the Ommelanden was exercised through the College van 
Heemraden, but at the ground level it remained in the hands of kampung headmen.  
 The Company kept the Ommelanden kampungs relatively autonomous, as legal enclaves 
which administered their own adat instead of the system of land laws which were in force in 
the Dutch Republic. Initially, the Ommelanden quarters and kampung were officially planned as 
settlements for specific ethnic groups but, since the inhabitants of theses settlements enjoyed 
relative freedom, most of these kampung were occupied by various ethnicities. Nevertheless, 
whenever a serious crime was committed in a kampung, the colonial administration would 
intervene by sending the landdrost with his assistants to conduct an investigation and make the 
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necessary arrest. In this study, I have shown that the landdrosten did not function as well as they 
might have done. In fact, security and order in the Ommelanden more or less depended on co-
operation between kampung headmen and their followers.  
 Prior to the establishment of the Heemraden in 1682, there was no clear policy on land 
ownership. This lack of land registration contributed to the emergence of legal pluralism in the 
Ommelanden land sector. Many forms of land ownership found in this region can be classified 
neither under the legally acknowledged system of statutory land rights, nor under traditional 
adat law. The establishment of the Heemraden did succeed in increasing colonial control over 
land ownership, but their presence failed to deter the rural inhabitants from occupying land 
which did not legally belong to them. It was beyond the capability of the local authorities to 
evict all illegal settlers since their number just kept on rising. Faced with a seemingly hopeless 
task, as long as these illicit dwellers did not create trouble and as long as the land they occupied 
was not granted or sold to someone else by the Company, the local authorities tended to 
accept their existence.  
 Several traditions merged in land utilization in the Ommelanden. Javanese sawah and ladang 
developed alongside Chinese sugar cultivation techniques and Dutch hydraulic engineering. 
The upshot was that a teeming population of more than 40,000 was amply provided with food 
and various agricultural products, among them sugar, pepper and, from the 1720s, also coffee, 
could also be produced for export. 
 In less than a century after the establishment of Batavia, the environs of this city developed 
from a heavily forested region with very small numbers of inhabitants into quite densely 
populated countryside supporting 58,761 inhabitants in 1710. The Ommelanden was a colony 
with a heterogeneous population of small Dutch elite, Mardijkers consisting of free Christians 
from India and Maluku, free Indonesian ethnicities, Chinese sojourners and settlers, Javanese 
migrant workers from the Priangan and the north coast of Java, and slaves. Although the 
colonial authorities always kept a keen eye on the social dividing lines based on origin and 
religion, the people from these varied backgrounds frequently mixed and intermarried. In this 
study, I have shown that intermarriage among the Ommelanden people was a common 
phenomenon. The stage was already set for this, since ethnic identity among Indonesian 
nations was quite loose and unarticulated. In their turn, the offspring of inter-ethnic marriages 
would marry people of different ethnic groups or persons who had similar background as 
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themselves. A few generations later, they had lost their own ethnic identity and formed a new 
one as orang Betawi, people of Batavia. 
 Lance Castles claims that the identity of orang Betawi was first formulated in the nineteenth 
century. Using a historical demographic approach by analysing the census data of 1673, 1815, 
1893, and 1930 he shows that the Betawi people were formed by migrants from various ethnic 
groups.469 His approach demonstrates that the orang Betawi are composed of migrant people 
and are not the original natives of Batavia. A different explanation is provided by Yasmine 
Zaki Shahab, who argues that the orang Betawi are indeed the original inhabitants of Jakarta. 
Although they were created from various ethnic groups who migrated to Batavia, the orang 
Betawi were still ‗made‘ in Batavia.470 Using the theory of the invention of tradition devised by 
E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger,471 she argues that Betawi culture was recreated in 1970s and that 
this process succeeded in strengthening the Betawi identity.   
 The conclusions of my research differs from the above studies because they are based 
strictly on the so far unused archival sources in the National Archief (NA) in The Hague and the 
Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) in Jakarta. These archival sources, particularly the 
notarial archives kept in ANRI Jakarta, provide information about the socio-economic 
interaction between ordinary people in the Ommelanden through records of property (land, 
sugar-mills, and cattle) and the purchasing and leasing and trading slaves. In this study, I have 
shown that slaves often were traded several times. Changes of ownership affected not only the 
slaves themselves, they had consequences for the slave owners as well. There were thousands 
of slaves and slave owners in the Ommelanden, so it goes without saying that the slave trade 
was an effective medium of cultural assimilation. 
 Ommelanden society was one of the first colonial societies built by the Dutch on Asian soil. 
The colonial character of this society can be clearly seen in the development of sugar industry. 
Very preoccupied with economic interests, the Company promoted and strictly regulated this 
industry. During the period under study, the sugar industry mushroomed in the Ommelanden 
boosted by an abundant supply of Chinese and Javanese labourers and of the absolutely 
essential firewood. Owing to the Chinese entrepreneurship and the Company efforts to create 
a market in the intra-Asian trade, this industry reached a ‗golden age‘ at the beginning of 
                                                 
469 Lance Castle, ―The Ethnic Profile of Djakarta‖, in Indonesia, Vol. 3, April 1967, pp. 156-158. 
470  Shahab, The Creation of Ethnic Tradition, pp. 80-87, see also Yasmine Z. Shahab, Identitas Dan Otoritas. 
Rekonstruksi Tradisi Betawi (Jakarta: Laboratorium Antropologi, FISIP UI, 2004), p.5. 
471 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invented Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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eighteenth century. Job opportunities in the sugar-mills and sugar cane-fields caused an 
increase in the Ommelanden population and a growth in economic activities at the local level.  
 In 1713 there were 128 sugar-mills operating in the Ommelanden and in 1734 this number 
reached its peak at 135. To operate so large a number of pre-modern mills required a very 
abundant supply of firewood. The uncontrolled consumption of firewood for this purpose was 
the main factor in the rapid deforestation and the severe ecological damage which followed in 
its wake. No effective efforts were taken by the Company to tackle this problem, if indeed it 
acknowledged that there was one. Within a few decades, most of the forest in the surrounding 
areas of Batavia vanished. The decline in the international demand struck the Ommelanden 
sugar industry a heavy blow and many mills had to close down. The bankruptcy of the sugar 
industry caused large numbers of people to become unemployed and ushered in widespread 
social disorder. The dynamic period of socio-economic development in the Ommelanden 
which began in 1684 came to an end in 1740, when the social unrest escalated into the Chinese 
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C.: Chinese, D.: Dutch, J.: Javanese, M.: Malay, P.: Persian, S.: Spain 
 
acte van donatie  (D.) certificate of donation, land grant 
adat   (M.) custom 
arak   (M.) locally product spirit, usually distilled from either sugar cane or 
   rice 
baljuw   (D.) head of police 
bale-bale   (M.) traditional Indonesian bed 
banjir   (J., M.) flood 
bujang   (M.) literal: bachelor, but referred to young unmarried Javanese workers  
   labourers 
cattij/kati  (M.) unit of weight equal to 6.25 pounds 
Chinesche kamp  (D.) Chinese settlement 
eigendom  (D.) property, ownership 
erfbrief   (D.) letter of land ownership 
Heren XVII  (D.) Gentlemen Seventeen, the Directors of the VOC in Holland 
Hoge Regering  (D.) High Government, Governor-General and Council of the Indies   
intramuros  (S.) literally: within the walls, the inner city 
gaga   (J.) dry rice-fields 
gamelan   (J.) traditional Javanese musical instruments 
gereja   (M.) church 
Geschooren Chinees (D.) Chinese Muslim who cut his hair short 
juffrouw   (D.) literal: miss, but in VOC usage denoting the wives of the higher 
   echelon officials, with the exception of the wife of the Governor-  
   General who was referred to as mevrouw 
junk   (C.) Chinese sailing vessel 
kaffer   (D.) assistant to the bailiff  
kampung  (J., M.) suburban quarter, village 
kerbau   (M.) water buffalo 
keris   (J.) traditional Javanese dagger 
klewang   (M.) short, curved chopping sword 
laksa   (M.) ten thousand   
landdrost  (D.) sheriff 
landmeeter  (D.) land surveyor 
mandor   (M.) overseer on a private estate  
mardijker  (D.) derived from Sanskrit mahardika, free men: Christian population 
   of South Asian and Indonesian descent 
menyirih   (M.) to chew betel 
mestizo   (S.) Christian people with a European father and an Asian mother 
nahkoda  (M.) captain of Asian vessel 
octrooi   (D.) patent, charter 
ommelanden  (D.) surrounding countryside, the environs of Batavia 
opperkoopman  (D.) senior merchant 
orang Betawi  (M.) the native population of Batavia and later Jakarta 
pangeran  (J.) prince 
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parang   (M.) type of large knife 
peranakan  (M.) 1. descendant of a Chinese man with a native woman 2. Chinese 
   born in Indonesian Archipelago 
petak   (M.) literally: small piece of land, small cabin 
pikul (J., M.) a measure of weight used widely in Southeast Asia. 1 pikul 
equals 125 pounds 
pothia   (C.) Chinese sugar entrepreneur or supervisor on a plantation 
perahu   (J., M.) small local craft 
rijksdaalder  (D.) a coin. 1 rijksdaalder = 3 gulden (guilders, florin) = 60 stuivers 
roeden   (D.) 1 roede = 3,767 m 
ronggeng   (M.) dancing girl 
sawah   (J.) wet-rice field 
schutterij  (D.) citizen militia 
susuhunan  (J.) you‘re majesty, the king of Mataram 
syahbandar  (P.) harbour master, the title of an official found in native ports all  
   over the Indian Ocean 
stuiver      (D.) coin: one gulden is equal to 20 stuivers 
tjoeke   (M) tax in the Priangan region amounted to one-fifth of the crop 
topeng   (J., M.) mask 
vrijburger  (D.) free citizen, not employed by the VOC 






























Batavia was founded as the headquarters of the VOC (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) in Asia 
on 30 May 1619, on the ruins of the Javanese port town of Jayakarta. Initially, the Company 
built Batavia as the rendezvous for its ships in Asia which sailed to and from the Dutch 
Republic. As it developed, this city became one of the largest trade centres in Asia. To support 
its livelihood as a large trading centre, Batavia required a hinterland which could provide it 
with food crops, building materials, and human resources. The area which fulfilled this role as 
a hinterland from which it could draw what it needed was called the Ommelanden or the 
environs of the city. 
 After two attacks by Mataram in 1628 and 1629 and several assaults by Banten in the 1640s, 
the Company realized how important it was to establish its authority in the Ommelanden if it 
were to maintain the security of its headquarters and ensure that it was not isolated from its 
vital hinterland. The territorial expansion of Batavia into the Ommelanden was accomplished 
in a series of war and contract between the Company with the local potentates, which began in 
the 1620s and reached their peak in 1707, when Mataram officially conceded sovereignty over 
Cirebon and the Priangan regions to the Company. This marked the solution to the problem 
of providing Batavia with an area from which it could obtain supplies. By that date, almost all 
of West Java with the exception of Banten was under the Company authority.  
 During its initial years, Batavia and its environs produced hardly any food for local 
consumption. To overcome this problem of an impending shortage of essential resources, the 
first priority of the Company government was to develop the immediate hinterland and 
populate it with peasants. As the local rulers in Java were hostile, the Company preferred to 
populate the Ommelanden with people who would be brought in from far away who would 
pose less of a threat. Therefore, in a situation similar to that in the intramuros, in its very early 
years the majority of the population of the Ommelanden consisted of various ethnicities from 
outside Java. 
 The highest authority in the Ommelanden was in the hands of the Company government 
and was administered through various institutions such as: the College van Heemraden, the 
Gecommitteerde voor de zaken der Inlanderen, and the landdrost. With a limited budget and few 
personnel, these institutions had to govern the territory of the Ommelanden and a population 
which grew steadily throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. The policy of 
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the Company at the very local level was to intervene in indigenous affairs no more than was 
necessary to protect its own interests. Hence, in daily life the head of the kampung enjoyed a 
great deal of freedom in running its own affairs. By making use of the authority of indigenous 
officials, the Company government could avoid being directly involved in the daily 
administration of the kampung. 
 After the third war with Banten (1656-1659) had ended, the Company began to selling and 
granting plots of lands to Europeans, Chinese, Mardijkers, and Indonesians in a bid to 
stimulate agricultural production. By the end of the seventeenth century, when the 
Ommelanden had become more law-abiding, increasing numbers of European ventured to 
build country houses and run landed estates there. There was a large-scale cultivation of the 
land and a host of sugar plantations sprang up; the initiative taken principally by Chinese 
farmers and entrepreneurs. In the same period, attracted by the security and the economic 
opportunities offered in the area, many Javanese also migrated to the Ommelanden to settle 
and establish rice-fields and market gardens. 
 To supervise landownership and the infrastructure in the environs of Batavia, the High 
Government set up the College van Heemraden in 1664, but this institution only became fully 
functional in 1682. The duty of the Heemraden was to administer the rural area of Batavia where 
large private estates lands which belonged to high-ranking officials and rich burgers were 
located. Their jurisdiction covered all of the land as far as the Company territory stretched 
outside the city walls of Batavia. The Heemarden had the authority to solve disputes between 
landowners, but if these became serious, they could bring them to the attention the Raad van 
Justitie. It was within the power of this institution to nominate candidates for the position of 
district head (wijkmeester) and their nomination would be confirmed by the High Government. 
Another duty of the Heemraden was to maintain security in the Ommelanden by supporting the 
landdrosten in the execution of their duties of keeping law and order.  
 To fulfil the demand for manpower in Batavia, the Company government employed 
thousands of slaves, the majority of whom originated from South Asia and Eastern Indonesia.  
In the Ommelanden, the greatest demand for slaves was from civilians.  The slave labour was 
employed in the rural factories, in agriculture, and in the domestic sector. Thousands of slave 
sales in the Ommelanden, which were recorded in the notarial archives of Batavia, show that 
most of people involved in slave trade in the Ommelanden were indigenous. Compared to the 
European and Chinese, they were small-scale entrepreneurs and they were many. A mixture of 
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identity often occurred when slaves were sold was because a transaction sometimes took place 
involve a seller, buyer, and slave all three with different ethnicities. The slave trade in the 
Ommelanden had become a field for social interaction which accelerated the formation of a 
communal identity among people in this region. 
 Despite this thriving trade, slaves could not fulfil the demand for manpower in Batavia and 
its environs. The solution was to recruit labour from elsewhere. Large numbers of migrant 
workers came to Batavia from the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung in south-east China. 
They left their home country in the hope of finding jobs in the flourishing agriculture in the 
Ommelanden.  Another source of cheap labour was Javanese bujang (young male workers) who 
came from Priangan, Cirebon, and the Pasisir. Attracted by the progress in the sugar and rice 
cultivation, which was going ahead by leaps and bounds, many Javanese seasonal workers 
moved to the Ommelanden to work in the sugar industry and in the rice-fields. 
 Sugar was indubitably the prime commodity in determining the economic development in 
the Ommelanden. The rise of sugar as one of the principal commodities traded by the 
Company happened to coincide with a decline in the demand for pepper in 1650. The 
Company introduced restrictions on the sugar prices, set production quotas, and limited the 
number of sugar-mills which were licensed to operate. These restrictions were important 
because the Company juggled to adjust the sugar production in areas under its control to 
accommodate to the fluctuating demand from the Asian and European markets. Batavian 
sugar enjoyed its heyday at the end of seventeenth century. 
 This heyday of sugar was of short duration. The crisis in Batavian sugar began in the 1710s 
and after several fluctuations really began to deteriorate in the 1730s, as a consequence of an 
accumulation of inauspicious circumstances. Just as the European demand for Batavian sugar 
was increasing, the deforestation, soil exhaustion, and erosion in the Ommelanden, which had 
already been evident at the beginning of eighteenth century, was really taking its toll. The costs 
of transport and labour for each mile had risen because the raw materials for sugar production 
had to expand exponentially to a larger area. The deforestation also forced up the price of 
firewood, the essential fuel for the mills. The consequence of all these circumstances was that 
the production costs increased and the sugar entrepreneurs had a difficulty in selling sugar at 
the price set by the Company. 
 While all this was happening, the High Government was trying to reorganize the sugar 
industry and hence was not inclined to encourage businessmen by paying them a higher price. 
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Since the bulk of the sugar produced in Ommenlanden was sold to the Company, this policy 
pushed the sugar entrepreneurs ever closer to the brink of financial ruin. They failed to 
accumulate the capital required to relocate their businesses to more fertile regions, farther away 
from the city. This explains why the number of sugar-mill decreased significantly at the end of 
1730s. The upshot of the bankruptcy of the sugar industry was large numbers of unemployed 































Op 30 Mei 1619 werd Batavia gesticht als hoofdkwartier van de VOC (Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie) in Azië. Gunstig gelegen in de nabijheid van Straat Soenda diende de stad met zijn 
prachtige baai allereerst als rendez-vous voor de vloot van de Compagnie in Azië en de 
komende en gaande schepen uit Patria. Weldra ontwikkelde de stad met zijn enorme pakhuizen 
zich tot één van de belangrijkste stapelplaatsen in Azië. Rondom Batavia werden de 
zogenaamde Ommelanden in culture gebracht die in de loop van de tijd de stad gingen 
voorzien van voedsel, bouwmaterialen en mankracht in tijden van vrede en oorlog. 
 Na de twee belegeringen door troepen van het Javaanse rijk van Mataram eind jaren twintig 
en verschillende aanvallen van het naburige Banten in de jaren veertig van de zeventiende 
eeuw, begreep de Hoge Regering van Batavia hoe belangrijk het was ook in de Ommelanden 
haar gezag te vestigen. De territoriale uitbreiding van Batavia en de Ommelanden werd in 1705 
afgerond met een verdrag, waarbij het koninkrijk Mataram de soevereiniteit van de Compagnie 
erkende over de Priangan Bovenlanden en Cirebon. Daarmee was met uitzondering van 
Banten vrijwel heel West Java onder het gezag van de Compagnie gebracht.  
 In de roerige pionierstijd werd in de directe omgeving van Batavia aanvankelijk nog weinig 
voedsel voor lokale consumptie verbouwd. De stad was vrijwel geheel en al aangewezen op 
bevoorrading van buitenaf. Zodra de gelegenheid zich daartoe voordeed, deed  de Hoge 
Regering van Batavia er alles aan om de Ommelanden te bevolken en in cultuur te brengen. De 
naburige inheemse vorsten stelden zich nog steeds vijandig op en daarom  gaf men uit 
veiligheidsoverwegingen er de voorkeur aan mankracht van veraf gelegen gebieden te 
betrekken  Zo kon het gebeuren dat in de eerste decennia zowel binnen- als buiten de muren 
de Aziatische bevolking van Batavia voornamelijk van buiten Java afkomstig was. 
 Weldra kwam het bestuur van de Ommelanden in handen van het speciaal daartoe in het 
leven geroepen College van Heemraden dat werd bijgestaan door de Gecommitteerde voor de zaken der 
Inlanderen en de landdrost. Deze laatste was met de politionele taken belast. Met beperkte 
middelen moesten deze gezagsdragers de snel toenemende bevolking zien te besturen in een 
achterland dat zich gaandeweg steeds verder uitstrekte . Het zal geen verbazing wekken dat zij 
zich zo weinig mogelijk inlieten met interne affaires van de omliggende inheemse kampongs, 
en dat zij het aan de inheemse kamponghoofden overlieten om hun dorpszaken te bestieren.  
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 Na afloop van de derde oorlog met Banten (1656-1659) kwamen de Ommelanden tot rust 
en begon de koloniale overheid land uit te geven en te verkopen aan Europeanen, Chinezen, 
Mardijkers, en  Indonesiërs om zo de landbouwproductie te stimuleren. Aan het einde van de 
zeventiende eeuw was zodanige ‗rust en orde‘ ingetreden, dat welgestelde Europeanen eigen 
particuliere landerijen ontwikkelden en zich daar als landsheren vestigden Tot diep in het 
achterland werden tropische wouden omgehakt en plat gebrand, en werd het braak liggende 
land in culture gebracht. Met name Chinese ondernemers richtten zich op de suikerrietculture 
en legden uitgestrekte plantages aan waarop ook suikermolens werden opgericht. Tegelijkertijd 
zetten nu vele Javaanse tani‘s zich neer in de Ommelanden en legden daar rijstvelden en 
moestuinen aan. Ook werd de infrastructuur van de Ommelanden door aanleg van kanalen en 
dijken ingrijpend veranderd.  
 Hoewel het College van Heemraden al in 1664 werd opgericht, begonnen de heemraden pas na 
de vrede met Banten van 1682 werkelijk te functioneren. Hun jurisdictie besloeg al het territoir 
buiten de muren van Batavia, dat in wijken verdeeld werd. Zij benoemden de wijkmeesters en 
bemiddelden in geschillen tussen de landeigenaren, maar ernstige vergrijpen droegen zij over 
aan de Raad van Justitie in de stad. Tevens ondersteunden de Heemraden waar mogelijk de 
landdrosten in de uitoefening van hun ambt.  
 Om te voorzien  in het chronische gebrek aan arbeidskrachten werden slaven uit Zuid Azië 
en Oost Indonesië aangevoerd. Zij werden voornamelijk ingezet als huisdienaren en  
handwerkslieden, of als arbeiders in de steenfabrieken en de tuinbouw. De duizenden 
koopcontracten in de notariële archieven laten zien dat de meeste slaveneigenaren in de 
Ommelanden inheemse kleine ondernemers waren. Vaak was er sprake van verandering van 
etnische identiteit wanneer slaven werden verkocht omdat de verkoper, de koper en de slaaf 
meestal van verschillende etnische afkomst waren. De namen van de slaven werden dan 
veranderd naar gelang van de etniciteit van hun nieuwe meester. Curieus genoeg kwam als 
gevolg van deze slavenhandel in de Ommelanden uiteindelijk een proces van groepsidentiteit 
tot stand onder de lokale bevolking die aanvankelijk onderling gescheiden in kampongs van 
verschillende volksaard woonde. Zo werd de orang betawi geboren.  
 Omdat de aanvoer van slaven bij lange na niet kon voorzien in de benodigde mankracht 
werd arbeid voor Batavia en de Ommelanden ook gerekruteerd in de vorm van contractarbeid. 
Grote aantallen gastarbeiders uit de zuidelijke kustprovincies van China werden elk jaar met 
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Chinese jonken aangevoerd, Zij zochten vooral werk in de bloeiende landbouwsector of zij 
verhuurden zich als ambachtslieden. Een andere bron van goedkope arbeidskrachten vormden 
de Javaanse bujang (jongelieden) uit Priangan, Cirebon, en de noordkust van Java, de Pasisir.  
Veel van deze seizoensarbeiders vonden werk in de rietsuikerindustrie en op de rijstvelden.  
 De suikerculture speelde zonder twijfel een hoofdrol in de economische ontwikkeling van de 
Ommelanden. De toenemende suikerproductie compenseerde in zekere zin het gat dat 
ontstond door de afnemende vraag naar peper rond 1650. Aanvankelijk stimuleerde de 
Compagnie de suikerrietteelt door het bepalen van een hoge inkoopprijs van de suiker maar 
toen er weldra sprake was van overproductie, en kelderende prijzen, werden voor het eerst  
productiequota ingesteld, en werd zelfs het aantal suikermolens beperkt. Zo probeerde de 
Compagnie de suikerproductie aan te passen aan de fluctuerende vraag naar suiker op de 
internationale markten. Het laatste decennium van de zeventiende eeuw markeerde het 
hoogtepunt van de suikerculture in de Bataviase Ommelanden. 
 Zo rond 1710 dienden zich de eerste tekenen aan dat de hausse in de suikerteelt voorbij was, 
en in de jaren dertig ontstond  een ware economische crisis door ontbossing, uitputting van de 
grond en verregaande erosie. Ook de transportkosten waren enorm toegenomen omdat zowel 
het brandhout als het suikerriet over grotere afstanden moesten  worden vervoerd. Daarnaast 
had de ontbossing de kosten van het brandhout voor de suikerfabricage flink opgedreven. 
Omdat de Compagnie om markttechnische redenen niet bereid was de aankoopprijs van de 
suiker te verhogen, werden vele suikerondernemers op de rand van de afgrond gebracht en 
nam het aantal suikermolens in de loop van de jaren dertig snel af, zodat er plotseling een 
groot overschot aan arbeidsaanbod ontstond. Grote groepen werklozen zwierven door de 
Ommelanden. In september 1740 pleegden Chinese landarbeiders uit de Ommelanden zelfs 
een mislukte aanslag op de stad Batavia. Een verschrikkelijke progrom op de Chinese 
bevolking binnen de muren was het gevolg. Ruim 8000 mannen, vrouwen en kinderen werden 












1. Location of some lands and kampung in the Ommelanden in the beginning of 
eighteenth century 
 
No.1 Campong der Baliers Gelegen omtrent ¼ uur gaans bewesten dese stadt aan de zuyd 
zyde van de Bacheragt Gragt even boven de post de Vyffhoek of in‘t Westerveld het 8e deel 
van t‘ blok J, synde door zyn Edelheydt Willem van Outhoorn anno 1689 aan Capt. Lampidia 
ter wooning verleend, thans sorteerende onder de Baliese capitains Abdul Atip Tangoek en 
Tsieeradiya, meest bebouwd met steene huysen en het overige met houte woningen met panne 
gedekt, belendend ten noorden met een nok sloot langs de Heereweg van Anke ten oosten en 
ten zuyden met de oude revier Grogol, en ten westen met de Oosterring sloot breed @ r gr N 
132 roeden, mitsgaders diep N.2 gr w 56 roeden. 
 
No.2 Campong der Baliers gelegen omtrent ¼ uur gaans bewesten deese stadt aan de 
noordzyde van de Bacheragt  gragt eeven beneden de Vyffhoek door zyn Edelhyt Willem van 
Outhorn anno 1690 aan den Luitenant Mambal en Capt. Pangoekiran ter wooning verleend, 
thans bebouwd met veele steene pedakken en houte wooningen met panne gedekt, belendend 
ten zuyden met een clappus laan, langs de Bacharagts gragt en verders rondom met verschyde 
particulieren, breed voor of aan de zuydzyde W 5 Gr N 62 (r) 3 vt en agter of aande 
noordzyde w 4 gr Z 25 (r) 9 vt, mitsgaders diep aande oostzyde eerst Z en N 16 (r) 
versmallende alhier westwaerds 34 (r) 6 vt en  dan nog diep z 6 gr @ 76 (r) 6 vt en aan de 
westzyde is de diepte Z 3 gr @ 89 roeden. 
 
No.3. Campong der Baliers gelegen omtrent ¼ uur gaans beoosten deese stadt of eigentlyk aan 
de zuydzyde, bewesten de Molevlietse Dyk, door zyn Edelheyd Willem van Outhoorn aan 
Capt. Nenga Goelian ter wooning verleend, thans bebouwd met verschyde steene wooningen 
en de rest met bamboese pedakken gedeeltelyk met panne gedekt, belendend ten oosten met 
de Heereweg langs het Molenvliet, en verders rondom met verscheyde persoonen, breed voor 
of ande oostzyde N.10 gr @ 65 (r) en aan de west zyde N.4 gr @ meede 65 (r) mitsgaders diep 
@ 4 gr N aan de noord zyde 87 (r) 3 vt en aan de zuyd zyde 93 (r) 3 vt.  
 
No.4. Campong der Baliers, gelegen omtrent ¼ uur gaans beoosten deese stadt, aan de 
zuydzyde van de gegrave revier Sontaar, door syn Edelhydt Willem van Outhoorn aan Capt. 
Tambesie ter wooning verleend, thans beset met verscheyde wooningen van hout en 
bamboese met panne gedekt, belendend ten  noordwesten met de groote zuyderweg ten Z 
revier oosten met diferente particuliere, en ten noordoosten met de gegrave revier Sontaer, 
breed aan de noordoost syde @ 31 gr Z 104 roeden, langs de Zuyderweg in twee differente 
courssen 140 (r) mitsgaders diep N 36 ½ gr @ 107 (r). 
 
 
No.5. Campong der Baliers geleegen omtrent ¼ uur gaans beoosten deese stadt, aan de Z west 
syde van de gegrave revier Sontaer, door zyn Edelheydt Willem van Outhoorn aan den Capt. 
Luitenant Salladt ter woon verleend, thans beset met eenige bamboese wooningen belendend 
ten noordoosten met de gegrave revier Sontaer ten zuid westen met de campong gemelte 
No.6, ten oosten met de groote Zuyderweg en ten noordwesten met de oude vervalle weg die 
na de khoe markt loopt, breed aan de noordzyde @ 34 gr Z 32 (r) en aan de zuidwest syde 
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O.34 gr Z 70 (r) mitsgaders diep aan de Oost syde N.8 gr W. 59 (r) en aan de noordwest syde 
N 35 gr @ 44 roeden. 
 
No.6. Campong de Boegineesen gelegen omtrent ¼ uur gaans beoosten deese stadt, aan de 
gegrave revier Sontaer, door zyn edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck aan de luitenant Tossolo ter 
woon verleend, than met houte en bamboese huysingen beset, belendend ten oosten met de 
groote Zuyderweg, ten noordwesten met de oude vervalle weg na de khoe markt, ten 
noordoosten met de campong gemelte No.5 en ten zuidwesten met een articulier, breed N 34 
gr @ 22 roeden, mitsgaders diep @ 34 gr z 71 (r). 
 
No.7. Campong de Boegineesen geleegen omtren ¼ uur gaans Zuid oostwaerds buyten deese 
stadt aan de noordoost syde van de Jacatrase weg, door zyn edelhydt, Abraham van Riebeck 
aan den lieutenant Day Malaya ter wooning verleend, thans beset met wynige bamboese 
wooninge, belendend ten noordoosten met de groote zuyder weg, ten zuidwesten met de 
Jacatrase heere weg, ten zuidoosten en noordwesten met differente particuliere, breed aan de 
noordoost syde Z ter @ 33 (r) en aan de zuidwest syde W 35 gr N 23 (r) 9 vt, mitsgaders diep 
aan de Z @ oost syde Z 36 gr W 87 (r) 4 vt en aan de noordwest syde 108 (r) 6 vt. 
 
No.8. Land geleegen omtrent ¼ uur gaans zuid oostwaerds buyten deese stadt aan de 
Noordoost syde van de Jacatrase heere weg door zyn edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck tot een 
beeste markt gedestineerd, thans bebout met twee houte pangons en khoestall, en met boom 
alleen beplant, belendend ten noordoosten met de groote Zuyderweg ten zuidwesten met de 
Jacatrase Heere weg, ten zuid oosten en noordwesten met differente particuliere, breed aan de 
noordoost syde N ten W 31 (r) en aan de zuidwest syde W 35 gr N 23 (r) 9 vt, mitsgaders diep 
aan de zuidoost syde Z  36 gr W 66 (r) 5 vt, en aan de noordwest syde 87 (r) 4 vt. 
 
No.9. Deese stuk compg: land door zyn Edelhyd Abraham van Riebeck aan de post Jacatra tot 
een coffythuyn gegeeven, werdende thans nog tot een thuyn en boom plantagie gebruykt 
geleegen omtren ¼ uur gaans be Z oosten deese stadt, en belendend ten zuidwesten met 
genoemde post en de Heere weg, ten noordoosten met de Groote Zuyder weg, ten zuidoosten 
met het Moorse Hospitaal en ten nordwesten met particuliere, breed aan de zuidwest syde, W 
35 gr N 24 (r) en aan de noordoost syde N ten W 53 (r), mitsgaders diep aan de noordwest 
syde Z 36 gr W 22 (r), versmallende alhier zuydwaerds W 35 gr N 16 (r) 4 vt en dan nog diep z 
38 gr W 32 (r) 4 vt en aan de zuidoost syde Z 36 gr W 31 roeden. 
 
No.10. Campong der Javaanen en Amboineesen, geleegen eeven buyten deese stadt, tusschen 
de Jacatrase en Sontaerse weg, door zyn Edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck aan den Capt. Soeta 
Wangsa ter wooning verleend, thans geheel bebouwd met houte en bamboese wooningen met 
panne gedekt, en nog eenige steeene gebouwen, belendend ten zuidwesten met de Jacatrase 
heere weg em de oude Chineese graven, ten noordoosten met de gegrave revier Sontaer, ten 
noordwesten en zuidoosten met differente persoonen, breed aan de zuidwest syde W 14 gr N 
25 roeden en aan de noordsyde W 7 gr N 30 roeden, mitsgaders diep aan de noordwest syde Z 
14 gr N 31 (r) 6 vt, verbreedende alhier noordwaerds w 14 gr N 49 roeden, vervolgens diep Z 
14 gr N 9 roeden 6 vt, versmallende alhier zuidoostwaerds W 14 gr N 15 (r) dan nog diep Z 14 
N 37 roeden nog versmallende zuidoostwaerds 10 roeden, en voor het laatste nog diep Z 14 gr 
N tot aan de Sontaerse revier 15 (r) aan de zuidoost syde is de diepte, eerst Z 14 gr N 42 (r) 6 
vt versmallende alhier noord westwaerds W 14 gr N 25 (r), alsdan diep Z 14 gr N 10 (r) ... 
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alhier zuidoostwaerds 25 (r) synde dan de diepte Z 14 gr N 20 roeden, berbreedende 
weederom zuidoostwaerds W 14 gr N 25 roeden alsdan is de diepte op de ... vers van Z 14 gr 
N 39 roeden alwaer het land nog versmalt W 14 gr N 25 roeden en voor het laatste nog diep 
tot aan de Sontaerse revier Z 14 gr N 23 roeden. 
 
No.11. De twee beveelen gemelte No.11 syn al lang geleeden onder differente persoonen 
vervallen. 
 
 No.12. Campong der Maccassaer, geleegen omtrent ¼ uur gaans bewesten deese stadt, aan de 
Noord syde van de Amanus gragt, door syn Edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck aan Day Matara 
tot wooning verleend, thans bebouwd met een Mohametaens tempel, veele steene wooningen 
en de ovrige opstallen van hout en bamboese met panne gedekt, belendend ten zuyden met de 
Heere weg langs de Amanus gragt, en verders rondom met differente particuliere, breed O en 
W 100 (r) mitsgaders diep zuid en noord meede 100 roeden.  
 
No.13. Deeser stuk Comp. Land, geleegen ruym ¼ uur gaans, beoosten deese stadt aan de 
noordsyde van de Amanus gragt door zyn Edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck aan eenige 
Christen Amboineesen en Macassaeren ten wooning verleend, veel van dit stuk dat onbebouwt 
en leedig geleegen heeft syn 26 roeden breedte, met de volle diepte van 100 roeden aan de heer  
comandeur Coest Roseboom, nog 30 roden breedte met de volle diepte aan d‘Edele Johannes 
Hartkop per taxatie geleveert, blyvende thans nog een strook van 8 roeden breedte en 100 
roeden diepte met eenige Macassaerse wooningen belet langs de Oosterringsloot aan d‘E 
comp: overige. 
 
No.14. Campong der Baliers en Boegineesen geleegen ruym  ½ uur gaans bewesten deese stadt 
door zyn Edelheyd Abraham van Riebeck aan Kiey Gustie Badaolo te wooning verleend thans 
voor het grootste gedeelt met houte en bamboese woonningen beset, met eenige steene 
peedakken, synde het overige ... land en Mohametaense graven belendend, bezuyder en 
benoorden de heere weg van Anke met differente persoonen, ten oosten meede met 
verscheyde eygenaer, en ten westen met den Wel ed: Gest: heer van der Sparre, Raad Ordinaris 
van Nederland Indie bakmeesteren, de post en revier van Anke, breed aan de zuyd zyde 31 Gr 
N 60 roeden en aan de Noorsyde 89 roden, mitsg: diep ten noord aan de westsyde langs de 
revier van Anke 123 roeden versmallende alhier oostwaerds 19 roeden, vervolgens diep ten N 
51 roeden verbredende wederom westwaerds O 4 Gr N 75 roeden dan diep ten N 30 roeden 
(springende?) alhier oostwaerds O 4 Gr N 75 roeden en dan nog diep tot de agterste sluyt... 
ten N meede 75 roeden en aan den oostsyde is de diepte ten N 233 roeden. 
 
No.15. Zekeere 3 beveelen E. Comp: land, gelegen omtrent ½ uur gaans bewesten deese stadt 
aan de noordsyde van de Bacharagts gragt door syn Edelheyd Abraham van Riebeck aan de 
Javanen tot een campong of woonplaats verleend, thans sorteerende onder capt: Baktie en met 
verscheyde houte en bamboese wooning beset, belend ten zuyden met de Bacharagts gragt en 
differente menschen, ten noorden en ten westen meede met particuliere, en ten oosten met 
een gemeene weg, breed oost ende aan de zuydsyde 15 roeden en aan de noordsyde 80 roeden 
mitsg: diep aande oostsyde eerst ter N 41 roeden verbreedende alhier oostwaerds 29 roeden en 
dan nog diep ten N 82 roeden en aan de west syde is de diepte ten N meede 41 roeden 
verbreedende alhier westwaerds 36 roeden en vervolgens diep tot agter ten N 82 roeden. 
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No.16. De Baliese Campong gemt: No.16 is al voor lange tyd onder verscheyde particuliere 
vervallen, synde de woonplaats van der Rebel capt: Boelilling geweest. 
 
No.17. Zeeker stuk land anno 1709, op den february door het Eerw: Collegie van Heeren 
Heemraden gekogt, en aan de post Mr. Cornelis gegeeven thans met eenige bamboese 
wooningen beset en het overige tot thuyne en clappus plantagie geaproprieerd, geleegen ruym 
2 uuren gaens bezuyden deese stadt in‘t ooster veld het 21 deel van ‘t blok L, belendend ten 
oosten met de passar, ten westen en zuyden met de groote revier, en ten noorden met het land 
Tsielemba van d‘ Ed: Jan van t‘ Hoft en een Moor, breed voor aan de oostsyde ten N 10 
roeden mitsg: diep oost en west aan de noordsyde 95 roeden. 
 
No.18.  Zeeker stukje Ed: Comp: land, thans bebouwd met eene steene wooning en een 
planke school, staande en geleegen eeven buyten deese stadt poort Uytregt of in‘t wester veld 
het be deel van ‘t blok S, belendend ten zuyden met de heere weg langs de Amanus gragt, en 
verders rondom met differente eygenaers, breed oost en west 5 roeden 6 vt, mitsgd: diep ten N 
11 roeden. 
 
No.19. Het erf gemt: No.19 is door heeren Heemraden voor eenige tydt aan den burger en 
wagen verhuurder ...veld verkogt.  
 
No.20. Zeeker stuk Ed: Comp: land, geleegen omtrent ¾ uur gaans beoosten deese stadt, by 
de post Zoutelande, synde het perceel t‘ welk aande Noordsyde van de Angiolse vaart geleegen 
door heer Heemraden voor eenige tyd, aan een Inlander verkogt, en het zuydelyke perceel, 
heeft gedeltelyk tot de onlangs gedaene vergrooting en versterking van gene post zoutelande 
verstrekt van dit perceel manqueerd de caart in neevens geend bestek. 
 
No.21. Zeeker stookje E. Comps: land gelegen eeven beoosten de Post Rijswijk omtrent ½ uur 
gaans bezuiden deze stad zynde thans door Heeren Heemraden met kas dyken verker, tegens 
het opperwater in de groote rivier. 
NB: Hiervan is meede geene caart in het bestek. 
 
No.22. Zeeker stuk E. Comp. Land, thans bebouwt met de Post Rijswijk en eenige bamboese 
wooning met een clappus plantagie staande en gelegen omtrent ½ uur gaans zuidwaerde buiten 
deze stad. Belendend ten oosten met de heer weg na Tanna Abang, ter westen met de rivier 
Crocot een de edele Jan ..., ten norden met de edele agtb. Heer Bleeck raad van justitie dezer 
casteels, en ten zuider met differente particuliere, breed aan de oost zyde Z 10 gronden 41 
roeden, en aande west zyde lange de rivier Crocot 19 roeden, meting: diep aan de zuid zyde 
0.50 gronden 18 roeden, versmallende alhier noordwaerds, Z 10 gronden 23 roeden en dan 
nog diep achter aan de rivier Crocot 0.50 gronden 39 roeden en aande noordzyde is de diepte 
eerst oost 10 gronden 8 roeden 9 vt, verbreedende alhier noorwaerds 8 vt en vas volgens nog 
diep oost 10 gronden 31 roeden. 
 
No.23. Zeker stuk aangespoeld Ed. Comp. land zynde thans voor heemraden oester bank 
geemploieerd, en bebouwd met eenige woningen van steek en hout, staande en gelegen 
omtrent 1 uur gaans beoosten deze stad. belendend ten  noordooster met slingerland, ten  
zuidwesten en noordwesten met de zee, en ten zuidoosten met de rivier Angiol, zynde in het 
begin afgestooken, W 31 gronden N 23 roeden breedte en W 40 gronden Z 52 roeden diep, 
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maar thans is door het  continueele af en aanspoelen de zee, dit terrain merkelijk verandert en 
vergroot. 
 
No.24. Zeker stuk ed. Comp. Land gelegen ruym 1 uur gaans beoosten deze stad aan de noord 
zyde van de Angiolse rivier, zynde van Comp. Wegen voor de leproosen gedestineerd. 
Belendend ten oosten met Slingerland, of een inlander, ten westen en ten zuiden met de rivier 
Angiol, en ten norden met de land Slingerland, breed aan de oostzyde N. Nwt. 310 roeden, 
mitsgader diep in differente coerser 320 roeden. Zynde voorigen door de loop van de rivier 
van Angiol menigt en beslooten. 
 
No.25. Zeeker 3 perceelen Ed. Comp: land, thans bebouwd met verschydene groote woningen 
dienende tot een hospital voor Europesen, staande en gelegen omtrent 1 ½ uur gaans 
bezuiden deze stad, tegens over de Post Nordwijk. Belendend ten noorden met de heer weg en 
differente persoonen, ten zuiden en ten westen meede met verschyde eigenaars en ten oosten 
met de groote rivier. Breed aan de noord zyde O 13 gronden Z 27 roeden en aan de zuid zyde 
O en W 200 roeden mitsgaders diep N 12 gronden W eerst 108 roeden verbreedende alhier 
westwaards, O en W 123 roeden en dan nog diep tot aande achterste sluyt linie N en Z 74 
roeden. 
 
No.26. Zeker stuk Ed. Comp. land gens. De javaanse campong, thans naar het zuydelijkste 
gedelte bebouwd met verschyde houte en bamboese woningen zynde het vorige of het 
noordlijkste meest vyvers of moeras, gelegen de noordwesten deze stad, aan de west zyde van 
de groote rivier, belendend ten zuiden met het plein, langs de vrymans haven, ten westen en 
ten noorden met de moerassige grond langs deze strand en de wester rivier, en ten ooster met 
de vlakte langs de Barm of westerhoofd van de groote rivier, breed oost en west 84 roeden 6 
vt, mitsgaders diep zuid en noord 69 roeden. 
 
No.27. Is de Chinese Campong be zuidwesten deze stad, behorende de erven en woningen 
allemaal aan differenten eigenaare, uitgesonderd twee perceelen, waar op de Europeese 
wachten staan, en die zeer weinig terrain beslagen. 
 
No.28. De zelver steen pedakken met de annexe grond gemt. No 28 zijn reets voor lange tijd 
onder verschydene particuliere vervallen. 
 














2. The Heemraden’s spending and income between 1685/6 – 1700/1 as reported by 
Reikert Heere (the secretary of the Heemraden) 
 
Korte samentrekkinge van de lasten en uitgiften gedaan door Heeren Heemraden tot Batavia 
het sedert anno 1685/6 tot anno 1700/1 waar men de jaarlijkste vergelijkinge en de toe en 
afneminge der lasten cortelijk kan bespeuren te weten. 
 
(1) In Rijksdaalder 
Anno 1685/6 1686/7 1687/8 1688/9 1689/90 1690/1 1691/2 1692/3 
Betaalde 
Ongelden voor 
























































































van het collegie 
-- 
 
-- -- -- 28 ½ /m 
931 
276 276 276 


























































Landmeters loon -- 150 60 -- -- 157 ½  180 180 
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(2) In Rijksdaalder 
Anno 1693/4 1694/5 1695/6 1696/7 1697/8 1698/9 1699/1700 1700/1 
Betaalde 
Ongelden voor 




























































































van het collegie 
291 336 336 336 336 336 -- 18/m 
504 
Het loon der 
bode 




12 ½ /m 
250 






































Landmeters loon 180 
 
180 180 180 180 180 180 11/m 
165 
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209 2/3  
 















































































(3) In Rijksdaalder 
Anno 1701/2 1702/3 1703/4 1704/5 1705/6 1706/7 1707/8 1708/9 
Betaalde 
Ongelden voor 


























































































van het collegie 
316 276 276 276 276 276 345 207 
Het loon der 
bode 
11 ½ /m 
239 
276 336 342 336 336 420 252 






































Landmeters loon 180 180 180 180 180 180 232 180 
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Korte samentrekkinge ofte verthoninge vande inkomsten van het collegie van Heeren 
Heemraden tot Batavia het sedert het jaar 1685/6 tot anno 1700/1 waaruit men de jaarlijkse 
vergelijkinge en de toe en afneminge der voordeelen in het korte kan bespeuren te weten 
 
(1) In Rijksdaalder 
Anno 1685/6 1686/7 1687/8 1688/9 1689/90 1690/91 1691/2 1692/3 
Particuliere 
Collecten tot het 
maken van 
bruggen 




















anno 1685/6 rds 
3137 tot het maken 
van de Tangerangse 
weg ter ordre van de 































































































































Pagt voor de 


















Ditto voor het 





















van de pady voor 
tiende de landerijen, 
de laaste post en 
overgebleve restantje 

















De intresten van 












































































































inkomsten soo veel 
door de gewesene 























(2) In Rijksdaalder 
Anno 1693/4 1694/5 1695/6 1696/7 1697/8 1698/9 1699/1700 1700/1 
Particuliere 
Collecten tot het 
maken van 
bruggen 
Daar onder voor 
anno 1685/6 rds 
3137 tot het maken 
van de Tangerangse 
weg ter ordre van de 












































































































































Pagt voor de 


















Ditto voor het 






















van de pady voor 
tiende de landerijen, 
de laaste post en 
overgebleve restantje 

















De intresten van 














































































































inkomsten soo veel 
door de gewesene 























(3) In Rijksdaalder 
Anno 1701/2 1702/3 1703/4 1704/5 1705/6 1706/7 1707/8 1708/9 
Particuliere 
Collecten tot het 
maken van 
bruggen 
Daar onder voor 
anno 1685/6 rds 
3137 tot het maken 
van de Tangerangse 
weg ter ordre van de 
































































































































Pagt voor de 


















Ditto voor het 





















van de pady voor 
tiende de landerijen, 
de laaste post en 
overgebleve restantje 

















De intresten van 











































































































inkomsten soo veel 
door de gewesene 























Source: KITLV H 387. 
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3. Report about paddy cultivation by Aria Surawinata, 1694 
 
Pady gaga is zulk die inde boven landen aan het gebergten werd geplant als: 
Pady koas werd naar verkoop van 2 ½ / m afgesneden 
 
Pady pandak } werd met de 3 maanden gesneden 
Pady hawara } 
 
De volgende schiet wat langsamer op, en mag voor de 4 1/2  of 5 maanden, niet ingesamelt 







Pady grogol  } heeft geen staarten (of hayren) is goed voor paarden 
Pady Tzjokrom } 





Pady Salak gadin 







Pady mera geeft rood rijs 
De pady kittan in gebergten werd genaamt: 
Pady kittan itam 
Pady kittan mera 
Pady kittan koening 
Pady kittan parasary 
Pady kittan gaadje 
Pady kittan lomboe 
Pady kittan poho dilakki 
Pady kittan Tzjokor en 
Pady kittan nanka 
 
Het volgende is pady zawa, en werd op de velden in de lege landen gesayt, als: 
Pady seri koenin moet na dat se 40 of 50 dagen is gesayt, weder uit getrokken en naar verloop 
van 3 ½ maand (de voorsz: dagen  daar onder gerekend) gesneden werden. 
Pady mogol als vooren, en geeft roode rijs 
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Pady menoer ditto 
Pady malaty  -- 
Pady katoembaran met de 4 maanden 
Pady ketak kutik, kan men de 2 ½ maanden insamelix, maar groeyt niet omtrent Batavia maar 
wel op Banten, en Sirrebon 
 
Deze volgende pady moet vier en ½ of 5 maanden op het veld staan als: 
Pady lampoejanan 









Pady kidan kantzjana 
Pady manjanan mangalar 
Pady baly 
Pady te tambon 
 
Pady rasse  } geeft roode ruijkende rijs 
Pady sisip naga  }  
 
Pady de dappan } roode rijs 
Pady gadonhan } 
Pady panpanaren } 
 
Pady kittan lomboe 
Pady kittan gaadje 
Pady kittan holik 
Pady kittan goblak 
Pady kittan itam swarte rijs 
Pady kittan aban roode rijs 
Pady kittan baly 
Pady kittan goelabre 
Padyy kittan segaking 
 
Getranslateerd Batavia 
Den 15-17 February 1694. 
 






4. The Heemraden’s list of sugar-mill in the Ommelanden  
(Registered between 11 December 1766 to 16 January 1767) 
 
Namen der Moolens     Hun de zelver 
eigenaars getaal 



















Pondok Lankap 1  d‘ heer van Basel Tjakon 5 maanden 892.21 
Oedjon Menteen, Comp. 
land, onder Heemraden 
2 d‘ heer Wypkens    --- 4 ½ --- 1512.12  
te samen 
Cali Abang 1 d‘ heer Sanders Baccassie 
landwaart in 
6    --- 1260.10 
Cadauon 1     --         ---           --- 6    --- 1260.nihil 
Tolok Boeyon 1     --         ---       --- 7    --- 1500.----- 
Tana Doea Ratoes, 
Comp. land, onder 
Heemraden 
2  d‘E. Van Jansen    Baccassie aan 
d‘overzyde 
5    --- 2950.----- 
Tollok Ansana, Comp. 
land, onder Soeta 
Wangsa 
2   --           ---       --- 5 ¼ --- 2460.----- 
Karang Tjon-ok, Comp. 
land, een inlander 
2 lieutenant Kou 
Tjanko 
      --- 7    --- 3800.14 
te samen 
Pangalinan Tengha 1 d‘ heer Sanders        --- 5 2/3 -- 1350.10 
Kabaleen 2    --          ---       --- 5 ½ --- 3000.12 
Tolok Poetjon 1    --          ---       --- 6 1/3 -- 1590.20 
Pangalinan Baroe 2    --          ---       --- 5 ½ --- 2640.20 
te samen 
Selemba 2    --      Mohr Grote rivier 4 2/3 -- 2550.30 
Tjikoko 1    --        ---    ---     --- 4 1/10-- 825.30 
Wester Tanjong 3 d‘ E. Duurkoop    ---     --- 6 9/10 2100  
een 70 
Cabantanan 2 d‘erfgen. van de 
wed. Lafarque 
De Vinke vaart 6 17/30-- 1800.nihil 
 
Lagoa 1 d‘erfgen van Pieter 
Theunis 
De Troesan 5 ½ --- 1700.----- 
[382] Assan 1 meer van der Spaar Passangrahan 
aan d‘ Ooster 
kant 
3 --- 787.nihil 
Kobon Jorok of Klappa 
Doea 
2 d‘ heer Bangeman          --- 5 ½ --- 3150.----- 
Paningaran of Pancalan 2 meer van der Spaar Passangrahan 
aan de Wester 
kant 
3  --- 665. 
een 40 
Pondok Poton 1 Tan Tjanlon          --- 5  --- 1450.30 
Prigi  1   --      ---          --- 4 14/15-- 1500.nihil 
Pondok Tjabe 1 d‘ heer Winter en 
Behrens 
         --- 4 14/15-- 870.----- 
Tjilidoek, comp. land, 
onder Heemraden 
4 d‘ heer Sanders Anke (2 aande 
Oost kant en 2 
aan de West 
kant) 
5  --- 4800.----- 
Pondok Soroet 2    --            --- Anke aan de 5  --- 2150.----- 
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Oost kant 
Leenkon 2 (1 Arnolda Schulp, 
1 de wed. Ong 
Engsay) 
Sidani aan de 
Oost kant 
5 ½ --- 2700.een 4 
Tjikokol/ NB deze haar 
privilegie casseert ult. 
Juny 1767 
2 de wed. Nie 
Hoekon 
        --- 7 1/30 -- 3825.nihil 
Babakan 2 Juff. Huysvoorn         --- 4   --- 2500.----- 
Batoe Tjeper en 
Cadauon 
2   --          ---           Mokeervaart aan 
de West kant 
5 6/15 -- 3300.----- 
Bataoe Tjeper di blakan 
of Cadauon 
2   --          ---         --- 6  --- 3632.----- 
Pakodjan of Concordia 2 d‘heer Jan Coning         --- 5 7/30 -- 2750.----- 
Paran Koeda  3    ---    Wypkens Sidani aan de 
Weest kant 
3 2/3 ---  1900.----- 
Wester Cadauon 4    ---    Mossel C.S. Sidani (2 aan de 
Oost kant, 2 aan 
de Oost kant) 
6  --- 6000.----- 
Sala Padjan 3    ---         ---- Sidani aan de 
Oost kant 
3 17/30 2990.----- 
Boedjon Ringit 3 d‘ heer Sanders         --- 5  --- 4810.----- 
Tollok Naga 2 juff. Huysvoorn         --- 6 ½ --- 3900.----- 
Pacayanghan 1  --          --- Sidani aan de 
West kant 
2 1/10 --- 456.2 
Campong Malayoe 2  --          --- Sidani aan de 
Oost kant 
7 ½ --- 4800.nihil 
Tagal Anghoes 3 Tan Soenko C.S. Sidani aan de 
West kant 
6 5/6 --- 6300.----- 
Campong Lemo of 
Daalvliet 
1 juff. Huysvoorn Sidani aan de 
Oost kant 
8 21/30 --- 2100.----- 
Dadap of Laylap 2  --          --- ¼ uur van strant 2 ¼  --- 990.----- 
Camal, Comp. land, 
onder Heemraden 
2 d‘heer Greving ½ uur van strant 4    --- 1860.----- 
Capok 1   --           --- Anke aan de 
West kant 
5 ½ --- 1650.----- 
Anke  2   --           ---         --- 5   --- 2400.----- 



















5. The Inventory of Susanna Staal’s sugar-mill 
 
Ben Ik Jacob Reguleth notaris publicq bij de Hooge regeringe van Nederlands India 
geadmitteerd binnen der stad Batavia residerende nevens de ondergenoemde getuigen verzocht 
en verscheenen op het land van Juffrouw Susanna Staal, weduwe wijlen de edele Joan 
Treuijtman de oude zalr:, gelegen aande westzijde van de groote rivier buiten dezer stad tegen 
over het Noordwijk ende aldaar op het verzoek van haar ed: zoon en gemagtigde de edele 
Joannes Treuijtman, cornet van de burgerlijk cavallerije alhier, opgenomen en geinventariseerd 
hebbe de zuikermolen met de op- en dependentien van dien op het voormelte land staande 
ende gelegen bestaande in het volgende namentlijk: 
 
- het opstal van een zuikermolen met pannen gedekt met een paar maalsteenen 
- 1 zuiker packhuis met pannen gedekt 
- 1 kleinder zuiker packhuis met pannen gedekt 
- 1 buffels loots met adap gedekt 
- 20 stuks ijzere kookpannen 
- 2 stuks stoele koelpannen 
- 2 stuks drumpel ijzers 
- 2 groote ijzere forcken 
- 1 ijzere pers in een houte kas genaamd Leeuw dienende aan off voor de maalsteenen 
- 7 stuks ijzere beugels genaamd atie-atie 
- 3 stuks kopere schuyms pannen 
- 4 lange vierkante ijzers waar op de kookpannen rusten 
- 2 platte ijzere sift lepels 
- 8 ijzere nootjes 
- 6 ijzere platte nootjes 
- 3 ijzere zuiker schrapers  
- 1 ijzere zuikerpers 
- 1 ijzere hoopschepper 
- 2 stuks groote kromme zagen 
- 2 stuks groote rechte zagen 
- 4 Chineese ijzere ploegen met de ijzere bladen daar bij behoorende 
- 1 groote ijzere ham ofte harck 
- 20 zo oude als nieuwe houwelen 
- 3 stuckende houwelen 
- 1 stuckende bijl 
- 1 schop 
- 2 oud en onbruikbaar schop 
- 11 hangslooten 
- 3 Chineese parrings 
- 8 kromme parrings 
- 1 lange parring 
- 2 kou bijtels 
- 1 stuckende en onbruikbaare dommekracht 
- 1 kromme dissel 
- 1 merk ijzer 
- 3 groote houte mokers 
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- 1 groote daats met zijn gewigt 
- 1 kleine daats met zijn gewigt 
- 1 compas 
- 2 houte ploegen 
- 600 stuks passos 
- 40 stuckende passos 
- 118 stuks passos voeten 
- 10 stuks groote syroop balijs 
- 5 stuks kleine syroop balijs 
- 2 platte syroop balijs 
- 2 meet syroop balijs 
- 7 water syroop balijs 
- 2 schep syroop balijs 
- 87 stuks groote wannen 
- 42 cannassers met oude zuiker 
- 16 stuks buffels karren 
- 25 stuks buffels alzo 2 stuks wegh gestolen en 6 stuks gestorven zijn 
- 275 moot en brandhout 
- 17 ½ laxa ofte 175000 stoelen zuiker dewelke a uzo aan de voors: zuikermolen moeten 
werden gemaakt 
- 2 Chinees chiampans of zuikerprauwen 
 
aldus opgenomen op het voors: land van Juffrouw Treuijtman voornoemt in presentie van 
Samuel Anthonys en Cornelis Fiers clercq als getuigen. 
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